

**THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION OF
DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY**

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for the degree of Ph.D.**

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract		4
Acknowledgements		6
Chapter I	S.1	Education, politics and democracy 7
	S.2	On defining democracy 18
	S.3	Liberalism and democracy 22
	S.4	Boundaries, Institutions, and values 37
	S.5	Towards a new analysis of democracy and education 41
Chapter II	S.1	Introduction 49
	S.2(a)	Schumpeter and value-free democracy 51
	S.2(b)	Education, training and socialization 61
	S.3	Dahl and polyarchy 67
	S.4	Downs and economic democracy 81
	S.5	Tullock, Riker and the disposal of social responsibility 89
	S.6	Knowledge, information and the new democrats 100
	S.7	Conclusion 107
Chapter III	S.1	Introduction 118
	S.2	Locke and the Levellers 125
	S.3	Rousseau, consent and education 141
	S.4	Kant 160
	S.5	Green 173
	S.6	J.S. Mill 178
	S.7	Conclusion 181
Chapter IV	S.1.	Introduction 190
	S.2.	Market Democracy and Utilitarianism 191
	S.3.	Citizenship, Market Democracy and Education 198
	S.4.	Market Democracy and the aims of Education 205
	S.5.	Market Democracy and the Curriculum 214
	S.6.	Concluding Remarks 223

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Chapter V	S.1	Introduction	229
	S.2(a)	What should the moral democrat know?	230
	S.2(b)	Moral democracy and Political Education	241
	S.3(a)	Is Moral Democracy possible?	244
	S.3(b)	The Moral Democrat and work	249
	S.4.	The Enigma of Liberal Democracy	253
		Concluding remarks on themes which have emerged in this essay	259

ABSTRACT

An initial attempt is made to draw connections between politics and education. A paradox exists in finding education ultimately dependent upon social and political values. The paradox is that as a result of a drastic revision of the concept of liberal democracy much more can be said about education than was previously possible in its treatment as a self-contained concept. Liberal democracy is essentially a hybrid of two rival value constellations, market and moral democracy.

In the second chapter different varieties of market democracy are considered as diverse as elitism and economic democracy. No variant of market democracy entails the intention to educate critical citizens, merely an acquiescence in socialization and training.

The third chapter expounds the moral conception of democracy. Thinkers from the Levellers to Green are examined in the cause of elucidating this concept. The latter entails the educational aim of a critical citizen.

The educational implications of market democracy are developed in chapter four. For the majority of the population material for reflecting upon the values and institutions of society, and diverse forms of life, will be absent from the formal curriculum, either because such material is the province of an elite, or because short-run individual utility is considered the only worthwhile goal.

In chapter five a connection is established between moral democracy and the disciplines traditionally thought to be "intrinsically" worthwhile, on the basis of the opportunities and encouragement the latter provide for reflection upon different forms of life and the critical assessment of institutions and values in society. Additionally the drastic curriculum changes

which follow from a participatory democracy are also examined. Finally the fundamental importance of the moral conception of democracy for the justification and continuation of liberal democracy is noted. This suggests the moral aim must have priority in relation to educational aims and curricula content in a liberal democracy.

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Chapter I - Introduction

i. Education, politics, and democracy

The traditional divide between liberal and totalitarian democracy has resulted largely in a state of acquiescence in the philosophy of education, in a paradigm of liberal democracy now dangerously redundant. Just as totalitarianism outdates Aristotelian classification of government, so it is also true that the notion of liberal democracy is itself outdated. This is not to say that a contrast still cannot be drawn between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. It is rather that developments within liberal democracy, occurring to some extent as a result of alarm at the phenomenon of totalitarianism, have produced divisions so great as to amount to rival conceptions of democracy. If, however, philosophers writing about education continue to defer only to the traditional liberal democratic paradigm then the implications of these rival conceptions of democracy for education are entirely missed.

As long as liberal democracy is expounded in the light of a contrast with totalitarianism, it appears a coherent whole, and of considerable significance. In such a frame of reference the existence of multi-party systems, secret ballots, independent judiciaries, and quinquennial parliaments appears to be quintessential of liberal democracy. If however one abandons this polarisation of liberal democracy and instead focuses attention upon constellations of values within liberal democracy, a marked rivalry between these sets becomes apparent. The most concrete manifestation of these competing models of democracy is to be found in the preoccupation with controlling the political activity and behaviour of the vast majority of the population. These rival constellations have been endemic in

political philosophy and ethics for a long period of time, (1) but have developed both momentum and sophistication in recent years. I shall seek to argue in particular for two conceptions of democracy, which I label moral and market theories of democracy. The distinction is novel insofar as it has not been acknowledged previously by philosophers of education. (2) To the extent that the concept of democracy has figured at all in education, and arguably it has not figured very much, the discussion proceeds for the most part as if democracy was an unproblematic concept. (3)

Now if one does concentrate on the institutions and procedural principles of liberal democracy and compares them with totalitarianism, then indeed liberal democracy appears unproblematic. For the rival schemes of democracy I shall identify would all want to endorse regular and supervised elections, independent judiciaries, and an uncensored press. Yet only in the case of what I term moral democracy, do the values actually provide a firm measure of support to such institutions. If these rival conceptions of democracy exist, as I contend they do, then liberal democracy is essentially a hybrid, tenable as long as it is contrasted with totalitarianism, and because of the underpinning provided by the moral conception of democracy.

I shall discuss the different strands within the market and moral conceptions of democracy and their implications for education. It will be argued that moral democracy is a preferable conception to market democracy, and its implications for education will be established.

My preliminary considerations in this introductory chapter relate to problems in defining democracy, and also to making general points about the link between democracy and education. This enables my positive thesis to be developed in subsequent chapters.

Any attempt at an analysis of the concept of democracy faces formidable problems, particularly if it is conducted with an eye to its relationship to education. That there are empirical connections between democracy and education is true, but for philosophy unremarkable. In particular, such connections are found, on examination, to be in the nature of a functional relationship, such that the higher the general level of education within a society, the greater the probability that it will be a democratic society. (4) The social scientific problems immanent in such an analysis, such as the matter of the direction of causality, are not my immediate concern. What I do wish to point out is that however strong the probability of the above hypothesis, its primary interest is in the conditions for the existence and continuance of democracy, and not in the meaning of democracy.

I regard it as the business of philosophers in this sphere to be essentially concerned in elucidating conceptual connections, leaving empirical issues to sociologists and psychologists; that for example empirical issues are not as value free as the latter claim. This activity is of good philosophical vintage.

Nonetheless in elucidating the concepts of democracy and education, philosophers are bound to pay some attention to institutional and empirical features. Some statements may arise which though normative, are also sensitive to empirical considerations. For example political equality might be deemed a necessary condition of democracy. Beyond political equality as a value there is the further consideration of what institutional arrangements are empirically necessary and what arrangements might be merely contingent in realizing that value. (5) An empirically necessary arrangement for realizing that value might be universal adult suffrage. Now

the statement about political equality is sensitive to empirical considerations to this extent, that if it were the case that a legislative change occurred whereby only some adults were able to vote instead of all adults, the latter would, *ceteris paribus*, tell against the value, political equality, and indicate that the term 'democracy' was being incorrectly applied in this case.

Another celebrated example of this problem is that of the rational, informed citizen, operating through a sovereign legislature, and postulated to a varied extent in Locke, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and Green. Research by political sociologists, together with advances in psychology, has made the concept of the rational chooser, the democratic man, and the sovereign legislature, highly disputable concepts. This of course does not lead an exponent of this view with no reply, but it does make it incumbent on him to reply. (6)

The above points are related to the tension between the conceptual and empirical, which also exists in the enterprise of education. Here the notion of what it is to be educated, and the values and prescriptions encapsulated by the concept of education, may be so incommensurate with the end products of that activity, that there may be pressure for the concept to be revised, or the suggestion made that the techniques employed in the activity are gravely at fault. (7) The latter is important. Of course a determined autocracy can maintain a notion of what it is to be educated that is applicable only to the members of a stultifying bureaucracy, but I am concerned here with the relationship between democracy and education, and in particular with that between particular conceptions of democracy and education. Ultimately the view that one takes off the constraints which democracy imposes on the notion of what it is to be educated, depends crucially upon what sort of democrat one is. This may be tautological, but it

is hardly trivial. It may well have appeared trivial when philosophers of education were confident of an agreed democratic paradigm. In general the latter appears to amount to a belief in the participation by all in the direction and policies of an institution. Thus Hirst* in the *Logic of Education* finds it necessary to argue against the "democratization" of educational institutions on the grounds that the inmates of such institutions are of too immature years to qualify as citizens.

Richard Peters ** also considers the contribution which the schools might make to democracy in terms of learning and practising taking part in democratic discussion. This presupposes that participation has a role to play in a democracy.

However uncontroversial such points might have appeared, it is part of the objective of the second and third chapters of this thesis to demonstrate that logically there are in fact great differences between professing democratic theorists differences not merely of degree but of values and purposes. The fourth and fifth chapters show that these differences have important implications for education. It is easy to see that a democratic elitist (8) could propose a "practical" programme consisting of a recondite schooling for a few and a utilitarian workshop training for the majority. Such a programme would be incompatible with the values of an adherent of the moral conception of democracy, and also repugnant.

Of course there are limits beyond which the elitist has to say of a particular educational ideal, that it is not democratic. One candidate for this would be the philosopher-king ideal of Plato. It is not so much that few could ever attain it as a cognitive achievement, but rather that it was indissolubly connected with virtue, and thus, correspondingly few could ever have any authoritative say on the direction in which society should move. The latter is a moral function, and an educational aim appropriate to the moral conception of democracy, is one which actively promotes such a function to the vast majority of the school population. A democratic

*)
**) See Footnotes

elitist could endorse this position only nominally. The difference between the platonic philosopher-king and the democratic elitist is that the latter is supposed to endorse regular electoral choice between competing elites. (9) I shall argue subsequently that on this view it is the groups, largely, that make judgements about where society ought to be going and the electorate which endorses one path rather than another. If the elitist favours democracy at all, it is unclear how his restriction on the electorate here can be other than arbitrary. (10)

Clearly in the most general sense all educational theories may be construed as political theories. (11) This is not merely because the organization of the educational system will be a relevant factor in the consideration of any ruling elite hypothesis, but also because the educational system can transmit norms of citizenship, directly or indirectly, through influencing political attitudes. The merits of free enterprise and the sanctity of monarchy can be innocuously conveyed, without any structured approach in the form of the subject "civics". It may be highly pertinent to a consideration about how far a particular society is a democratic society, to be aware that senior civil servants and the cabinet members of the governing party, though ostensibly performing different tasks in government, went to the same band of selective schools and share the same attitudes and beliefs. Such persons, who have attained the pinnacle of the educational system, may themselves be directly involved in preparing and influencing policy measures, or framing a criticism of such measures. In addition, the educational system will form a ladder of occupational selection and mobility. This may mean, for example, that high status occupations are open, in the vast majority of cases, only to those with a private schooling. This leads to issues of

how far the society in question is an open society, and also about how far some occupations are 'political', such as the law, in the sense of reflecting a particular spectrum of values.

The above points are primarily sociological in so far as they exhibit links between different sub-systems of society, such as work and education. However the issues may be of interest to philosophers, though they may ask different questions. More dramatically, and of more interest to philosophers, education has figured centrally in programmes to reform and regenerate society. For Rousseau, (12) education was the means of both regenerating and reproofing man against the corruption of societal institutions. For Plato, education was the vehicle for perpetuating the status quo, via selection and stratification. In totalitarian societies, education has been the means for the infusion of loyalty to the norms of the party, and in capitalist democracies, the indirect means for sustaining civic attitudes and loyalties, and economic and political viewpoints.

Whilst these points indicate in a very general way that the educational system can fulfil certain functions within society, such as providing a means for social mobility, I am concerned with the nature of the connection, if any, between the political system and the educational system, primarily from the point of view of philosophical entailment. That given a particular conception of democracy certain implications necessarily follow for education. (13)

It seems necessary before making some observations about conceptual features of democracy to pay some attention to changes in modes of doing philosophy. Political philosophy has seen a considerable undulation in its fortunes since Plato. For my purposes note ought to be taken of the affinity between "grand design" political philosophy of Plato and Rousseau, and the rebirth of political

philosophy under Nozick and Rawls. Prior to logical positivism, the notion of philosophers saying something, not merely about what it was to know something, or what was entailed in saying that something was good or right, but also about the implications of the latter considerations for how societies ought to be governed and organized, was acceptable. The merit of this grand design philosophy for my present purposes, is that it made overt certain connections between politics and education; in particular it made explicit the moral and epistemological presuppositions in the former.

Grand design philosophy recognized a corpus of questions which provided a conceptual link between the enterprises of politics and education. What things can be known? What things are worth knowing? Can all men know these things? Is knowledge of how men ought to live different from or a compound of other sorts of knowledge? Is it available to all? Supposing that with Plato we answer the question, what things can be known, in terms of a distinction between general terms and particulars, such that knowledge comprises acquaintance with the "essence" of general terms, and opinion encompasses only acquaintance with the referents of particulars. The consequent superiority of knowledge to belief will demand not merely a superior intellect, but will also licence an hierarchical morality in which, for the ordinary man, virtue will be found in acceptance of the edicts of those who possess the knowledge of how one ought to live. There is no notion here of knowledge being provisional and truth being an aegis under which debate and discussion might produce further advance. The very perfection of the Platonic Forms logically entailed their inertia, and in turn ossified the social structure. With such preconditions the function of the educational system was essentially conservative, subservient to a

static societal model. Again, with Rousseau, there was the same dependence of his philosophy of education, on the theoretical scheme of his "grand design". His subordinate placing of reason vis a vis the passions permits him to insist on the importance of equality in the face of different degrees of reasoning power, and his empiricism removes any epistemological warrant for a privileged access to ethical truths, though it does not discount reference to experience in the running of political institutions. The aim of education here was the regeneration of society and the establishment of a virtuous citizenry. (14)

Grand design philosophy highlights two features: a key to perfectibility, and a lack of autonomy for education. The latter point calls for immediate comment. I want to propose two senses in which it might be used:-

1. That what counts as the achievement of being educated in a particular society is always a reflection of institutionalised norms and values.
2. That teachers and pupils are inhibited from questioning current norms and mores.

The first sense in which this is used is logically true, the second is a contingent factor depending on the particular society in question: it is not true, for example, in relation to the moral conception of democracy.

Societies cherish aims which themselves fashion what it is necessary or desirable to know in succeeding generations. These aims, though there may be some dispute as to how far they are political in character, cannot ultimately take effect without the attention of the political structure, even if it be only an acquiescence in the wholesale conduct

of schooling in the private sector. The link between the political structure and educational aims is at its acme in Plato. Here there is genuinely no difference between educational and political criteria in deciding what should be taught, though questions about when and how they should be taught remain. The point about the Platonic political system is that it leads to a lack of autonomy in sense (2). This, as I have suggested is not a necessary feature which must always occur in the relationship between education and politics. It is possible to envisage a situation, where for example, the pupil studying history was taught about widely different political regimes from his own simply because it was considered desirable by those prescribing history syllabuses. Clearly pupils may in this situation evolve views critical of their own political regime, a fact not pleasing to some politicians or possibly to the general public. (15) Here education enjoys a measure of autonomy in sense (2).

It happens of course in the Platonic system that there is a condition (rule by philosophers), the realization of which will transform the existing imperfections into an ideal state of affairs. Since knowledge of this ideal is the preserve of the few initiating the change, it follows that steps merely to implement the condition, and no more than the implementation, no criticism or further examination, are either appropriate or necessary. Moreover, the means of implementation will themselves be prescribed insofar as they are a function of and subject to the presuppositions surrounding the panacea in question. What we are offered in education is thus a programme from the existing state of affairs to the 'new' state of affairs, such that we can always ask and answer why such an item is prohibited, why another is included, why one is stressed and so on. In Platonic Grand Design, the product of the educational system is not therefore the critic of the idea

principle, but its disciple. Education here, is not therefore an open-ended activity, but an endorsement of what is held to be both possible and valuable.

Supposing, however, that a philosophical system was to embody the notion of the critical citizen, as in participatory democratic theory, then the notion above, would itself be open for assessment. Here again it appears that education would not be autonomous in sense (1), in that it would be expressing a particular ideal. But we need to qualify this point. One of the characteristics of the Platonic model is the unity of purpose it exhibits. This is a contingent feature. A society may be pluralistic in that it embodies several competing ideals: it will be no less a society for that. The paradox of the critical citizen idea is that it thrives on the presentation of alternative social goals, ideals, and life styles. Thus though education is not autonomous in sense (1) it is expressing an ideal that is open-ended. Sense (1) is logically true, as I have suggested, in that I cannot envisage a society in which it was possible to have completely autonomous education. That is, the provision of education will always reflect a particular value(s) on the part of the society in question, even if it was merely of individual utility. If we ask the question in a given society, concerning what is taught and receive the reply that teachers teach what they like, this still represents a value position.

On the matter of democracy, I take it that if a particular conception of democracy had the idea of improvement of its citizens implicit, it would seem that it would have to acknowledge the necessity for the provision of education. I do not refer here to just any sort of improvement, such as the finer acquisition of vocational skills. Rather I am concerned with the acquisition of those modes of thought which enable a citizen to evaluate different courses of action within

society. It may be that the latter will require the acquisition of some skills, such as financial decision-making (16), but what is essential is equipping the individual to be a moral agent. The latter requires the capability for choice, whether in relation to national politics, work, or domestic life. It seems that within what I term "moral" democratic theory, it would be contradictory to declare of any person both that I intend to educate him, and that I intend him to sustain no improvement of a cognitive kind. Examples of such improvements might include the sampling and development of tastes in literature, the mastering of quantitative techniques, and the elaboration of conceptual schemes in general.(17) Of course this does not obviate the need to consider whether such an individual can in fact be produced by that particular society. According to one influential "market" theorist such an issue was not squarely faced by older theorists. It is at all events an issue on which some comment will have to be made here.

ii. On defining democracy

It is now fashionable within political philosophy to start from an "original" position, stipulating various conditions, and arguing from there for various entailments of a procedural and substantive kind. (19) Because this is so recent, it has not contributed much to any understanding of democracy. (20) Prior to this there seems to have been considerable malaise over the "meaning" of democracy, and difficulty in defining democracy. (21) At an elementary level this may seem to arise from the diverse uses to which the word has been employed. Bewilderment arises at the seemingly contradictory referents, such as American capitalism and Russian communism, plus a desire to discover which system is in fact a democracy. The latter implies that there must be some litmus test for this purpose. At

an esoteric level the assumption is made that, since "A is a democracy" is in the grammatical form of a statement, this is a sufficient condition for insisting that it is capable of being true or false. I shall later claim that the latter leads to insuperable difficulties in any analysis of democracy. It has been suggested that the concept of democracy is meaningless (22); others have proceeded by identifying democracy wholly with their current political system (23), and it has also been claimed that democracy is a concept quite properly to be disputed over, without any hope of a final conclusion. (24)

It will, I think, be granted that we can engage in everyday discourse without scholastic precision in the meaning and use of terms, and without troubling too much about technical distinctions between connotation and denotation, and the importance of speech acts. There is of course no necessary connection between controversy over a policy, practice, or institution, and controversy over its meaning and use. Thus, for example, the issue of Nationalisation has been a controversial policy item in post war British politics, yet there seems little difficulty in settling the meaning of the term Nationalisation, namely by referring to those instances where the government of the day passes a bill into law authorizing the payment of the industries shareholders, and the establishment of a Public Board to run the industry. Yet though there has been agreement on what counts as Nationalisation, there has been a very different attitude towards it from different groups.

On the other hand, we may say of the concept democracy, that there is little difficulty in assessing the attitude towards it, namely that it is in general, favourable. Its connotation, in other words, is favourable. Yet in the central sense of meaning the former will not help very much, in that we cannot say that the meaning of a term is its connotation. For grant that there is a favourable attitude

to democracy, suppose also that there is some paradigmatic sense of democracy to be found analagous to the way in which the word apple names and corresponds to the fruit apple. In what possible way then could we make anything of the fact that diverse political systems claim to be democracies, and also that democracy is approved. For we would be prevented from identifying the one to one correspondence in which our theory of meaning prescribed.

There is a more subtle difficulty with the paradigm search in the theory of democracy, but I would like first to mention one possible and influential alternative which has been employed by some writers on democracy. Recognising the discrepancies and diversities of belief about democracy, they have circumvented the difficulty by claiming that a particular political system is "real" or "true" democracy. (25) Now there is a logical fallacy in this move, which is I think quite fatal to any such enterprise. What in effect has happened is that such persons are guilty of assuming what they have set out to prove. Thus, supposing I want to show that a political system, P, is a democracy, and that I proceed to do this by claiming that it is a democracy by virtue of containing features S, T and J, this manoeuvre would be evidently circular. I would first have to establish that features S, T and J, were necessary and/or sufficient conditions for democracy, and only then could I conclude that system P was a democracy.

A rather different ploy would be to suggest that any analysis of the concept of democracy would be vitiated by the fact that it is an emotive word. (26) By this I take it that what is meant is that the word excites approval. We may agree that typically the word excites approval, but beyond this I am not sure what we are supposed to conclude. Though the fact that the word democracy excites approval when it is used may tell us something, it cannot, I suggest, tell us

what democracy means. We can, I think, adduce ready explanations of why people approve of democracy and do not therefore need to fall into the trap of insisting that the term democracy has some special emotive meaning.

I have mentioned the emotive theory of meaning here simply because it has had a powerful effect in discussions centering on democratic theory. In the hands of W.B. Gallie (27) it leads to a result where one definition of democracy is equally valid with another. My view is that Gallie's particular treatment of democracy rests on a mistake brought about by a confusion between liberalism and democracy. My aim is to overcome this confusion by maintaining a historical perspective on the development of the concept of democracy. Gallie's analysis is an example of the partial nature of emotive meaning, no matter how powerful it has appeared to him and to philosophers in the past. (28)

The importance of maintaining some degree of historical perspective is further reinforced when a direct application of analytical philosophy is attempted, leading to disappointing results. Supposing that two different political systems, A and B, both claim to be a democracy, X. In what way should we react to this situation. Insofar as there is a dilemma here, it arises because of a conviction that it is somehow right, or proper, that we should be able to choose between A and B. This does not mean, of course, that they are either of them necessarily democracies, but what it does imply, in principle, is that there must be some way of choosing between them. Now, if we are to make a choice, in the face of both A claiming to be X and B claiming to be X, with both A and B being constitutively different, then that choice can only be made in the light of their approximating to some paradigm of X, called Y. Such a procedure cannot however

be helpful, at least ultimately. Suppose that we proceed to adjudicate between A and B with reference to the paradigm Y. We might conceivably be able to settle on Y as a paradigm, at the cost of extreme generality, but the institutional practices would have to be settled, and it is on these points that A and B would be at odds. For the resolution of the dispute both parties, A and B, would have to agree about the acceptability of the details in the paradigm instance of democracy, Y. But it is precisely the essential or institutional properties of democracy that are at issue. Thus either the paradigm secures agreement at a level of generality too far removed to entail specific institutional details, or, at a more concrete level, it simply duplicates the disputes.

Both of the foregoing possible assaults on the meaning of democracy have been applied with reference to competing systems of democracy, namely liberal and totalitarian democracy. In this respect they reflect the approach to an understanding of liberal democracy discussed in the first section of this chapter. Since I want to abandon that particular approach for the meaning of liberal democracy I shall turn to examining the development of liberal democracy without reference to totalitarianism.

iii. Liberalism and Democracy

I have suggested that it will ultimately be more rewarding to take a different approach when considering the meaning of democracy from that followed by analytical philosophy and emotivism. I believe that it is possible to get behind the relativist position which would leave us with the banality of saying that each has his own view of democracy, and that is all there is to be said. Though there may be some merit in the claim that democracy is a contested concept,

this does not amount to the admission that it is exclusively so. The latter appears to have some credence only when one adopts an entirely ahistorical approach to the analysis of a concept, thus neglecting crucial shifts which have arisen over the course of time.

I am not here suggesting or defending an approach which simply amounts to an historical study under the guise of conceptual analysis. I am saying that some concepts have a historical perspective rather analogously to the way in which a cube has a volume property as well as an area dimension. We are not getting the measure of some concepts if we arbitrarily divorce them from a rich and varied past. My view is that such an approach is crucial to the concept of democracy for several reasons. The latter I want to mention briefly at this point, and then proceed to develop them. It is of course partly a matter of history that democracy has its origins and original applications in Athenian civilization. It is further a matter of history that it did not reappear in civilization until very much later, and then in Western European thought. It is a matter of analysis, however, as to how far the reappearance of the concept in Western European thought, was an identical or different concept. It is further very much a matter of analysis as to how far democracy became fused with liberalism in political thought and how far liberal societies are also democratic societies. It is also a matter of analysis as to how far there are any empirically necessary features in democracy. The historian can say that the institutions of so called democracies have changed through time, he cannot properly debate the former issue. I want to resist then, as vigorously as I can, any charge that I am simply doing history. My approach is different from that of Gallie, described previously, but I think, ultimately more fruitful.

The historical approach in analysis seems to be fruitful wherever different systems of social and political thought are bound together at various points by one particular tradition of interpretation from a common conceptual root. My view is that such a conjoint relationship exists between liberalism and democracy in the individualist interpretation given by thinkers from Locke to Hayek. It should be noted, however, that I am only concerned with liberalism to the extent necessary to disentangle the concept of democracy. It is the latter and its relationship with education that is my main concern. One further brief illustration of this point of common conceptual roots and conjoint relationships with other strands of social and political thought would be the phenomenon of totalitarian democracy. An understanding of the differences between totalitarian and liberal democracy does require an appreciation both of the common, i.e. democratic root of these two traditions, as well as other facets of social and political thought, such as Marxist utopianism, or laissez-faire liberalism, within which the two traditions have functioned.

I do not want to elaborate on the distinction between liberal and totalitarian democracy, but I do want to extend my present line of analysis to argue that one particular tradition of democratic theory, liberal democracy, can without fundamental objection, be held to contain several subsets of concepts which may not be acknowledged with equal force within liberal democratic policies. That such a situation is feasible follows from my earlier argument about the importance of conjoint relationships and common conceptual roots. I am suggesting that it may be possible to argue within the confines of one particular tradition of social and political thought, that a given topic such as liberal democracy logically owes a measure of coherence to some aspect of its corpus of beliefs, which it prefers

or tends to neglect. I am convinced that this much may be said of liberal democracy in that it prefers or tends to neglect aspects of "moral" democratic theory which are conceptually related to it, and necessary for its justification. I further maintain that this factor is of the first importance in assessing the relationship between liberal democracy and education.

I suggest that such a method of analysis, if successful, will prove more illuminating than the mechanistic approach of adumbrating a different interpretation of democracy and proceeding to evaluate the systems of government so described. I grant that the latter has some importance for we may certainly wish to reject a view of democracy because we find its results repugnant. Both approaches will feature here, indeed there is no necessary incompatibility between them. It is arguable too that conceptual shifts do not divide into discrete sections which are qualitatively different. There is, rather, frequently a connecting thread to an earlier strand of the concept, which may, sometimes on almost nostalgic grounds, seek to stress one aspect which appears patently lacking in the present context.

In the light of the development of democracy reference is first made to Athenian thought. J.S. Mills attempted correlation between a form of government and the character of its citizens is thoroughly Greek in its orientation. It was a relationship acceded to by democracy's opponents as well as its supporters. Sinclair states that: "Changes in a constitution were therefore regarded with suspicion; if they went far, they would change the whole character of the city, and of the citizens too. Plato uses demokratikos - to sum up the character of a changeable and pleasure-seeking kind of man - I Socrates never tires of calling the constitution the very mind of a city; Aristotle speaks of it as the life of the state; Demosthenes says that a city's laws are its character." (29)

Similarly, Rousseau's contentions on the voluntary character of political obligation consequent upon participation in law making was matched in the Athenian polis.

" - any binding public decision of the Athenian state, the making of an alliance, the declaration of war, the passing of any law, was enacted by the popular assembly of the Athenian citizen-body as a whole, meeting regularly." (30)

The right to be heard on these issues, in the Assembly, gave to the citizen: " - at least the claim on the part of the community at large to a corresponding equality of obligation." (31)

The organic dimension in Rousseau and later Green, is also thoroughly matched: "The ancients had seen their community as a focus of value, an entity, the significance of which dwarfed their own lives." (32)

Clearly though the latter points to a conceptual divide from the later notions of pluralism, checks on power, and limited governmental spheres. The absence of a perceived division between public and private life and extra-state political activities represents a much greater gulf between Athenian democracy and pluralism, than between the former and democratic elitism. The latter can already be found in the tracts of the critics of democracy and argued over by its supporters. However, despite the fears of elitists, it appears that: "widespread public participation in the affairs of the state including the personal failures, socially isolated, economically insecure, uneducated, did not lead to extremist movements." (33)

Aristotle pondered the issue of whether some citizens should be excluded from the governmental process and pointed out: " - that there is a serious risk in not letting them have some share in the enjoyment of power; for a state with a body of disenfranchised citizens

who are numerous and poor must be a state which is full of enemies." (34)

Equality, itself suggestive of a latent optimism in human character seems to have been a further basic ingredient in Greek democracy. It appeared to encompass both equality before the law and fair play for all. The latter should be seen in contrast to arbitrary power, a theme prevalent in the earliest debate on the best constitution. (35)

Again there is continuity of theme from Athens to the later revival of democratic ideas in that the attack on arbitrary power was repeated by the Levellers, at a moment so close to Locke, yet containing none of the latter's individualistic overtones. Its ideals are, if anything, more transparent in the Funeral Oration attributed to Lysias than they are in Pericles: "Our ancestors - were the first and only men of that time who cast out arbitrary power and established democracy, holding that the freedom of all was the greatest concord - and the part of men to define justice by law, and to persuade by reason, and serve both by action, having law as their king and reason as their teacher." (36)

Turning to the distinction between public and private life, however, it is clear that this is essentially a modern introduction into democratic beliefs, and one attributable to liberalism. It is an illustration of the extent to which liberal individualism has entwined with democratic ideas. In the Athens of Pericles, there is already identity between public and private life. "An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of policy. (37)

My argument would be that the location of participation in Greek democracy is partially contingent in the sense that as a happy

coincidence the Assembly was also the locus of potential and possible power relations affecting the citizen. Work had not assumed the dominancy or the essentially hierarchical character it was to achieve under industrial capitalism. What was necessary was that participation and equality should function in just that situation where the individual was affected by power relations, viz. in relation to political commitments. It would, however, have been unthinkable to suggest that a 'full' life was possible merely through 'private' satisfactions. This was not merely a consequence of the lack of other associations beside the state, it was rather consequential upon a view of public life as the ground of an individual's being. In this respect the Athenians went essentially further than Mill for whom public life was merely an instrument to produce a civilized populace.

A similar point introduced by liberal individualism is the denial of the Athenian link between democracy and character. Whilst J.S. Mill wrote eloquently on the latter, individualists from Locke to Hayek have raged against any hint of a "collectivist character". With the absence of any division between public and private life, as discussed above, the link between democracy and character has had a powerful effect. Field argues that: " - the ultimate justification for democracy is a means to, produce certain states or attitudes of mind in the citizen, independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others, interest in public affairs, a willingness to think about them and discuss them, and a sense of responsibility for the whole community." (38) The explanation for this must depend in part not merely on the individual actors within a participatory democracy, but also on the perceived norms and values immanent in the practices of that society. It is only within the latter context that Protagoras's claim is understandable, that: " - every man has a share of justice and general citizen skill - ". (39) It may be that proximity is both a

psychological necessity as well as a value in relation to institutions, in order to realize this. As Dunn argues: "the ancients had seen their community as a focus of value, an entity, the significance of which dwarfed that of their own lives as individuals. - if the democratic regime in Athens was narrow by modern standards in its citizen body, it was democratic in its political institutions to a degree that is hard for the citizen of a modern state to comprehend." (40)

The above points suggest that the decisive shifts affecting the concept of democracy themselves relate to the notion of human agency and character that is built into it, and not in the main to its procedures. (41) Of course the latter, as I have suggested, are as much a matter of value as the former, but there are largely historical reasons why procedures produce little controversy until the twentieth century. Bearing in mind the cluster of points made so far concerning the influence of liberalism on democracy, it may be possible to enlarge on this issue by paying some attention to etymological considerations. The evidence is that the word "democracy" remains in limbo until the eighteenth century, when it reappears in restricted, scholastic language and is used in political antipathy to the word "aristocrat". (42) It appears that political thinkers who did employ the term used it in connection with the old Aristotelian classification, combined with monarchy and aristocracy. Certainly it did not enjoy any sort of favourable connotation. Of more significance is the position with the noun "democrat". Palmer finds that: "The two nouns "democrat" and "aristocrat" did not exist until the very last years of the Old Regime. No "democrats" fought in the American Revolution; and the Age of Aristocracy, as long as it was unchallenged, heard nothing of "aristocrats." (43)

Dunn notes that "The late 18th century assault on the closed privilege caste order of the post-feudal Ancien Regime, in Europe as

a whole and of course above all in France, was responsible for the resurrection of the term 'democrat' as a term of political self-identification." (44)

A century later, Tocqueville: " - saw the political meaning of democracy as essentially the repudiation of the feudal past, the triumph of the non-privileged over the aristocrats, the victory of the Third Estate." (45)

In some senses this is not dissimilar to the position in Athens prior to the institution of democracy, but the situation is inevitably much more complex because of both the existence of different strands of individualism, already established in England, and because of the existence of embryo political institutions (46) which could themselves constitute vehicles of democratic political practice. Moreover, some of the demands for the instigation of democratic machinery came from men who were not themselves avowed individualists at all. The latter were quite distinct from those who demanded freedom of commerce. The Levellers, and the less influential but more radical Diggers, were primarily concerned with the control and removal of arbitrary civic power, not with the freedom to establish market relations.

In addition, not every strand of individualism was democratic in the sense of being unambiguously in favour of popular control of government. Conservatism in England partly drew its strength from the contention that government was an esoteric art which thrived on a repository of wisdom, vitalized by tradition, and was not amenable to the demands of the uninitiated. (47) Confusion may also arise because a strain of individualism which was seemingly 'moral' in its stress on the sanctity of the individual, as in Puritanism, and democratic in its own internal organization, could also be associated with a doctrine of material wealth and prosperity as the outcome of individual resourcefulness and blessedness.

There is a final point relating to liberal individualism and democracy which must be made. It happens to be the case that the mainstream of individualism has itself been conceptualised in the doctrine of liberalism. (48) It is moreover, just that part of individualism which does not see ruling as an esoteric or problem undertaking. The grounds for an insidious conceptual confusion here between democracy and liberalism are overwhelming in that liberalism itself has come to be associated both with the highly naturalistic strain of thought commencing from Hobbes, which discarded traditional concepts of society, justice, and natural law, and deduced political rights and obligation from the interest and will of dissociated individuals, and with the 'moral' strain of individual worth emanating from the Puritans. It has also been held to cover the work of the British Idealists who emphasised the possibility of state action to further the conditions for individual moral development. Yet the demands of both wings of liberalism in their attacks on autocracy were demands for democratic controls in that they favoured a sovereign legislature and the application of the rule of law and separation of powers. It is important to remember, however, that men like Bentham and the Mills were liberals first and democrats second, in that at least with Bentham and James Mill, democracy was merely the most effective instrument by which rulers could be controlled. (49) Thus democratic procedures such as elections, did not reflect anything other than expediency, and certainly did not instantiate values of a lofty moral nature. The same is not true of John Stuart Mill, for whom democratic procedures were a part and indeed the principal part of the amelioration of the common people.

What a wholesale and uncritical acceptance of liberalism as a unity leads to, is the view of English democratic theory from Locke onwards, as merely the superimposing of representative

procedures on an increasingly divided society, with the latter as entirely secure from any fundamental change. (50) Liberalism is not primarily a doctrine about political organization and being a liberal " - is often a matter of broad cultural allegiance and not of politics at all". (51) Liberalism however has political implications insofar as some conditions in society are more conducive to the enjoyment of liberalism than others. In particular liberalism in its political implications has been equated with a condition of minimum government. "A liberal society is a pluralistic society precisely because the concept of countervailance is essential to its understanding of liberty - ". (52) In this respect the term 'liberal' has afforded a most convenient prefix to those who wish to distinguish those nations professing democracy with capitalist or mixed economies, from those nations professing democracy and following command economies. The latter have been labelled "totalitarian democracies". (53)

In the main, this development is decidedly unfortunate for any analysis of the concept of democracy. The term "liberal", as I have suggested, is an unhelpful one, masking as it does two traditions of individualism, whose divisions increase in strength in the twentieth century. The very distinction between totalitarian and liberal democracies indirectly suggests the latter as a unity, which it manifestly is not. Whilst I think the term liberal democracy an unfortunate one, I shall continue to use it in some places, mainly where I wish to subject to criticism writers or schools of thought which tend to propagate it. What I very much prefer is the distinction already mentioned between the market and moral conceptions of democracy. (54) This distinction cuts right across liberalism. I regard T.H. Green, for example, as a 'moral democrat', but he is also hailed as a liberal. On the other hand I regard Rousseau as a moral democrat and he is certainly not

classified as a liberal.

I do not pretend that this is an easy distinction to maintain. Some theorists such as Locke and John Stuart Mill are exceedingly difficult to classify since they appear to show a concern for the moral worth of individuals, yet also envisaged man as merely a bundle of utility preferences. For all its difficulties, however, the distinction seems long overdue. Modern divisions within liberal democracy are now so very different in their implications for society and in the values they champion that it has become impossible to assess their implications for education, by simply parroting liberal democratic clichés and tacking on a few valedictory comments about education. The divisions within liberal democracy are sometimes referred to as elitism, pluralism, and participatory forms of democracy. (55) I regard both elitists and pluralists as essentially market democrats. In addition I include within market democrats, theorists whom I term economic democrats and whom (56) I regard as being on the extreme liberal wing of the market concept. Economic democrats are characterized by their predilection for individual utility as the guiding principle for social action and their extreme distaste for any form of governmental role, exceeding that of a Lockean night-watchman. Elitists distrust the masses political behaviour as much as pluralists and economic democrats distrust the government's political behaviour. But the latter also are unhappy with some facets of individual political behaviour. Dahl's (57) desire to see groups interposed between government and the individual is as much due to a fear of "mass" political behaviour as it is to control central power, and Down's and Riker's (58) determination to exorcise moral ideals and aims from individual political perceptions is largely due to the same cause. All market theorists can be distinguished by their attempts to devalue majority

political behaviour from the level of a prime moral engagement. Participatory democrats are moral democrats, but the class of moral democrats is larger than the class of participatory democrats and includes theorists such as Kant and Green (59) who did not envisage the extension of individual control over institutions beyond that of the political macrocosm, unlike Cole (60) who did advocate the latter especially in relation to work. What unites moral democrats is a belief in the moral potential of the individual in relation to political affairs, a conviction that individuals ought to make decisions which influence public policy (61) and a belief that the state has some role to play, partly through education, in helping the individual to realize his moral potential especially in relation to the wider considerations of the political macrocosm. The foregoing is necessarily a generalization, but will I hope serve to distinguish moral from market theorists.

In maintaining the distinction between moral and market democrats, I shall also be criticising and assessing the implications of these two positions. Clearly I think there can be several stances from which a comparison can be made between the two rival systems. There are purely formal requirements such as consistency, which would constitute grounds for preferring one characterization rather than another. Then there is the issue of how far one scheme solves the philosophical problems found endemic in another. Thus for example, both elitism and pluralism claim to solve some of the problems endemic in classical democratic theory. (62) Finally, there is the sense in which one characterization is ethically preferable to another. In some cases the latter could be classified under a formal requirement. Thus classical utilitarianism treats statements about values in the same logical manner as statements about facts. Now, if it is held that statements about values are

indeed logically separate from statements about facts, then the ethical theory involved will have been shown to be defective. Further, one ethical theory may be preferable to another in terms of the ideals immanent in it. The notions of moral autonomy and integrity might be found more defensible than the Hobbesian rational man.

Part of the difficulty in assessing different conceptions of democracy is that one is concerned with operational conditions and values. In their characterization of democracy pluralists have confined themselves almost exclusively to the matter of operational conditions such that democracy becomes synonymous with certain empirical features such as freedom of association (except for communists!). Indeed all market theorists freely and lavishly commit the naturalistic fallacy: elitists as well as economic democrats. The purported 'value-free' position of market theorists is examined later at various points, but for the present I want simply to argue that operational conditions are merely empirical features which, accurately it is hoped, translate values which are considered appropriate to their particular conception of democracy. It is important to appreciate, however, that the relationship between values and empirical features is asymmetrical. For empirical features may relate to 'n' different value systems, and thus it is not possible to claim of a particular piece of political machinery that it is a sufficient reason for concluding that the society in question has such and such a political regime.

However, there is a case on what amounts to inductive grounds for suggesting that the existence of 'n' different empirical features, especially for some features more than others, point towards one set of values rather than another. This argument is developed shortly but it is necessary first to say one more thing

about values. There seem to be strong grounds for saying that values, including declarations and choices of values cannot, unlike empirical political features be true or false. This is not to say that values are things we cannot usefully argue about nor is it to say that one set of values cannot be preferable to another. What it does say is that declarations of values are of a different logical type from other statements, even though they have the same grammatical form.

One important effect of declarations of value is to create expectations about empirical political features. It is this area of functional dependency (64) which has been of decided importance in relation to shifts in conceptions of democracy, and which indicates that the relationship between values and empirical features varies within certain finite limits. The elitist formulation of the concept of democracy arose directly out of a perceived incongruence between the value precepts of early democratic theory, such as the rational voter, and the considered results of empirical research into attitudes and voting behaviour. The conception of democracy subsequently proposed by both elitists and pluralists, was superimposed on what was considered to be the empirical realities of the time. In this whole operation, value premises were entirely subsumed under empirical auspices.

It is perhaps part of the reason for the lack of attention to these developments by philosophers of education, that both the elitist and pluralist models did not, either in their value positions, which were implicit, or in their empirical recommendations, stray outside the accepted norms of liberal democratic societies. Indeed it is arguable that their positions were more apposite to industrial capitalism than the position they intended to revise. In this respect, the development of both these conceptions merely

reinforces the traditional divide between liberal and totalitarian democracies. The latter is not, however, my concern in this thesis. I am dealing with the implications for education of rival conceptions of democracy which happen to come within the ambit of liberal democracy, though moral democracy in its participatory form undoubtedly creates some tensions with capitalist economic organization.

iv. Boundaries, institutions, and values

The exclusion of totalitarian democracy from consideration returns to the theme of the meaning of democracy and the question of boundaries in relation to the meaning of democracy. I have already mentioned the functional relationship between values and empirical political institutions. I have suggested that this relationship can and does vary. Thus for example, the elitist model of Schumpeter attempts to reduce the value fraction to zero, unsuccessfully I believe. I have also suggested that values cannot be true or false, but that they can and do differ. What I am concerned with now is whether there are limits to the operation of the whole expression, i.e. the combined fraction of values and empirical political features. There are undoubtedly differences between elitists, pluralists and moral democrats both about values and political institutions. Elitists want minimum participation in politics by the electorate, confining it to a choice between competing parties at election time. To them democracy is merely a political method by which government is periodically subject to renewal or change. Pluralists are concerned with countervailing centres of powers, to match the state, rather than simply periodic elections, which they regard as an insufficient check to government. The meaning of democracy here is a society with a multiplicity of autonomous groups, in which the state is only one association.

Moral democrats hold that democracy fundamentally presupposes individual autonomy, a necessary condition of which would be the opportunity for participation in social and political institutions, and the provision of an adequate moral and political education.

What remains evident as common is the possibility of changing the government of society. At a minimum, in the elitists model, this involves elections at which rival parties stand for office. There may be other means of changing governments than elections, but I find them difficult to conceive of if it be allowed that the choice to be made by the society is between rival parties. Without the possibility of a change to a rival government, there seems to be no democracy. Elections would then be an empirically necessary condition of a democracy and a firm indication that if this institution were missing the political system concerned would not be a democracy.

Since, however, I have suggested that institutions differ to the extent that they are empirically necessary to democracy, or merely contingent, it follows that there are several possible marginal cases affecting the boundaries of democracy. Suppose, for example, that we were able to ascertain something of the political methods of a certain country. We discover that country A has enfranchised its adult citizens, excluding only lunatics and vagrants. We further discover that voting is conducted by means of verbal utterances at polling stations. Clearly A has elections and universal suffrage yet it cannot be presumed that such elections are effective in duplicating national opinion between the two rival parties, because of the possibility of intimidation, that is to say then that guarantees ensuring a choice without intimidation (normally the Secret Ballot) are more than contingent features of democracy. Again, it may be that A subsequently introduces a Secret Ballot, but it is also now apparent that the media in A

are controlled by the governing party and that no opposition policy statement is ever available for perusal by the electorate. In another respect then, the choice between the rival parties is nullified by the absence of sufficient grounds on which to make a choice.

Other combinations of different empirical properties may be adopted. Assume that an official opposition is tolerated and that governments are voted into office for a ten year maximum session, through a representative simple majority system. Policies are debated in the run up to the election, but the government, during its ten year term of office, has to take many decisions which were not debated in the pre-election period, and some of which are highly unpopular with the electorate. For moral democrats changes might well seem desirable here to allow for greater participatory opportunities. Elitists however may well approve of the sovereignty of politicians here. The point is I think, that both market and moral democrats would be prepared to allow that this particular political system was democratic.

There is, I think, no need to prolong these examples to draw out the points that a mere list of empirical features will not do when discussing the meaning of democracy since it is crucial to settle on the distinction between necessary and contingent features. In a sense the distinction is even more complicated than that. Interest groups are a familiar feature in Western societies. Pluralists, however, make the existence of interest groups virtually an axiom of democracy since they stipulate autonomous groups as part of the meaning of democracy. Yet to an elitist, what matters within the operation of democracy is regular elections which feature competing parties. The existence of groups is contingent within the elitist model of democracy. Pluralists, however, accept

elections as a necessary feature of a democratic political structure, but not a sufficient one.

Empirical features then are not sufficient for concluding that a particular society is a democratic society, though they will clearly count towards such a verdict, but in varying degrees according to whether they are necessary or contingent features. A further problem with any assessment based on empirical features is that the relationship between these features and the form of government is asymmetrical. That is, we cannot take any one institutional feature, for example an elected parliament, and argue from that feature that the country in question is clearly a democracy. I am not suggesting that such a feature would be without significance in deciding whether a particular society is a democracy, but my view is that the empirical approach remains unsatisfactory. We have to be clear about values, if we are ever to resolve differences over empirically necessary arrangements.

An attempt upon values would however meet an immediate riposte from elitist democratic theorists. Schumpeter, for example, claims that democracy is merely a political method. That claim will be examined but it should be noted that a caricature of democracy as a bundle of procedural principles plays straight into the hands of the elitist insofar as it says nothing about the extent to which individual autonomy should have a bearing on public policy. Pluralists are primarily concerned with the maximization of group and individual utility. Moral democrats are concerned with the furtherance, not merely of individual utility, but of the moral development of individuals as well. Thus though the moral democrat may be happy to envisage state action to secure improved circumstances for the growth he favours, he does not thereby commit

himself to a sanguine acceptance of values which emanate other than from the controversies of individuals. In particular he is not necessarily bound to any collectivist doctrine. Indeed, it might be suggested that the whole apparatus of elections, the rule of law, and the separation of powers, is a reflection of a non-holistic value structure, in that it presumes that truth is a matter of debate. This would apply to all values, even that of moral autonomy.

v. Towards a new analysis of democracy and education

The present chapter has argued for the hybrid nature of liberal democracy and made the plea that more fruitful work will come from analysing the different value constellations within liberal democracy. At present such a move has not been made within philosophy of education, and it seems long overdue. An examination of the different conceptions of democracy, market and moral, will be carried out in the following two chapters, and it will be seen that the divisions between them are broad. This detailed examination will permit me to show the incoherence of market democracy and the weakness of its values as a foundation for democracy. The moral conception will be shown to provide a firm foundation for a democratic polity. Hopefully this will substantiate the claim that it is the moral conception that lends plausibility and support to liberal democracy. The latter has persisted as a model because of the attention paid to empirical features such as elections and because of the attribution of several values which arise from the moral conception of democracy.

To attempt to dissect liberal democracy at this time is not merely apposite in terms of the very general injunction that philosophy should amount to some kind of search for truth. There is also the matter of an urgent need for clarification in

relation to the aims of education and the composition of the curriculum. In the present chapter I have discussed in general terms the relationship between politics and education in autocracy and democracy. Following the elucidation of the two conceptions of democracy, the thesis goes on to consider in much greater detail the relationship between the two conceptions and education.

Again it must be emphasised that this work is not simply a matter of stipulating several initial conditions and then extrapolating various political and educational implications. It is a question of looking at liberal democracy and its properties as it stands now, and the inconsistencies and ambiguities within it. I shall also attempt to show that these are apparent within its educational aims and curriculum. If my analysis is correct then a good deal of philosophy in education has been written around a model which is no longer tenable, and based upon a false consensus. For it is not merely that there are two conceptions of democracy, but that within the market conception there are rival strands of thought which are diverse and contradictory. Again, if it is the moral conception of democracy which actually provides the semblance of unity and sanctity to liberal democracy, then it is past time for that construction to be made explicit in educational aims and curricula. Once the fundamental weakness of the market conception is perceived, namely that its values cannot provide enduring support for the institutions and practices designed to give a moral polity, the importance of the moral conception of democracy in providing liberal democracy with an appearance of unity becomes apparent.

Notes to Introduction: Chapter I

1. Despite the mistakes he makes the most interesting juxtaposition occurs in:
Schumpeter, J.A., Two Concepts of Democracy, in Quinton, A.M., Ed Political Philosophy. O.U.P., 1970
2. There is some evidence, however, of its application in relation to Political Education in:
White, P.A. Democratic Theory and Priorities in Political Education. Teaching Politics. Vol.3, No.3, Sept 1974
It is applied to Philosophy of Education in general, in:
Tarrant, J.M. Democracy: A Problem for the Educator, Teaching Politics, Vol.5, No.2, May 1976, pp 141-153
3. There appears to be no perception of the distinction I am trying to make. See for example the various writings of Richard Peters in his philosophy, especially his Democratic Values and Educational Aims, Teachers College Record, Vol.80, No.3, Feb 1979.
A distinction with remote similarity insofar as it attempts to rule out some views of democracy and explore others, is to be found in:
White, P.A. Education Democracy and the Public Interest, in Peters, R.S. ed. The Philosophy of Education: O.U.P. 1973.
The main thrust of this article is, however, on the concept of interest. One particular concept of democracy and its relationship to education is explored in:
White, J.P. The Aims of Education: Three Legacies of the British Idealists, Journal of the Philosophy of Education, Vol.12, 1978 pp 5-12.
See also, Gordon, P. and White J.P. Philosophers as Educational Reformers, R. & K. Paul, 1979
4. Lipset, S.M. Political Man. Mercury Books. 1959
The relationship between the level of education and a democratic polity is of course only one of a number of possible examples which might be used here.
5. For a detailed consideration of this point, see pp 28-31
6. This research is important for an understanding of the work of elitist market democratic theorists such as Schumpeter and Sateri. Their writings might be construed as an attempt to take account of both the political implications of Freud's assault on human

rationality, and the hitherto undiscovered existence of highly authoritarian social groups inhabiting acknowledged democratic societies. Examples of this research include:

Adorno, T. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Norton, 1969

Almond, G. and Verba, S. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton University Press, 1963

Fromm, E. *The Fear of Freedom*. R & K Paul, 1942

Lipset, S.M., *op.cit.*

For the reaction of a pluralistic democratic theorist, see

Dahl, R.A., and Lindblom, C.E. *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*.

New York: Harper, 1953, p. 96, *passim*.

Some of the above sociological evidence has been challenged in

Stacey, B. *Political Socialisation in Western Society*. Arnold, 1978

Also, Femia, J.V. *Elites, Participation and the Democratic Creed*, Political Studies, Vol. 27, March 1979, pp 1 - 20.

On the possibility of educating for a moral role for the individual in society, see Chapter V.

7. Perhaps an easier, but analogous point would be whether we would be prepared to argue that a person instructing five year olds in the calculus was in fact teaching. I suggest that we would not.
8. The democratic elitist is a market theorist in my classification. See this Chapter, p. 33.
9. For a detailed discussion of democratic elitism, see Chapter II, Section II.
10. *ibid.*
11. Evetts, J. *The Sociology of Educational Ideas*. R. & K. Paul, 1973, p 121.
See also Warnock, M. *Schools of Thought*. Faber and Faber, 1977, p.10
12. Rousseau is discussed in detail in Chapter III, Section III. The conceptual and contingent relations between education and macro-political values are also pursued in this chapter.
13. For the different conceptions of democracy see p.34 this Chapter: for the market conception Chapter II and the moral conception Chapter III.
14. This is discussed in detail, Chapter II, Section III

15. In Chapters IV and V I argue that the critical function is vulnerable in market democracy, and safest in moral democracy. Indeed it really has no place in market democracy.
16. This point is fully developed in Chapter V, p.250
17. This is elaborated in Chapter V, section IIa
18. Dahl, R.A. Procedural Democracy in Laslett, P., and Fishkin, J. eds. Philosophy, Politics and Society, Fifth series. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. pp 97-134
19. See Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. O.U.P. 1972
 Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford. Blackwell. 1974
 Dahl, *ibid.*
 It might be suggested that I am using just such an approach. For my reply see the point on page 42, this chapter on the dependency of liberal democracy on the moral conception of democracy, then Chapter V, p 253
20. Dahl, *ibid.*, is the direct application of this approach to democracy.
21. Pickles, D. Democracy. Batsford., 1970, p.11. Pickles comes near to suggesting that the concept is meaningless.
22. See Pickles, *ibid.* p.11
23. See Dahl, R.A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago.University of Chicago Press, 1956
24. Gallie, W.B. Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., Vol. LVI, pp 167-198
25. Pickles, *op.cit.*, *passim*.
26. For the discussion on emotive meaning I owe much to Cooper, D.E. Philosophy and the Nature of Language. Longman, 1973, Chapter III, Meaning in Philosophy
27. Gallie, *op.cit.*
28. cf, Stevenson, C.L. and Ayer, A.J.
29. Sinclair, T.A. A History of Greek Political Thought. R. & K. Paul, 1961, p.35
30. Dunn, J. Western political theory in the face of the future. O.U.P., 1979, p.16
31. *ibid.* p.17
32. *ibid.* p.20

33. Finley, M.I. *Democracy, Ancient and Modern.* Chatto and Windus. 1973, p.19
34. Barker, E. *The Politics of Aristotle.* Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1948 (1960), p.145
35. Sinclair, *op.cit.* p.36
36. Jones, A.H.M. *Athenian Democracy.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1968, p.62
37. Quoted in Sabine, G.H. *A History of Political Theory*, 3rd edition. Harrap, 1963, p.14
38. Field, G.C. *Political Theory.* Methuen, 1956, p.125
39. Sinclair, *op.cit.* p.56
40. Dunn, *op.cit.* p.15
41. Arguably representation is the most important change in procedural terms. The concept was alien to the Greeks, and for some commentators it has constituted an insuperable difficulty in the coherence of classical democratic theory. For representation as a problem, see:
Griffiths, A.P. and Wollheim, R. How can one person represent another, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supp. Vol.XXXIV, 1960
For an examination of the concept of representation, see Pitkin, H. *The Concept of Representation.* California: Berkeley, 1972
42. Palmer, R.R. Notes on the use of the word "Democracy", 1789-1799. *Political Science Quarterly* LX VIII, June 1953, p.204
43. *ibid.* p.205
44. Dunn, *op.cit.* p.6
45. *ibid.* p.9
46. The democratic jury system, the development of Parliament
47. Quinton, A.M. *The Politics of Imperfection.* Faber and Faber, 1978, p.13
48. Professing liberals might resent the term "doctrine", may be in some respects they would argue that liberalism was the antithesis of a doctrine. Ideology might therefore be preferable, but there might also be objections to that.
49. Steintrager, J. *Bentham.* Allen and Unwin, 1977, p.78.
Lively, J. and Rees, J. eds *Utilitarian Logic and Politics*, 1978 p.49

50. This view is put forward by Macpherson, C.B. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*. O.U.P., 1977
51. Dunn. *op.cit.*, p.29
52. Marming, D.J. *Liberalism*. Dent, 1976, p.16
53. See Talmond, J.L. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. Heinemann, 1961
54. See p.7, *passim*, this chapter.
55. This classification in respect of elitists and pluralists is found in embryo in Barry, B. *Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy*. Macmillan, 1970, still a powerful and perhaps neglected work.
56. Distinguished by the use of traditional economic concepts such as utility, the margin, trade-offs, and cost/benefit analysis, in application to politics especially voting behaviour in democracies. See Chapter II, Sections IV and V.
57. For Dahl see Chapter II, section III
58. Chapter II, sections IV and V
59. Kant and Green are discussed in Chapter III, Sections IV and V
60. Cole in Chapter V
61. They would not necessarily, or likely, make these decisions directly.
62. I am not referring here to the disparity between the rational man of classical democratic theory and the findings of empirical research (already mentioned). Rather the problems here have been the result of the application of analytical philosophy to the tenets of classical democratic theory. The example of the concept of representation has already been mentioned (see note 42). Further examples can be found in Wollheim, R. 'On the Theory of Democracy', in Williams, B. and Montefiore, A., eds *British Analytical Philosophy*. R & K Paul, 1966.
Wollheim, R. 'A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy' in Laslett, P, and Runciman, W.G., eds 'Philosophy, Politics and Society'. Second series. Oxford: Blackwell, 1971.
63. On the demand for an operational definition, see Dahl R. A. 1958, *op.cit.*
64. I am using functional in a mathematical and not a sociological sense here, such that $y = f(x)$

- * Hirst, P., and Peters, R.S. The Logic of Education. R. & K. Paul, 1972
- ** Peters, R.S. Authority, Responsibility, and Education. Unwin, 1973, p.51

CHAPTER II

Values, The New Democracy, and Education

1. Introduction

I mentioned in the last chapter the profound difference in democratic theory between market and moral democrats. (1) Part of the claim of market democrats to pre-eminence stems from their boast that their approach to democracy is 'value-free', and hence in marked contrast to the moral conception of democracy.

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the thesis of the new democrats in some detail, arguing that their claim to be 'value-free', even assuming that to be either possible, or desirable, is confounded by a barely disguised preference for the values of stability and utility maximization. In addition, it is suggested that such a value position necessitates the reduction of education to the twin pillars of socialization and training. The implications of the market conception of democracy for education are further developed in Chapter IV. Some general points of an introductory nature are made first, before considering representative offerings of the new democrats in detail.

On the matter of the choice of which theorists to consider, the position can be readily defended. Schumpeter wrote a brilliant attack (2) on 'moral' democracy, but only the least satisfactory aspect (3) of that polemic has attracted attention. Of much greater philosophical interest is his most original attempt to claim that democracy is merely a political method and not amenable to question of value. In this respect Schumpeter may be considered as the father of the revisionist movement, though as I shall try to show, as far as the role of politicians, and the importance of elections are concerned, there are significant differences between Schumpeter

and other theorists. Schumpeter is less successful in the points he makes against the moral conception of democracy but this aspect of his work is also significant in that it provides a possible realm of meaning for the much vaunted value-free claim. The latter becomes intelligible only and insofar as it represents a reaction to the very obvious moral preoccupations of some early democratic theorists, their presupposition of epistemic (4) rationality to individuals at large, and their belief in the efficacy of governmental institutions and practices to achieve their moral ends.

Robert Dahl is also an extremely important figure in modern democratic theory. Dahl is essentially a pluralist (5): he differs from Schumpeter most obviously in that he accords rather less importance to elections, less freedom to politicians, and much greater reliance on social constraints, principally groups, on rulers rather than mere institutional constraints. Dahl regards democracy as an ideal, and in discussing democracy he substitutes his extremely influential "polyarchy" (6), which he holds to be an approximation to democracy. Dahl's interest is primarily in conditions necessary for the maintenance of democracy, or polyarchy, an end for which he is prepared to espouse rigorous social indoctrination.

Anthony Downs uses the tools of economic analysis, especially utility theory, to build an explanatory model of political behaviour in a pluralist society. I shall try to show that Down's model, despite its sophistications and rigour, is self-defeating. Mathematical analysis appears in the work of Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, and Ordeshook, in their attempt to explain political behaviour on the basis of rational self-interested agents. These theorists also endorse inconsistencies ultimately fatal to the model.

A measure of the above theorists work is similar to the utilitarians (7), and has important implications for education. It should be noted that really very little work has been done on the

relationship between democracy and education, apart from sociological observations (8). Barrow's (9) work, with which I am in disagreement, is the most important at the present time. There are however signs that this conflict will have important implications in schools in the near future (10).

An allied controversy which has attracted much more attention in recent works is the status of the 'value-free' claim made by revisionists. To some extent this dispute was part of a general dilemma about the status of political philosophy as a whole. It is fair to say that in the light of very recent developments, political philosophy is certainly not dead, in the sense that writers in this field now bring an unabashed treatment of values to the fore of their works. (11)

iii. Schumpeter and Value-free Democracy

Commensurate with his view that classical theorists built far too much into democracy, Schumpeter sought to demythologize democracy to the extent that it became a political method only. His criticisms of the classical theorists I turn to later, my immediate concern being his reduction of democracy to a political method, entirely neutral with respect to whatever results may accrue from its implementation. Schumpeter attempts no less than the splitting of values and empirical procedures in the following passage:

"Let us transport ourselves into a hypothetical country that, in a democratic way, practices the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughtering of Jews. We should certainly not approve of these practices on the ground that they have been decided on according to the rules of democratic procedure. But the question is would we approve of the democratic constitution itself that produced such results in preference to a non-democratic one that would avoid them?" (12)

Schumpeter believes that it would be most reasonable for a democrat to answer the question in the negative, and that this should not come

as a shock since: " - there are ultimate ideals and interests which the most ardent democrat will put above democracy." (13)

The position which Schumpeter assumes here is entirely question begging. The way in which we respond to this position depends entirely on what values we build into democracy yet this is precisely what Schumpeter intends to isolate. It is not clear what it means to say: " - that in a democratic way practices the persecution of —". (14) Presumably Schumpeter means that such clandestine practices in this instance were approved of by the majority. There is however no logical relationship between majoritarian support for a measure and a democratic regime. The most scurrilous dictator may choose for reasons of expediency, to obtain majority approval for a particular measure or measures. Neither is there any necessary connection between majoritarian or unanimous support for an administration, and the same measure of support for an individual measure of that regime. In essence what Schumpeter wants to say here is that a democratic regime is a regime in which measures are approved of by most of the population and further that there is no logical or empirical restriction on the measures which may be approved of. That is, Schumpeter proposes the majoritarian or unanimity rule as a sufficient condition for democracy. Yet this cannot be a sufficient condition for we do talk of the importance of toleration in the context of democratic regimes. This is not to elevate toleration to the status of a sufficient condition since it is possible to envisage an autocratic regime which tolerated various kinds of opinions without persecution and yet did not permit the vast number of persons within its boundaries to have any control over the measures which it enacted.

There is thus nothing illogical about withholding the title 'democracy' from a regime, which with majority support conducts such clandestine practices. It is in any case to construct a false

dichotomy to claim that there are ideals and principles which a democrat will put above democracy. For it is part of the very concept of ideals and principles that indeed they are imperfectly realized: equality, toleration, respect for persons. Schumpeter wants to say that if a democratic system goes seriously enough off course, then on the basis of these ideals we will condemn it. It is clear however that we would no longer be talking about a democracy. This is not to deny that there are degrees of toleration, that there are degrees of representation, and that hence some systems are more democratic than others. But what Schumpeter presents as democracy is a system which practices the systematic suppression of minority groups, hence with the total abrogation of toleration.

Following his comment that there are values which will sometimes be put above democracy, Schumpeter proceeds to advocate the value-neutrality status of a method, and of democracy in particular. Schumpeter declares that democracy is merely a political method and, "hence incapable of being an end in itself." (15) Quite what Schumpeter means at this point is difficult to arrive at. If he means that as a matter of logic, anything that we classify as a method is non-normative he is surely wrong. For we do talk of one method being better than another, of a method being unacceptable, or poor. If he means that a person cannot delight in a method for its own sake then he is arbitrarily legislating against a whole field of human action. For in the latter what logically counts as a method to one person does not proscribe the same activity from being an end to another person. Painting a canvas is a method of preserving a scene or capturing a pose and it is quite conceptually coherent to regard it merely as one method of preserving and recording. Yet for some

it also counts as an end in itself, as an activity which affords vast opportunities for expression, endeavour, amelioration. To treat it merely as a method is to inflate the causal properties of painting to the exclusion of all other properties. Yet this is what Schumpeter wants to do for democracy. If we inflate the causal properties of political activity sufficiently it can then be argued that it is merely a means to forming a government. But to do so is arbitrarily to proscribe a whole area of human action and condemn it to a regulative activity. This arbitrary causal reduction would of course apply equally to activities like education where it could be construed as merely a means to producing a skilled work-force. In fact this "means-end" construction emerges again in the revisionist thesis, presented with increasing force and sophistication, until it reaches its zenith in Riker and Ordeshook's claim that private satisfaction in political activity is irrational and publicly inefficacious.

I want to suggest that further difficulties follow for Schumpeter's thesis from the very restricted interpretation he has placed on a method. In order to do this, slightly more needs to be said about a method. Let us suppose that 'x' is a method leading to achievement 'y'. If we say that 'y' is an end in itself this is tantamount to saying that 'y' requires no further justification. If something is incapable of being an end in itself then presumably it must be justified by a reference to something which is an end in itself. This I take to be what Schumpeter is implying; that a method can logically only be justified by the result to which its implementation leads. But because a series of operations 'x' is empirically conducive to a particular achievement 'y' this does not mean that 'x' must always be construed as a contribution to 'y'. In particular, because 'x' is causally necessary to 'y', this does

not amount to logical necessity. Thus sowing seed is a method causally necessary to growing vegetables, but there is no logical reason why sowing seed should not be regarded as an end in itself. This has important implications about the scope for action in various fields. Sowing seed has a utility value in terms of the food or flowers produced. It is possible to hold, however, that one gets equal or more satisfaction out of sowing seed, that the satisfaction derived from sowing seed well is not derived from the higher yields but from the exercise of skill, judgement, and finesse in sowing the seed. That further, sowing seed can be refined, improved, and excelled at. In addition, I may see 'x' as causally necessary to 'y', yet also as an end in itself. Doubtless we might want to hold that outside a given range of intentions the engagement in any causal process becomes rather absurd, and in some cases logically impossible. For example, it would be a trifle absurd if the individual who saw innumerable challenges to his abilities in sowing seed, did not intend to grow some produce, since the latter is at the end of the causal chain from seed sowing. The point is that the causal chain itself does not oblige him in any way to limit what he regards as the intrinsic interest in sowing seed. In the case of a formally structured game, of course, like chess, it is logically impossible for me to claim both that I intend to play chess and that I intend to disregard every rule of chess. Moving pieces in a certain way is not merely causally necessary to playing chess, it is also logically necessary since the game of chess takes its identity from the rules and conventions ordering the way in which pieces may be moved. But in the case of this highly structured activity the notion of a method, in the narrow sense of a means to the achievement of a given end, becomes logically redundant. Moving pieces in a certain pattern on a chequered board,

is not a method of playing chess, it is playing chess! In this narrow sense there is only one method of playing chess and the logic of method simply collapses here into the concept of chess.

But chess as I have suggested, is a highly structured activity. To meet Schumpeter on his own ground one may take the appointment of a government as an end. But note that this says nothing about the extent to which governing ought to be or will be a function of public pressure or participation. When he declares that democracy is a political method Schumpeter has a very definite view of public participation in the process of governing, namely that it shall be at a minimum. As far as individual voters are concerned:

"... they must understand that once they have elected an individual, political action is his business and not theirs" (16). He declares that "... democracy is the rule of the politician" (17). In his reformulation of democracy the passive role of the citizen is again apparent: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions by means of a competitive struggle for the people's votes". (18)

What is now clear is that Schumpeter's concept of democratic government involves a highly structured and narrowly defined end, that of popular endorsement of the policies of a political party, from time to time. In giving citizens the very minimum role to play, and confining that role to confirming a party in power Schumpeter is then able to plausibly cast democracy in the role of a political method. Though it is still logically possible for an individual to maintain in the face of this system that they find politics intrinsically interesting, challenging, enriching, stimulating, it is nonetheless empirically extremely doubtful. For on Schumpeter's own admission political action is not the business of the ordinary

voter, politicians must be left to get on with the job. We may therefore take it not merely that there would be a very limited supply of political resources in the form of speakers, information, debates, consultative documents, but further that such spontaneous political activity as did occur would have little or no effect on politicians. Moreover it seems doubtful that such a system would continue in that form. With voters occupying such a passive role two obvious dangers loom. Voters would have a limited and immature perspective on politics by their very lack of political activity and political argument. Hence the continuance of the democratic method would rest heavily on the parties and would make the most onerous demands on their integrity. If parties compete for votes by means of rational debate the process is expensive in terms of the cost of information provided, the risk of losing office, the budgeting of an election fund. These costs could be avoided either by presenting a previously agreed campaign to the voters with the aim of sharing the spoils of office, or by one of the parties conducting an insidious campaign designed to inflame prejudice, exploit irrationalities and gain power with little opposition. The logic of Schumpeter's position is to make parties and not voters the custodians of democracy. It is to require that politicians be convinced democrats and to leave voters politically immature. In time the system would appear to be justified, for as voters had less opportunities for political activity, so they would appear more politically inept. Ultimately, the spectre of a popular persecution of minority groups with which Schumpeter attempts to confront the classical democrat, appears an empirical possibility under his revisionist system.

The dangers imminent in "party sovereignty" seem to go unnoticed by Schumpeter, though not by Downs who ventures that the conduct of parties must in some way be constrained by law. Yet on this model

how shall parties be persuaded to constrain their activities other than as the result of an extraordinary phase of altruism? If democracy is merely a political method there is a puzzle as to why parties must always endorse laudable values in their conduct for votes? Schumpeter claims as an advantage for his model that it is realistic in the sense that unlike the classical theory (19) it fits conditions in the real world. Part of his thesis is that in general people have rudimentary, irrational notions about politics. His solution to this problem is the essential status quo procedure of advocating a strong executive government with the most limited participation by the electorate. In this respect he differs markedly from other revisionists who in general favour construing individuals as centres of preferences aiming at a maximum utility income, served by weak governments whose utility is to be found in holding office and who therefore strive to please their electorate. This of course is much more like the classical utilitarian treatment of democracy and will emerge in more detail when considering the values of Downs, Riker and Bullock. But if realism is Schumpeter's value and his goal he must at least explain away both the ready and prolonged engagement in politics which individuals make, and the predilection for tyranny which strong executives show. Above all he says nothing about the criterion by which he thinks voters ought to choose between one party programme and another. In the absence of such a criterion we are obliged to look to his notion of a "manufactured will" (20) by which the parties themselves act to produce the political thought of the voters. In this way the last vestiges of voter action are withdrawn.

Any attempt to provide a caricature of democracy which fits the real world faces enormous social-scientific difficulties about which a considerable amount has been written.(21) In general this material

has more force against Dahl than against Schumpeter. Clearly it is true that Schumpeter either does not see or chooses to ignore the value judgement immanent in selecting what in fact is to count as a real world democracy. But this is a point of only the mildest sophistication. We get nearer to the deserved criticism of Schumpeter by noting the logical point that having selected the paradigm of democracy certain crucial variables are thereby endowed with a particular status and then lead to the value judgement that one state of affairs is better for democracy than another. For example, following Schumpeter it appears that competition between elites is a crucial variable, as is very restricted citizen participation. If then I point to a society in which there is a limited measure of competition between elites, but a high level of citizen participation in the political system, Schumpeter must, to be consistent, say that the first state of affairs is better than the second. This leads I think to the values of Schumpeter's democracy: a conservative preoccupation with stability based on a pessimism about the outcome of human action in democratic politics. Schumpeter is prepared to sacrifice the principle of political equality in favour of stability. It is better that the majority of men should react to the options presented by the few, rather than act to produce and pressure options on the few. He is prepared, too, to sacrifice whatever benefits classical democrats thought to accrue from participation in politics in the name of stability. This species of naturalism has the mark of a self-fulfilling prophecy; men are politically inept therefore they ought to be kept out of politics, hence of course men thereby lose the opportunity of being anything but inept. Above all what strikes one about this revision of classical democratic theory is the way in which the possibility of virtue, the potential of rationality in the individual, has shifted to the virtue and promise of a stable society. Moreover, the former was not founded on a contingent empirical property, but itself occupied the status of a value,

central to the concept of democracy.

We have then the view that minimum citizen participation in the political system is not merely necessary for democracy, it is also desirable. That it is desirable is due to the fact: " - that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede -". (22) The latter are to remain in ignorance whilst the name of democracy is upheld by parties, who on Schumpeter's own startling admission are not " - a group of men who intend to promote public welfare - ". (23) Of the empirical likelihood of parties continuing to champion democracy I have already commented adversely but what concerns me now is the position of education within such a political system. If Schumpeter is right about the immaturity and irrationality of men in relation to politics, then the maintenance of his model of democracy serves not merely to preserve this state of mass ignorance but also to commend it. On this view, any change in the level of participation in politics is undesirable since it threatens the stability of the political system. For Schumpeter does not merely consider participation in politics is undesirable because of the quality of the participants, he also considers the isolation of the politician desirable, per se. On both counts then, participation is undesirable since either it threatens the stability of the system because of its inherently irrational demands, or because of the intolerable administrative burden it places on the politician. So that even granted a man might be a rational chooser, as opposed to a member of Schumpeter's irrational stampede, he would still be a menace to the system.

ii(b) Education, training, and socialisation

It has already been suggested that the concept and aims of education reflect the values and norms of society. (24) In particular the extent and variety of ways in which autonomy is exhibited in education in respect of different social and political systems has been mentioned, and it was noted that education enjoys the greatest measure of autonomy in relation to the moral conception of democracy, with its ideal of the critical citizen. I now want to consider the position of education in relation to Schumpeterian democracy, discussed above, and to make some comments on the concepts of training and socialisation.

I take it firstly that education is an intentional enterprise. This is not simply because of the empirical point that in societies where education is compulsory for a given age range provision has to be made to provide for syllabuses, inspections, assessment, partly because public money is involved. It is rather due to the conceptual point that education as an enterprise involves the prescribing of a programme of learning with the intention that certain aims and objectives ought thereby to be achieved. What one wants to do at the level of the social and political macrocosm is to enquire what sorts of learning it would be coherent and consistent for that particular society, given its values, to propagate. We can take the values of a particular society and enquire what sorts of achievements that learning may terminate in, which may be considered worthwhile.

For Schumpeterian democracy a number of observations and inferences may be made. If it is better that participation in politics be kept to a minimum, then men's expectations about the manipulation, assessment, and understanding of their environment must also be kept

to a minimum. The ramifications of a determination to keep the masses out of politics are enormous for the teaching of various subject disciplines. The advent of modern science, for example, contributed to the ebulliance of empiricism, with its anti-dogmatic stance: the pens of Zola and Hugo recorded the deceit and grandiosity of the French Second Empire. The teaching of economics would also be a candidate for exclusion, since questions of inflation, wages, profit, rent, interest, and public finance logically entail judgements about the role of government in influencing the distribution of wealth in the community, about the assumptions of benefits and burdens by the masses. History too might fare badly, for might not discussion of the French Revolution, the Chartist Movement, the General Strike, cultivate a desire for participation in politics? In particular, it seems empirically possible that, taught by an enthusiastic teacher, some at least of these issues will defy the norms of apathy and status quo, which are necessary to this variant of democracy.

I have already argued that for a moral conception of democracy an appropriate educational ideal is one which promotes rational judgements for the individual in relation to the political and social macrocosm.(25) This would have to obtain for the vast majority of the school population, whatever other vocational skills were thought appropriate in relation to the curriculum at various ages.(26) Its hallmark would be the debate of social and political values, policies and institutions. What I think is apparent in Schumpeterian democracy is that education, in the open-ended moral sense I have just given it, could not obtain. For it is clear both that education in the foregoing will entail change, in a logical sense, and in particular open-ended change. Of course related concepts such as socialization and training are also committed to change in some way.

To socialize someone is to introduce them to a particular way of life, to train an individual is to introduce them to the skills and accomplishments of a particular role. Though the difference between these latter two concepts, and the concept of education might be marked out in various ways, it is clear in the case of the moral democrat that the difference will be marked out in terms of an open concept and two closed ones. On this view Schumpeterian democracy cannot, logically, be educating pupils, merely socializing and training them.

The argument is as follows. We socialize into, we train for, in the sense that we are aiming the individual at some pre-determined end. Change is clearly entailed here, but with no apparent restriction on how the change might occur, and no facility for evaluating the predetermined end. Indeed, the predetermined end is analytic to propositions of the sort 'x' is training for 'y'; 'p' is being socialized into 'a'. To be well trained for something is to be proficient in a role, to be socialized into a community is to occupy acceptable roles within that community. Reason of course has a role to play in training; clearly if one were expected to perform several actions in sequence: $n, n_1, n_2 \dots n_p$; it would be compatible with being a good trainee to enquire; why do n_1 before n_{p-1} ? The answer may be that n_1 is a safety precaution necessary to check a known hazard at action n_{p-1} . But what would not be compatible with being a good trainee is to ask for reasons for being in such an occupation at all? One is never trained to be critical of an occupation; one is simply trained for the occupation. There are, it is true, legitimate objections which might be made concerning the extent to which the training for a particular work role encourages some reflection upon that role instead of the achievement of mere behavioural skills.

Thus an objector might argue that teacher training includes within its learning programmes the opportunity to reflect on the role and purpose of a teacher. But then we do in fact sometimes talk of teacher-education as well as teacher training; we do not talk of educating to be a plumber, but training to be a plumber. That we can talk of teacher-education and not plumber education is due to the fact that we require trainee teachers to possess a variety of socio-cultural concepts both before and during their training and it is the latter which facilitate any reflection which they can engage in. Such concepts are not necessary in training plumbers, plasterers, or bricklayers.

Again, to socialize is logically to take certain norms as given, as acceptable for a subject. The demand for reasons is compatible with socialization in so far as it is reasoning about procedures: when is it best to do 'x': how should one do 'y': is it better to do 'x' than 'y'? Training and socialization are essentially instrumental concepts, means-end in their orientation. These points cannot be dismissed as a mere semantic quibble, for the notion of socialization is analytic to society, and training is an empirical necessity to an advanced industrial society. Both activities therefore have a ready justification. But there is the matter of the propriety of questions which we found incompatible under these two concepts. In the case of socialization a sufficient condition for asking the rationale for certain moves is that one is already socialized. To start formulating critical assessments of social moves is to move beyond the field of action prescribed by the concept of socialization. Similarly with training, questions arose about values presupposed in the enterprise of training. To question why one ought to be trained for a given end, is to seek for a justification

outside the enterprise of training. Both socialization and training are interested in the attainment of a given end state. Why such questions are appropriate in the education of a moral democratic citizen has to do not merely with the fact that the demand for reasons is an important facet of any cognitive process, for we saw that in a restricted perspective that demand was also appropriate in training and socialization. Rather it has to do with the ethical basis of education in such a society, and especially with respect for persons, treating people as ends, seeking truth, being impartial. Education in the moral democratic society, is an open-ended concept in the sense that all postulated ends are moral ends, in that they are themselves capable of debate and vulnerable to demands for justification. This point requires stressing in the face of injunctions that education should serve the needs of industry or the whims of political parties.

The concept and aims of education commensurate with the moral conception of democracy is incompatible with the norms of Schumpeterian democracy. The ideal of the critical citizen is antipathetic to the norms of apathy and ignorance which is the logical prescription for the bulk of Schumpeterian democracy. The moral democratic educator is committed to a degree of optimism in the face of a status quo insistence that men cannot be changed, or are happier or better as they are. The principle of respect for persons implies an opposition to the exclusion of any area of knowledge from his students, in the absence of good grounds being produced to the contrary. To refuse the opportunity to another of acquaintance with a given area of knowledge is not only to flout the concept of respect for persons, it is also to prohibit a condition which Schumpeter might well endorse as being necessary to the concept of an educated man, namely breadth of understanding.

Schumpeter claimed democracy to be merely a political method, but I argued that certain values were implicit in his presentation of democracy. The cursory endorsement permitted to voters of the presentations of political parties is hardly compatible with the notion of respect for persons. In particular the elevation of government to a lofty impregnable station between elections, the predilection for a 'manufactured' political will, represents the indictment of the electorate as moral children and governments as moral adults. This rests on an arbitrary notion of the intuitive inability of the electorate to make acceptable judgements about societal ends, and not upon any rationally defensible value position. It contains not merely the empirical position that most individuals are moral children, but the prescription that they ought so to remain.

Schumpeter's contrivance may lead ultimately to a conforming and sterile society with men unable to see themselves as actors or originators on the socio-political scene at all. For since according to Schumpeter men are so immature, then presumably government will have to exercise considerable supervision over the community. But those whom such controls affect will not be permitted to make representations or proposals about them. In his concern to preserve the stability of the community Schumpeter in yet another arbitrary sweep, has excluded a further facet of the democratic legacy, namely the representation of interests. This presents a further, contingent incompatibility between Schumpeter's values and whatever protestations he might make to the effect that he would offer the majority a curriculum broader than a mere vocational training programme or a conformist prescription. The objection arises simply because in the process of the development of mind, students may acquire several values and propensities; values of truth, tolerance, justice, and

sympathy, which cause the level of participation to rise, thus invalidating the premise on which the theory is based. Insofar as I am concerned with truth or justice, I may contingently be obliged to probe for information into those spheres of activity labelled 'the political'. Further, on some occasions my zeal for such values may lead me to co-operate with like-minded persons to influence the modification of existing legislation or press for new legislation. In other words, to participate in the political.

By claiming that "democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them;" (27) on the premise of voter irrationality, Schumpeter justifies a system as elitist as the Republic. Knowledge of how one ought to live is reserved to the few, the many being pawns in a manufactured will. If men are so irrational in politics, then it is not clear why they are deemed capable of endorsing or refusing the policies presented by competing elites. Equally, if they are so capable, then it is not clear why political participation should stop here. Where individuals are deemed worthy of respect an inference can be drawn to the effect that their ignorance is not a matter of indifference. In Schumpeter, it would appear that democracy is only possible because of men's ignorance.

iii. Dahl and Polyarchy

Dahl has both less trust of politicians than Schumpeter and less trust in simply leaving the majority out of politics. Insofar as he is critical of early democratic theory his quarrel is limited to the inability of the institutional checks of Lockean and especially Madisonian democracy, to guarantee the preservation of a pluralist society.(28) Dahl's single most important contribution to revisionist

theory is his insistence on the primacy of social constraints on government to secure the maintenance of democracy and to that end he advocates wholesale indoctrination in the values of polyarchy. Whilst the responsibility for the maintenance of democracy was placed on parties by Schumpeter, in Dahl that role is taken by autonomous groups and fostered by a favourable civic culture. For Dahl, education is a means for the maintenance of polyarchy and not a right which accrues to the individual by virtue of values inherent in the concept of polyarchy. In Dahl the elite is made up of autonomous groups. In Dahl bargaining between groups and the government is important, but even more important is the fact that this takes place within certain limits of acceptable action, and according to certain agreed rules.

In common with other revisionists Dahl makes the claim that he is simply describing "the actual facts of political life", a gambit encountered in discussing Schumpeter and open to the reply discussed there. It is in any case quite apparent that Dahl advances in places to an overt valiative position. In his Preface to *Democratic Theory*, Dahl declares: "But at a minimum, it seems to me, democratic theory is concerned with the processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders -. (29) In *Modern Political Analysis* he writes; "A democracy is a political system in which the opportunity to participate in decisions is widely shared among all adult citizens". (30) In considering the conditions which must obtain in order for democracy to exist Dahl rejects at some length the Madisonian argument for the efficiency of external checks because, " - it underestimates the importance of the inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralistic society. Without these social checks and balances, it is doubtful that the intra governmental checks on officials would in fact operate to prevent tyranny -. " (31)

Dahl proceeds to establish his own theory of democracy, known as polyarchy. "What do we mean by democracy? Do we mean a perfect or nearly perfect equality of power? — a perfectly equal distribution of power seems to be unattainable, certainly it is in a large industrial society. We shall consider as democracies political systems in which power over (32) state officials is widely, though by no means equally shared." "Polyarchy requires social indoctrination and habituation in the process of polyarchy —". (33)

The construction of political equality as equality of power leads Dahl to attack traditional democratic theory; " — we must conclude that the classic assumptions about the need for citizen participation in democracy were, at the very least, inadequate. If one regards political equality in the making of decisions as a kind of limit to be achieved, then it is axiomatic that this limit could only be arrived at with the complete participation of every adult citizen. Nevertheless, what we call democracy — that is, a system of decision in which leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders — does seem to operate with a relatively low level of citizen participation." (34)

But Dahl has almost certainly got his analysis wrong here. The nature and extent of desired participation varies crucially from Locke to Mill. To Locke, Bentham, and James Mill, participation was a necessary condition for ensuring that rulers provided what men wanted and was not a panacea for their amelioration. It was in fact decidedly similar in its orientation to the social constraints of Downs, Tullock, Riker and to a lesser extent Dahl. For Tullock as for Mill and Bentham " — governments exist for our satisfaction not to promote our moral consciousness or to encourage us in any way to honour or lead us to recognise our obligations". (35) For Locke

" - it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty and Property - - the power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good - -." (36) Bentham's verdict on government was that a measure of it " - may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it." (37) Since participation was primarily an instrument of control on government and not a value pre-requisite of a democratic society it was in the main a matter of indifference to Locke, Mill and Bentham who represented, providing only that governments were faced with a sufficient cohesion of interest to remain only protective agencies. Locke, though he credited every man with the executive of the law of nature, never acknowledged any moral problem in settling for the procedural device of majority rule. The latter emerged, simply as a device for securing the unity of society and not as a response to a moral imperative which is what Dahl is implying. For Bentham and James Mill representation is essentially the presentation of interests, necessary to ensure that they will not be coerced and hence put happiness at risk. Indeed Dahl is pleading for the same instrumental view of participation when he advocates democracy as a system in which leaders are responsive to the preferences of non-leaders.

Though it is true that Rousseau envisaged political equality probably as equality of power, Dahl fails to acknowledge the very considerable empirical arrangements which Rousseau provided for this end. It is clear too that J.S. Mill who was certainly an advocate of participatory democracy was seeking an informed discretion in a democratic populace "A democracy has enough to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for its own proper

work, that of superintendence and check." (38) Dahl claims the advantage of a model of democracy which operates with a low degree of citizen participation yet it is bought at the cost of a definition so loose as to be commensurate with any political regime. To say of a political system that it is one in which the leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders is to provide a charter to which any dictator could happily assent.

Dahl's theory of polyarchy differs little from the work of Bentham and James Mill. Though the latter do not specifically refer to group interests it seems that in their adherence to the representation of interests they could well have accommodated the existence of groups and certainly accepted private interests as constraints on government. Dahl declares that " - for most people much of the good life is found in small groups." (39) Hence it follows that "The predominance of small groups is essential in order to limit the degree of control of leaders over non-leaders". (40)

"The nation-state can only provide the framework within which "the good life" is possible; it cannot fulfill the functions of the small groups that make up the immediate environment of good living".(41)

Government is thus primarily a "black box" into which various preferences are channelled. No criteria ~~are~~ laid down for the resolution of conflicting preferences, yet it is axiomatic that such preferences will conflict. Where resources are used to satisfy the preferences of one group they cannot also be used to satisfy the demands of a rival group. In one sense the resolution of such a conflict will lie in the strength of the group demand, the latter deriving from access to information, financial resources, and the number of votes commanded. Dahl, it appears, expects such conflicting demands to be resolved in a way analagous to the market economy.

What is logically required in any system in which preferences are resolved, is some consciousness of "the rules of the game". If voluntary associations are to predominate in a market democracy then something more than a mechanism for the resolution of preferences is required. There must be agreement that such associations ought to exist. For on the basis of the maximizing of preferences alone it may be in the interests of one group not merely to lobby the government as keeper of the nation's resources, but to secure its position by direct action against its rivals, or the government, or by uniting with other groups.

This leads to a most important conclusion against the revisionist thesis in general. Individuals and groups in market democracy participate primarily for the satisfaction of preferences. If however parties participate on this premise how shall we guarantee that a fabric of peaceful, open competition between individuals and groups shall be maintained? To be sure Dahl anticipates the problem when he declares "Polyarchy also requires agreement on those basic issues and those methods that facilitate peaceful competition and the opportunity for non-leaders to switch their support to rival leaders". (42) It seems reasonable, however, to ask how such an agreement might be guaranteed or perhaps more important, to ask how it could be rational to follow such an agreement. Dahl declares that "An action is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement, given the goal in question and the real world as it exists" (43) Without institutional checks, which Dahl explicitly rejects, and with a system of ethics which equates obligation with desire, peaceful competition seems problematic. Various solutions are offered by revisionists: Schumpeter reserves political activity to an elite, Downs relies

on a "super-preference" of social responsibility, Tullock on private "irrational" satisfactions. Dahl places the problem of ensuring "correct" social behaviour partly with groups and partly with schooling.

Dahl correctly anticipates a mere reliance on the market economy of preferences will not sustain the social system. or those groups who profit by the status quo the system is rational enough, but not for the losers. For the losers government action is not a possibility since they cannot win on an aggregate of preferences. For an overriding preference for the "rules of the game" to work all groups must obtain greater satisfaction from abiding by the rules of peaceful competition, than they lose by an inability to realize their policy goals. In the case of groups persistently failing to obtain policy goals a continued adherence to the norms of peaceful competition would appear to be irrational. This is irrational even though group members may have some private admiration for peaceful competition. For on the one hand they may calculate that by stepping outside the norms of peaceful competition the system will only be marginally diminished in its orientation, and secondly in the face of a continued failure to achieve policy goals there will arise an inevitable dissonance between admiration for the system and disappointment at the failure to achieve satisfaction through the system.

Dahl attempts to preserve polyarchy in a way far more drastic than thorough-going market revisionists like Downs, Tullock and Riker could possibly contemplate owing to their marked emphasis on the individual rather than the group preference. In doing so Dahl ridicules attempts to foster individual autonomy, to preserve an element of choice, and to treat people as ends. He argues that the wholesale social engineering he attempts is no more drastic

than anything liberals have ever done." Whatever might be made of his charge against liberals, there is no doubt that Dahl is inconsistent in his advocacy of social engineering. Polyarchy is to be preserved by norms instituted by "successful indoctrination". (44). To maintain polyarchy " - the norms and habits must be built into the very depths of the unconscious". (45) He remarks "that polyarchy - or indeed any stable structure of control must rest upon successful indoctrination is now hardly contested". (46) Yet he also takes up a view on social engineering reminiscent of Burke rather than Rousseau. He advocates a piecemeal approach to social change, cautious, and suspicious of the potential of reason to produce a desirable remodelling of society. "Incrementalism is a method of social action that takes existing reality as one alternative and compares with probable gains and losses of closely related alternatives by making relatively small adjustments in existing reality, or making larger adjustments about whose consequences approximately as much is known as about the consequences of existing reality, or both". (47)

"Patching up an old system is the most rational way to change it, for the patch constitutes about as big a change as one can comprehend at a time". (48)

One wonders therefore how Dahl can reconcile his position as an avid supporter of indoctrination and yet also as an incrementalist. For if the essence of incrementalism is profound caution in the management of social change in the structure of society, the characteristic of polyarchy is the inculcation of unshakeable beliefs about the social and political order. So that on the one hand we have an awe of change, and on the other wholesale intervention in society to secure adherence to polyarchy. Thus it is hard to

resist the conclusion that for Dahl wholesale intervention is permissible only to secure the maintenance of polyarchy, otherwise it is suspect. Indeed Dahl makes the latter empirically valid by contriving a very limited role for the state in polyarchy and a wide role for sectional interest groups. We can hardly agree, I think, that Dahl's proposals for the maintenance of polyarchy merely amount to the patching up of an old system.

Incrementalism is not merely a proposal about what can or cannot be done in the way of social change, it is also about what ought and ought not to be done. It is an added bulwark to polyarchy, an attempt to present a value judgement in the guise of an empirical generalization.

Dahl defends his group politics and especially the inculcation of unshakeable beliefs in polyarchy by claiming that liberals in fact do much the same. This is an extraordinary and important argument. In essence Dahl claims that no society, no matter how liberal or democratic it might appear to be, can avoid either the psychological or the moral problem that social processes, the total environment, helps to mould the individual. Typically he thinks that liberals try to avoid the problem by an absence of direct interference with the person, but this absence of interference is a mere illusion.

"By concerning themselves with the general framework of society rather than direct control over personalities, liberals solved a psychological problem and appeared to believe they were solving a moral one. — it might be said that the moral problem was solved by avoiding direct action in shaping human personalities, in order to follow the categorical imperative of Kant according to which men are to be treated as ends and not means. Yet this is to avoid

the problem rather than solve it. — whether men take social actions consciously and purposefully or not, their social processes do in fact help to mould personalities. Second, the moral distinction between controlling the broad framework and direct control is very shaky. One treats man as a means in Kant's sense only if he is looked upon exclusively as an instrument to one's own goals." (49)

"Finally, to the extent that one believes that some norms, attitudes and social processes foster widespread opportunities for freedom and others do not, one is logically committed to favouring the kinds of personalities predisposed to the norms, attitudes, and social processes that one desires. No more than totalitarians can democrats shrink from the prospect of social action directly to foster desired personality types in their society." (50)

Dahl is of course correct in his contention that the social milieu of a person's youth have some influence on his personality. He is further correct in implying that there is a moral problem inherent in the social process namely that the decision to abstain from programming a person's environment with a view to fostering a particular type of personality, itself is a value judgement. It is in that respect only that the moral distinction between controlling the broad framework and direct control is very shaky. Of greater significance is whether the personality will be permanently inhibited from ever depending on its own judgement, making its own choices, possessing any integrity. It seems in the case of Dahl's polyarchy that the failure to realize the latter is a distinct possibility. In his advocacy of indoctrination Dahl assumes that means are instrumental and ends final and thus he wants to claim

that such processes are justified by the 'freedom' which they eventually produce. In his desire to institute an unshakeable belief in polyarchy, Dahl confounds the very value of freedom which he champions. Dahl claims that one treats man as a 'means' in Kant's sense only if he is looked upon exclusively as an instrument to one's own goals, yet this is precisely what Dahl advocates in producing polyarchical man. He argues that a belief in norms such as freedom logically entails favouring certain personality types. But again he assumes a simple means-end relationship. For one thing there is clearly a difference between Dahl's notion of a democratic personality and the rational chooser of early democratic theory. Evidence in favour of the latter suggests that there are certain invariant stages through which the rational chooser progresses before reaching autonomy. These stages are incommensurate with a programme of indoctrination promulgated by Dahl. Again, the values of a democrat may not merely logically predispose him towards a certain personality type but also act as constraints on the process of education of the individual. To this extent means will be expressive and ends will be immanent.

It is also true that Dahl's prescription for the preservation of polyarchy is inherently fragile. Polyarchy is to be favoured because it permits the satisfaction of preferences on the part of the ruled. If such a system is self-evidently good it is difficult to see why Dahl has to introduce indoctrination to support it. Of course, we could say of most political systems that they do this but presumably that is why Dahl is prepared to involve indoctrination for polyarchy. It is unstable in that presented with rational argument a product of polyarchy is thrown back on a corpus of convictions which he cannot justify.

bove all in his advocacy of polyarchy Dahl neglects the essential point that the small groups which he champions, the good life which he alleges is to be found in such groups, was as a matter of history made possible not by the championing of appetitive preferences but by the value bequest of early democratic theory. Dahl's solution to the inefficacy of external checks in a democracy was to suffocate moral imperatives altogether. In so doing he divorced the existence of his reputedly autonomous groups from the very ideological roots which justified them. The pluralism which Dahl favours so much is the effect of a particular consciousness of the dignity and rationality of man. It was this philosophy which provided the justification to achieve the limited government Dahl so ardently supports and not the claim that men should be able to indulge in appetitive preferences per se. He states: " - in all countries where popular governments have thrived, a great variety of associations have enjoyed considerable autonomy - political parties, Trade Unions, Churches, lobbies, pressure groups, and the like." (51) But such associations were historically antecedent to popular government, and were by no means able to enjoy autonomy at large prior to popular government. Their importance was that in their procedures they exemplified and practised autonomy.

Moreover it is not the case that they believed in pluralism per se, rather that pluralism was a consequence of the realization of their demands. The latter were moral claims not appetitive preferences. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke made the moral claim that "the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the Commonwealth - ". (52) The struggle for religious toleration in England gave moral force to political democracy. It was true

of dissident groups that "In their constant struggle to maintain their own independence they placed a perpetual check upon the absolutism of the civil authority, and they developed a theory of resistance that lead ultimately to democracy and freedom." (53)

"The moral imperative also ensured a highly democratic procedure.

"The foundations of modern democracy are to be found in the Church meetings of the Independents and Baptists, and the Class Meetings of the Methodists. The form of ecclesiastical government was a christocracy run by democrats." (54) "Reason cannot be kept down for ever, and Protestant regard for the individual soul could and did enlarge into respect for the individual judgement." (55)

Unions also were the progenitors of popular government, not its result. The Chartist Movement demonstrates the presence of the pressure of democratic demands from unionists. Their aims were political and not economic: universal adult manhood suffrage, annual parliaments, equal electoral districts, abolition of property qualification, and payment for Members of Parliament.

My point is that the nature and beliefs of the associations which Dahl finds so characteristic of polyarchy, is antithetical to an indoctrination in the norms of polyarchy and the wholesale pursuit of appetitive preferences. Further the emancipation which such groups have achieved is grounded in moral argument, something which a product of Dahl's polyarchy would seem to be incapable of. These groups with their preoccupation with the dignity of the individual, with moral conviction, are the antipathy of government by preference. The logic of an advocacy of government by preference is the presumption that the functions of government are so minimal or insignificant as not to justify the use of reason. This cannot be the case in Dahl's polyarchy for there government has at least

the important function of ensuring that the "rules of the game" are followed. Dahl finds institutional checks and balances inefficacious for this purpose, and instead relies on indoctrination. Yet the norms of the voluntary groups he wishes to rely upon are themselves antipathetic towards indoctrination, favouring as they do an emphasis on individual reason and autonomy. These values logically commit such groups to educating individuals rather than acquiescing in a state where men were in blind obedience to polyarchy. In his advocacy of revisionist democracy Dahl misconstrues the fact of pluralism. Though he might care to construe the demands of groups as preferences it is not possible for the latter to provide a justification for this activity.

In his advocacy and determination to sustain polyarchy by means of an unshakeable commitment to its practices, Dahl robs it of rational sanction. He removes from the area of debate the value of goals, and focuses attention on the means to attaining those goals. "There are two basic prerequisites to rational social action by an individual or group. The actor must make rational calculations about the ways in which the attainment of his goals can be maximized in the real world. And the actor must be able to control others whose responses are needed to bring about the desired state of affairs." (56) A political training for polyarchy is a training in bargaining and lobbying. Success for the individual in polyarchy is to be judged not on how worthy his cause is but how many politicians he controls and how far he can effect a given change.

In his construction of polyarchy Dahl thus provides a system antipathetic to any moral democrat. His advocacy of an unshakeable belief in polyarchy is the result of a prior judgement that rational consensus about polyarchy is not possible. In so doing Dahl violates the very genesis of polyarchy which is the values and norms of autonomous groups.

iv. Downs and Economic Democracy

There are both similarities and differences between Downs and his supporters and Schumpeter and Dahl. In brief, groups matter far less than in Dahl, elections matter more. Whilst Schumpeter controls the electorate by keeping them out of politics and Dahl controls them by indoctrination; Downs and his school control them by ensuring that political activity leads to a maximization of individual utility-income. Downs makes explicit the materialistic view of man entertained by the other revisionists. He makes the now familiar confusion between description and prescription encountered in Schumpeter and is thus vulnerable to the same counter-arguments. At the climax of his thesis he finds utility maximization unsatisfactory for explaining some features of political behaviour and introduces the notion of social responsibility in an attempt to shore up his case. It is my contention that this rescue attempt is unsuccessful and leaves Down's brand of democracy with a fatal flaw.

Early on in his thesis Downs makes a blunt statement:

" - we do not take into consideration the whole personality of each individual when we discuss what behaviour is rational for him. We do not allow for the rich diversity of ends served by each of his acts, the complexity of his motives, the way in which every part of his life is intimately related to his emotional needs. We assume that he approaches a situation with one eye on the gains to be had, the other eye on costs, a delicate ability to balance them, and a strong desire to follow wherever rationality leads him."
(57)

Downs statement may be taken in one of two ways:

a) Men do as a matter of fact approach situations in the light

of a cost-benefit trade-off.

- b) Men ought to approach situations in this way.

Now Downs does make the claim that: "To avoid ethical premises we define democratic government descriptively." (58) He maintains that: " - the central purpose of elections in a democracy is to select a government. Therefore a citizen is rational in regard to elections if his actions enable him to play his part in selecting a government efficiently." (59) Finally, "Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental hypothesis of our model; parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than hold elections in order to formulate policies." (60)

There is a general difficulty about this position. To say that an action is rational is to say that it coheres with a certain framework of explanation, that is considered to be desirable. What Downs offers is an explanation and commendation of political behaviour of a certain variety. If we are to offer a descriptive account of political behaviour then we must say what it is that people do. There are difficulties in this course of action. Where we confine choice to a particular paradigm such as utility maximization, we are also narrowing it, since other paradigms, such as moral dilemmas, are being excluded. Where we declare that a given choice is rational we are thereby commending that paradigm. On Downs own admission what he has done is to limit the construction of human behaviour and action. Downs would readily admit that his rational man would not suddenly change from one mode of behaviour to another. Rational action under Downs thereby commends a society in which the finest elements of men cannot be accorded recognition or encouragement. Where in a society bargaining and opportunism flourish, and are highly regarded there are strong pressures on

the individual to follow. Mill declared that "The play, therefore, of the political machine acts immediately upon the mind, and with extraordinary power; but this is not all, it also acts upon almost everything else by which the character of the mind is apt to be formed." (61)

It is also the case in Downs that the rulers are as acquisitive as the ruled. "The politicians in our model never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se." (62) That also has implications for society: "Now this is certain, that the means by which the grand objects of desire may be attained, depend almost wholly upon the political machine. When the political machine is such that the grand objects of desire are seen to be the reward, not of virtue, not of talent, but of subservience to the will, and command over the affections of the ruling few; interest with the man above to be the only means to the next step in wealth, or power, or consideration, and so on; the means of pleasing the man above, become in that case, the great object of pursuit. And as the favours of the man above are necessarily limited - as some, therefore, of the candidates for his favour can only obtain the objects of their desire, by disappointing others - the arts of supplanting rise into importance, and the whole of that tribe denoted by the words intrigue, flattery, back-biting, treachery, are the fruitful offspring of that political education which government, where the interests of the subject many are but a secondary object, cannot fail to produce." (63)

It would seem that an explanatory model of a political system, and of democracy in particular, which does, " - not allow for the rich diversity of ends served by each of his acts, the complexity

of his motives —" (64) is contentious in the extreme. There is not merely the valuative notion of rationality employed, there is in addition a deductive outcome from the original premises themselves which requires examination. Taking Down's comment: "We assume that he approaches a situation with one eye on the gains to be had, the other eye on costs — government seeks to maximize political support;" (65), there is implicit the notion of an equilibrium. The rational voter in Down's democracy reacts to a situation to the extent that anticipated gains exceed costs. Where he can no longer move to a situation in which gains exceed costs, he is in equilibrium, and in a state not merely desired but also desirable. The nature of the costs and gains is irrelevant except as countervailing force fields. Though a voter appears to act on a situation insofar as he seeks to maximize gains, he in fact largely reacts to it since the costs and gains themselves are significant only for equilibrium purposes.

The above indicates certain results when contrasting the situation facing a convinced democrat, and a Downsian democrat living in a "safe" seat and supporting the dominant party. The convinced democrat addresses himself to the moral obligation laid upon him as a result of his conviction for democracy. He might consider the position along the following lines. Since I am a democrat I ought to turn out and vote in this election, even though my vote may not of itself affect the outcome in this seat. Further, I ought also to vote on the basis of an informed choice, for to do otherwise would denigrate the act of voting to an ape-like response. The Downsian democrat cannot address himself to an obligation, since to do so is to confound the explanatory model which Downs proposes. He is bound to look at the election in terms of costs and benefits.

This has really two effects:-

- a) All information relating to the election becomes the subject of a trade-off, i.e. Is it worth my acquiring this information?
- b) The act of voting is suspect. Is it worth turning out to vote in a safe seat?

(a) is a function of (b) and varies directly with it in that almost any cost in acquiring information is not worthwhile if one's particular constituency is a safe seat, since if support is for the 'safe' party they will win despite such information as might be obtainable by the individual voter, and if one's support is not for the 'safe' party, the loss from the policies they enact will be increased by any cost incurred in procuring information about policies. Political activity becomes a means to a selfish end. All equilibrium models are inherently selfish, based as they are on self-referential assessments.

However, there is the situation of the Downsian who says that democracy as a political system offers benefits in general to him, which he would rather not do without and he must therefore vote for that reason. This is not an argument from obligation as the costs and benefits associated with the institution of an elected government may be long term as well as short term phenomena. But there is nonetheless a difficulty here for Downs. If in reacting to a situation such as the prospect of whether to cast a vote I reckon merely the long term benefits which I anticipate accruing to me from an elected government, it is arguable that I have not assessed the situation very well. For I have ignored the possibility that the benefits I seek from representative government are not dependent in any direct way upon the costs I incur in participating in the institution of voting.

Once I apprehend that my act of voting plays a minimal part in installing an elected government, then the cost of voting seems likely to almost always outweigh the benefit. The benefits of an elected government, whatever I might consider them to be, arise in spite of what I do, rather than because of what I do.

I do not really see that Downs can object to this latter argument. It is essentially merely an instance of rational self interest, an ethic he appears to endorse in his assumption that men approach a situation with one eye on the gains to be had, and the other eye on costs. He does not stipulate that the gains I apprehend can only accrue from any costs which I incur, and he produces no ethical argument to say why the former ought to be the case. Certainly on his premises there is no way in which an astute citizen can face the charge that by not casting his vote, despite a professed enthusiasm for democracy, he is thereby taking a moral holiday.

To some extent Downs appears to anticipate this dilemma, since he concedes on the basis of his analysis that:

- 1) "rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain its benefits and it works best when the citizenry is well informed;
- 2) it is individually irrational to be well informed". (66)

Downs attempts to extricate himself from this dilemma by an appeal to the concept of social responsibility. He argues that:

- 1) "Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by a sense of social responsibility, relatively independent of their own short-run gains and losses.
- 2) If we view such responsibility as one part of the return from voting it is possible that the cost of voting is outweighed by its returns for some but not all rational men". (67)

In this appeal Downs attempts to shore up a fundamental weakness in his position. He declares that: "Since voting is one form of insurance against this catastrophe, i.e. the fall of democracy, every rational citizen receives some return from voting per se, when voting is costly." We seem to have implicit the unargued assertion that rational citizens prefer democracy to any other political system. Yet why should they do so, except on the grounds that it maximizes their utility? What rational citizens want from situations facing them is benefits per se. It is a further matter entirely to claim that they want the benefits of democracy. If Downs is to achieve that he has to show that democracy always and necessarily maximizes citizen benefits. Understandably, he does not attempt to do that.

Downs claims the notion of social responsibility is independent of short run gains and losses. It contrasts obliquely with his ruminations that it may be rational for politicians to encourage voters to be irrational. If the concept of social responsibility is to stand Downs must admit another value in to his system other than the rational self interest he has consistently espoused. Social responsibility can be made to cover situations where there is a net loss in the trade off between costs and benefits to the individual. To be consistent social responsibility must be construed not as an obligation on the part of the democrat, but as one of the gains from democracy. But it is difficult to see how social responsibility will always be commensurate with self interest. Downs appears to assume that social responsibility will always represent a gain for each rational citizen. Nothing could be further from the truth. For the powerful and well organized social responsibility is an inconvenience, a cost it would not

be rational to bear since it would minimize the net gains available. Such groups may not need or want political equality or elections. To appeal to social responsibility for them is not to appeal to a long term gain, but to a system which limits their influence and affords a measure of protection to their opponents. Why should they regard the collapse of democracy as a catastrophe?

There is in addition the notorious difficulty that for the individual voter, rational action encourages him to calculate whether others will rally to the consideration of social responsibility. If he considers that they will, what incentive remains for him to vote on these grounds? It might be argued that this consideration of how others will respond, is something he will have to include in his calculations. But quite apart from the point that this will lead to an infinite regress, there is the fact that Downs makes no mention of the attitude of leaders towards the concept of social responsibility. For weak parties there is a sense of protection from the idea of social responsibility, but there are also costs in the form of competing for survival with other parties. For strong parties there is little incentive to remain in a state of competition with its attendant uncertainties. Downs implies that there is a sudden catastrophic cut-off point for democracy, but this need not be the case. For all parties, an oligopolistic situation offers the saving of uncertainty, their gravest cost. If the rational voter seeks a trade-off, so also does the politician. If the rational voter can act strategically, so also can the politician. By co-operation, rather than competition, he can reap the rewards of office.

Given his predilection for appetitive preferences and rational self-interest, Downs has to derive social responsibility from individual preferences. Yet paradoxically social responsibility

appeals to a consideration of the political macrocosm. It implies the existence of a utility function of a higher order than that posited to exist for individuals, implying in turn that the rational self-interest approach to politics breaks down at a crucial point. The latter is the fact that individual actions have social consequences which aggregate to the social environment.

Considering the difficulties entailed in accommodating the concept of social responsibility in a rational self-interest model, it is not surprising that such a move is abandoned by other theorists. Some such notion, however, has to be introduced by them since in their attempt to account for political behaviour in modern democracies they have to explain, amongst other things, the relatively high turn-out in general elections. This is of course a problem for the market democrat since as we have seen with Downs, the rationally self-interested voter can apprehend that his vote is an infinitesimally small contribution in a safe constituency, towards the final result. It is something of an irony that as the classical construction of man surpasses in complexity the overt, acquisitive simplicity of Downs construction of man, the notion of a macrocosm perspective to voting becomes easier to accommodate. There is simply no place for social responsibility in Down's economic man, a concept far more readily entertained in Rousseau's political theory of sentiment or Kant's social Contract as an idea of reason. (69)

v. Tullock, Riker and the Disposal of Social Responsibility

Social responsibility appeared to be the essential weakness for Downs and by implication for economic democracy. Yet Downs is by no means representative of economic democracy, and there is to be found amongst his contemporaries a pre-Nozick flavour,

sufficient in the end to dispose of the besetting problem of social responsibility. (70) This was not accomplished without difficulty, but essentially the achievement occurred through both a progressive diminution of the parameters of human action until it sat firmly in one Hobbesian desire/action model, and a brilliant bifurcation of public and private rationality (71) such that however bizarre one's own conception of political acts, such as voting might be, such a construction was always and everywhere publicly efficacious. Social responsibility is redundant when it is appreciated that a populace contains individuals who are absurd enough to endow their political acts with a piety, purpose, and significance wholly in excess of their own wants and appetitive preferences. These are Rousseau's government of gods for whom all political preferences are manifestations of responsibility. Sufficient gods will ensure the survival of a rationally self-interested community.

Tullock writes of his work 'The Vote Motive': "All the propositions of this Book depend on the premise that governments exist for our satisfaction not to promote our moral consciousness or to encourage us in any way to honour or lead us to recognize our obligations." (72) "It is an analysis of how people behave in the world as it is, not how they should behave, it is behaviour or positive economic theory of what is, not normative theory of what should be." (73) Tullock also declares: "In modern economics and in the political theory which is now developing out of economics, the preference schedule has now substituted for man." (74)

An integral part of this thesis is a persuasive account of rationality which equates the latter with practical rationality. The latter has a peculiarly stultifying effect on human action.

It will be shown that if I vote for a party because I endorse its principles, if I construe the act of voting as a moral act, rather than a tie breaker leading to the formation of an administration, I have acted irrationally. This conclusion, which inevitably means that a good deal of voting behaviour is irrational, has attracted little criticism. Not merely does it fail to cohere with moral action, but it also conflicts with any concern with epistemic-rationality.

S.I. Benn criticizes practical rationality: "An action is practically rational if, given whatever beliefs the agent has, it is done for reasons that relate to optimising in terms of his ends. A person would exhibit practical rationality (or at any rate formal practical rationality) embracing an epistemically irrational belief if, despite its failing to satisfy the relevant criteria of true belief, he embraced it because it made him feel good and feeling good matters more to him than having true beliefs. Similarly he would exhibit a high degree of epistemic rationality but be practically irrational if an obsessive concern for ensuring that his beliefs were true prevented his attaining any of his goals - even perhaps his goal of having true beliefs; for the extreme of epistemic rationality may be total scepticism." (75)

Benn does not state that optimising in terms of ends relates to utility and it is an important point that the optimising of an action need not necessarily terminate in utility. A man faced with a moral choice may undertake a course of action which does not ensue in satisfaction. The difficulty with practical rationality as Benn presents it is that it entails an indifference towards the end, other than personal preference. It is a means-end instrumental phenomenon. Practical rationality assimilates all questions about ends to technical questions, omitting the issue of whether the end

itself is desirable. Practical rationality per se is a licence to grasp at the trivial as well as what is worthwhile, to construe any end as desirable. Indeed it sets a primacy upon what is quickly realized, upon the apparent, the concrete, the quantifiable. In a macrocosm of practical rationality there seems no protective area for what is intrinsically valuable, for achievements that are laboured rather than immediate, shared rather than self-centred. Given the relationship sketched so far between the norms of society and the curriculum, the effect on education will be direct.

Practical rationality must of course take place within a framework of beliefs, though these need not be true. And it is the case that true beliefs may be a necessary condition for the achievement of an action that is practically rational. Thus, suppose that 'A' strongly desires a protectionist economic policy and proposes to vote for a party 'N' which advocates a strong free market economic policy. A's action can be challenged on the basis of the fact that his desired end of protection is unlikely to cohere with the policy of party N. We cannot, however, on any theory of practical rationality, criticize the end protection, per se. In the sense of practical rationality, then, an action can be irrational as a consequence of a lack of epistemic rationality. Thus, in the example given, if A knew some economic theory, he would appreciate the incompatibility between adherence to free market economics and a strong advocacy of protection, hence he would not vote for party N. The revisionists would admit the necessity for holding true beliefs, insofar as these aid practical rationality. But again, on this view, true beliefs would be merely a means and not an end. The end would be the utility accruing to the individual.

It is clear, too, on this view that the value of epistemic rationality is only contingent. It is contingent in the sense

that it is assumed that the acquiring of true beliefs entails a cost on the part of the individual and that cost may be irrational (in a practical rationality sense) if it is less than the expected gain to be obtained, given the payment of the cost. A society might then acknowledge an instrumental argument for developing epistemic rationality, by government or private agencies, because it does maximize practical rationality, but such a project would entail costs and there remains the issue of how that cost should be supported.

A somewhat related difficulty with this species of revisionist democracy is anticipated by Benn who argues: "The difficulty in the case of political participation is that a system would be self-stultifying if it depended on numbers of people forming rational beliefs about politics and acting on them, while yet for almost anyone to do that would be to expend effort he could use to better advantage elsewhere." (76) We need to ask, however, why it matters that the system would be self-stultifying? Clearly for an ethic of autonomy, of personal dignity, it matters since it is logically necessary to the concept of autonomy that men choose the principles by which they live. If men are to choose how to live they must be given true beliefs about different styles of life. To deliberately propagate false beliefs to an individual is to limit his choice, because he has only misleading accounts from which to choose, and to deny him respect by deciding for him on an issue which he is not entitled to decide for himself. It is to treat him as a moral child.

The revisionists do not of course mind on value grounds whether the system is self-stultifying since they are only concerned with the stability of the system and the maximization of utility

income. Downs appears to have become alarmed on contingent grounds at the self-stultifying effect because it may threaten the system, and hence he introduces his idea of social responsibility which have already criticized. Downs noted that if personal rationality requires that people act to maximize their utility income, a rational voter will perceive that the chance of his own vote making a crucial difference to the policies adopted, and so to his utility income, is so small that voting would rarely be worth the effort. Unless this can be supplemented in some way, as Downs attempts to do with his concept of social responsibility, a democracy of practical rationality would collapse.

The same dilemma essentially faces Riker and Ordeshook. They extend " - the range of conditions that could count as costs and benefits to include any consideration whatsoever that someone could have as his reason for action." (77) Though Tullock provides this same blanket coverage for action it is in fact clear that he subscribes to practical rationality. In his work *The Vote Motive*, Tullock states, "Democratic political structures are explained in terms of how well they can be expected to get for people what they really want." (78) Similarly he is driven with Downs to acknowledge that in many situations voting is an irrational act. But this problem is faced differently by Riker and Ordeshook. They argue that, " - the conclusion that voting is an irrational act follows from an incomplete and misleading specification of a citizen's calculus." (79) They refer in particular to an equation of Tullock's, evaluating the benefits of voting. Their point is that Tullock defines 'R' which is the expected utility of voting, less the expected utility of abstaining, in a function which is far too restricted. In the Tullock equation $R = PB - C$, where C is the

cost of voting, B is the differential benefit that an individual voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one, and P is the probability that the citizen will by voting materially affect the outcome. Since P is assumed to equal one divided by the number of voters, it is asserted that PB must be a very small number so that C outweighs PB , leaving R negative. But Riker and Ordeshook argue that Tullock ignores the private benefit of voting which is substantial. The factors contributing to it include the satisfaction of complying with the ethic of voting, the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system, and the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference. These items are usually regarded as costs, but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the decision, these supposed costs are actually benefits.

It is therefore easy to explain away the problem which faced Downs and Tullock, viz. that people incurred the cost of voting in the face of the most miniscule benefit. Such behaviour is easily assimilated by claiming that though the benefit is miniscule in terms of the chances of effecting a change of government, the benefit in terms of private satisfaction, for example at the feeling of having "done one's bit", easily outweighs the cost. Yet this explanation has a dangerous superficiality about it. It may be possible to explain such behaviour in these terms, but where exactly does this lead? For the explanation does not mean that people did in fact construe the act of voting in this way at all. To explain an action in terms of private satisfaction is not really to say much about it, at least where political behaviour is concerned. It is much more significant to ask how an individual saw his action: there might be all the difference in the world for political education between voting as an instance of self-actualisation, and voting because it makes me feel good.

Riker and Ordeshook claim: " - behaviour is rational - an assumption which entails an attempt to gain a benefit. Since in the case of voting it turns out, on close analysis that getting a benefit is logically related to breaking a tie, it follows that the closer an outcome appears to be, the greater the chance of benefit also appears." (80) In addition: " - we assume that participation is rational in the sense that it consists of the examination of alternative actions and the selection of that alternative which gives the greatest expected utility." (81) The saving formula is that although the act is irrational in that its public efficacy is very low, it is rational in terms of private satisfaction. But there is something seriously wrong with this concept of rationality. Granted that there might be an, " - ideology of obligation that leads men to participate by reason of private incentives - ". (82) Any talk of obligation is incongruous with incentives. In particular, if men participate by obligation they logically do so because they think they ought, not because of any benefits accruing to them. We would have to say therefore that their act of voting was rational because they felt under an obligation to vote. But here the term rational seems redundant. Whatever the public efficacy of our act, our vote reflects our obligation, and is therefore not prone to irrationality. Riker's use of obligation will not do, unless we legislate to make satisfaction tautological with the feelings accompanying the termination of each and every act. In the latter situation as an explanation, the theory would be bankrupt. "The explanatory force of the theory is reduced to the research recipe: if the net costs seem too heavy to make an act plausible that has nonetheless been done, find some compensatory benefit to account for it: conversely, if the expected net benefits should have been large enough to excite action that nevertheless did

not take place, look for some countervailing cost." (83)

We have no means of knowing whether the voter is voting to appoint a government per se or for reasons of private satisfaction.

Riker's position on the function of voting appears to be (84):-

H1. Participation is rational in the sense that it consists of the examination of alternative actions and the selection of that alternative which yields the greatest expected utility.

H2. Participation is publicly inefficacious insofar as it is not related to tie-breaking but guided by private satisfaction. It is nonetheless rational in terms of these private satisfactions.

Now, H1 contains implicit the condition that selecting the alternative yielding the greatest possible utility is logically related to breaking a tie.

Suppose that voter A falls under explanatory hypothesis H1. He favours Protectionism in economic policy. He participates in an election in which there are three parties:

	Party T	Party U	Party V
Policy	Free Trade	Mixed Trade policy	Protectionist
Electoral Success	Traditionally Strong	Traditionally Strong	Traditionally Weak

In order to be subsumed under H1 voter A must concentrate on the alternatives with a view to selecting that alternative which yields the greatest possible utility. It is a necessary condition of his selection behaviour that it be directed to breaking a tie. Now it appears on past performance that a tie is most likely to emerge between T and U. A is a protectionist and he can happily reject both because he disagrees with T's policy and because in rejecting

He has not violated the chance of breaking a tie. In terms of its economic policy he would prefer to vote for V but this violates the possibility of tie-breaking, since V is unlikely to win. He therefore decides to vote for U.

Voter B also votes in this constituency. He also is a protectionist, but in addition he obtains a good deal of satisfaction from "supporting democracy", of which voting is one instance. B votes for party V because he has a preference for protectionism. If he is challenged that his vote has been used wastefully, because V will not win, his reply is that his commitment is firstly to democracy, and second to protectionism. On the Riker view, B's action is publicly inefficacious, yet B is a convinced democrat and believes that in casting his vote his action was efficacious in that it affirmed his support for one part of the democratic apparatus.

We may take two further constituencies:-

	Constituency 1			Constituency 2	
Chances	Party A Strong	Party B Weak	Party X Strong	Party T Strong	Party V Weak

In constituency 1, voter A disagrees equally with A and X. In constituency 2, voter M disagrees with T. In constituency 1, A, from the point of view of public efficacy must select with a view to forming a government, and on this basis, B is out. Yet he dislikes A and X intensely. We therefore have the paradox that on grounds of public efficacy, he is disenfranchised. In 2, on the same grounds, M is also disenfranchised. The logical consequence of a policy of public efficacy in 2, is that the system of public contestation ceases: empirically, this will

not be the case simply because people will continue to vote on the basis of irrational private satisfactions!

All the emphasis in the Riker model is put on tie-breaking with reference to personal preferences. Insofar as tie-breaking is causally connected with forming a government this is clearly acceptable. But the model is persuasive in at least two ways. In the first place it loads the activity of the individual insofar as it represents a search for tie-breaking. In this respect it minimizes or neglects the activity of persuasion, discussion, argument, which may be considered part of political activity. Allied to this is the presumption that there are merely opinions and preferences instead of principles and judgements. Riker may simply reply that a person may have a preference for a party because of the extent to which it advances certain principles. But this is at once both superficial and incongruous. To say that we have a preference for party X because it favours social justice is at least to suggest that we are not merely influenced by the fact that party X is rather less likely than party Y to gain enough seats to rule. Further, it belies the fact that parties are themselves sometimes occupied with principle and particularly that they are prepared to take the initiative on 'this issue', despite considerable apathy or opposition.

If people are merely bundles of opinions, aggregating preferences, controlling leaders on the basis of their satisfaction of those preferences, it is easy to see that there is little scope for discussions of principle in party or government. Yet empirically it is the case that parties do get occupied with issues of principle: inflation, defence, human rights, monetarism, state control. Does this present the economic democrat with a telling objection?

vi. Knowledge, Information, and the New Democrats

It is of course not a necessary condition for my having a preference for the freemarket economy, that I should understand the fundamentals of Adam Smith's 'hidden hand'; it seems sufficient that I can be described as having such a preference if I merely favour abolition of government subsidies, minimal welfare benefits, abolition of price control, low taxes, and so on. Yet there is a crucial difference between preferring these socio-economic policies, i.e. between falling neatly under the description of a free market supporter and understanding and recognizing myself as a free market supporter. The point is that to qualify for the description or undergo the categorization of "free market supporter" it is not a necessary condition that I have the concept of the free market, much less understand its alternatives.

To the new democrats it is a matter of sheer indifference whether or not a man has the concept of a free market, or other socio-economic concepts. Indeed the attempt to arrive at the concept as opposed to further information about free market policies and their possible effects on him, would be regarded as irrational, since despite any private satisfaction gained by flaunting such information to one's friends, no public efficacy would thereby accrue. For the latter exists as a result of tie-breaking by utility aggregation, and does not therefore depend on conceptual sophistication.

If utility maximization is the key value we might ask why it should be maximized through groups and individuals, and not by governments? We have here all the standard problems met first by the classical utilitarians. Downs, Dahl, Riker and Tullock rest their defence on the individuals awareness of his own preferences and their possibility of realization. It is assumed by Downs, Riker

and Tullock, and not argued, that governments, whom they fear, will be under the control of individuals. Neither of these factors is a logical truth about individuals or governments, much less can it be built into democracy as such. We have already noted that the system is actually antipathetic to the acquisition of socio-political concepts. If information is a necessary means to control governments it might be anticipated that an instrumental argument can be found for knowledge, in the Revisionists. This, however, is surprisingly difficult.

The most ambitious attempt to provide for the individual aggregation of information, on instrumental grounds, is made by Downs. "In order to find his current party differential, a voter in a two party system must do the following: 1) examine all phases of government action to find out where the two parties would behave differently. 2) discover how each difference would affect his utility income, and 3) aggregate the differences in utility and arrive at a net figure which shows how much one party would be better than the other. This is how a rational voter would behave in a world of complete and costless information ..." (85)

But there are, as Downs acknowledges, various causes of uncertainty surrounding the voters field of action. The basic utility which Downs accords to information is that it reduces this area of uncertainty and not that it enhances his view of the good society. In particular information may assist voters in assigning the responsibility to a party for a decline in their utility, in assessing the repercussions on their utility of some proposed course of action. Further, as a result of increased information citizens may be able to introduce a new course of action to the government. The instrumental value of information is further evident in Down's discussion of party ideology " - many a voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity

of his relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the difference between parties; therefore they can be used as samples of all the differentiating standards. With this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues." (86) An ideology for Downs is not a view of the good society: "According to our basic hypothesis parties seek as their final ends the power, income, and prestige that go with office. Ideologies develop out of this desire as a means to gaining office." (87) In any case: "We contend that the desire to obtain and keep office per se, plays a larger role in the practical operation of democratic politics than the desire to implement ideological doctrines or serve particular social groups." (88)

By means of a party's ideology, then, a voter can make a forecast both of the more general policies a party is likely to follow, and also its likely reaction to a particular turn of events, for governments necessarily meet unanticipated contingencies. Downs wants to say that the ideology itself is not the outcome of a politicians view of the good society, but is rather the politicians view of what the voter sees as the good society. An ideology is not here a recipe for the amelioration of the human condition, it is part and parcel of the seduction of the voters. We might intuit that ideologies are the genera of event policies, and hence if Downs can show that awareness of an ideology is instrumentally useful, his democracy will entail an education. Unfortunately Downs is by no means clear about the relationship between ideologies and events, and as we have seen, between ideologies and the good life. As Downs presents it an ideology seems to amount to no more than a series of specific proposals for action. Now this could

be of some instrumental value to the voter if he were able to extrapolate from the list of events. Thus if an ideology contained events:-

1. Reduce taxes
2. Introduce selective pricing into the health service
3. Abolish subsidies:

the voter may be able to conclude:-

4. De-nationalize some state industries
5. Reduce welfare benefits.

But consider what the voter would need to know in order to successfully extrapolate (omitting chance guesswork). It is a logically necessary condition of extrapolation that the data given be reduced to a common trend line. In this example the extrapolation is a function of the concepts of laissez-faire and the free-market economic system. Subsequent items of policy initiative are deduced on the basis of their commensurability with that particular part of the socio-economic spectrum. Now Downs makes the rationality of acquiring information a function of the perceived probability that further investigation will disclose something important. But, paradoxically, we can never estimate the probability that it will disclose something important unless we know something about it.

There is evidence that Downs anticipates this conclusion but attempts to avoid it by stressing the inferiority of ideologies compared with a knowledge of events. In essence Downs argues: " - the man who uses his ideology differential as a cost-saver knows something about current affairs. But he does not know as much as a citizen using issues to make his decisions, because there are many more issues than philosophic axioms in politics. We call such compromisers dogmatists because they look at doctrines rather than behaviour when choosing a party to support." (89) Downs

fudges the issue here. Assuming Downs equates affairs with events he makes the logical point that an ideology is at one remove from a set of events. He then contends that a citizen studying issues knows more than an ideologist because there are more issues than philosophic axioms. Presumably he must say that the citizen studying issues (events) knows more about the issues (events) i.e. details, than the ideologist, who is not studying the issues, but is looking at abstract items of policy. But the whole point of knowing about issues and ideologies is to make a decision relating to the future behaviour of a party. Yet how can one see an event in a way sufficient to permit predictions without the use of a set of concepts. It is empirically unsound to argue the activities of party A in year 1 will be repeated on a one for one basis in year 10. Parties are essentially amorphous groupings susceptible to the ascendancy of different wings and themselves working within the constraints of limited resources and sundry external forces. Moreover, if parties are as responsive to societal pressures as Downs suggests, it is empirically the case that their action may be different from one period of government to the next.

What I am suggesting then is that if event prediction in the future is to be as reliable as Downs implies then such a prediction must be a function not merely of present events, but of a conceptual grasp of those events as functions of the socio-political spectrum of parties. That an ideology is more than a mere shorthand recording of events, rather that the transposition of events into an ideology requires a generalization of these events into more fundamental, sophisticated libraries of concepts, of which events are mere concrete instances.

Dahl is less opaque than Downs on this matter of information, but the locus of information is much more restricted. True Dahl gives information an important place in his model of polyarchy, but information is contingent in the important sense that Dahl is primarily concerned with the maintenance of democracy, its sustenance, and not its logical properties. He notes that:

" - whenever the citizen body is large the chances for extensive participation and a high degree of public contestation depend to some degree on the spread of reading, writing, literacy, education, and newspaper or their equivalents." (90) Of course this is to some extent catered for contingently in that an advanced economy

" - distributes political resources and political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups, and organizations. Among these skills and resources are knowledge, income, status, and esteem, among specialized groups; skill in communicating and organizing, and access to organizations, experts and elites." (91) But it is clear that: " - the complexity and richness of beliefs about the legitimacy of polyarchy no doubt increase with education, political interest, and involvement." (92)

It is hardly surprising that Dahl goes no further than this, for the focus of autonomy for Dahl is the group and not the individual. Dahl's value is autonomous pluralism. Essentially the autonomous individual and a macrocosmic notion of the good society are seen as posing the threat of unfettered change into uncertainty. Polyarchy accepts the fact of unequal political influence hence the beliefs of the leaders and groups receive far more attention than individuals. "When conflicts arise, as they inevitably do, access to political resources helps individuals and groups to prevent the settlement of the conflict by compulsion

and coercion and to insist instead upon some degree of negotiation and bargaining —. Thus systems of bargaining and negotiation grow up within, parallel to, or in opposition to hierarchical arrangements; and these systems help to foster a political subculture with norms that legitimate negotiation, bargaining, logrolling, give and take, the gaining of consent, as against unilateral power or coercion." (93) It is not the information that people possess, rather their beliefs which are crucial to polyarchy, and in particular a belief in the legitimacy of the system. These beliefs must be held unshakingly, and in blind faith. Dahl sets sufficient store by them, to make it unnecessary to grapple with any concept of social responsibility.

There seems something blatantly arbitrary about any political theory which does not provide for the very basic distinction between information and propaganda or indoctrination, especially when it claims to be a refinement of democratic models! If we ask what kind of understanding of political phenomena Dahl's voters will have, we arrive against a blank wall, where group preferences are lumped together without regard to their merit. Again, if we choose to describe voters exclusively in terms of expressing attitudes and registering opinions, we describe voting in such a way that implies that voters have no responsibility to be well informed and to think about the issues.

The latter is a reminder of the folly of supposing that the revisionist thesis will be confined only to political activity. It will taint any enterprise for whom the public criterion of a ready calculus can be easily applied. Information can readily be reduced to a means of "getting on", public activity to a "what's in it for me" mentality. What is at risk in such a polity is the public encouragement of activity which finds a purpose within itself.

For there is no possible value within such a system which justifies these activities. If they are threatened then the possibility of any criticism of the norms of society itself is also threatened. Such activities afford the material by which individuals can make an objective appraisal of what is happening against other possible alternatives. This further affords some recognition to the dignity and integrity of the person because in such activities they are not merely the instruments of another as in socialization. This is not an argument for a "high culture" for a few. Rather it is employing the logical point that the mind is not a given pre-nata entity, and therefore the development of a person must involve social influences. In addition there is the empirical point that in some societies that development is institutionalised and funded by public money with a measure of control in the light of what is thought valuable in society. It is therefore reasonable to suggest not merely that a means-end social ethic will transfer to a succeeding generation of individuals, but also that such an ethic will insist that it is quite properly influential on new members of society. It is to debar the inclusion of conflicting ideals into education, to preclude debate on different views of man and society. There seems little that can be recognized as democratic in such a position.

vii. Conclusion

To sum up, the following points apply in relation to the new democrats:

1. Market democrats deny that their systems are valutive, yet notions of self-interested rational individuals, minimum government, and utility maximization, represent the "good life" favoured by the new democrats. Their particular conception of democracy was unfolded in the guise of description. At best they can be charged

with confusing description and explanation. They claim to be descriptive, but then follow the style of explanation by proscribing some features of human behaviour and fastening upon others.

2. No justification was offered for the rationally self-interested individual, other than his apparent self-evidence. The revisionist system claims to correspond to and hence explain political behaviour; insofar as it claims that men are centres of preferences and that these preferences ought to be satisfied in any democratic political system, the system is also offering a justification.

3. Rational political action was construed on a means-end basis. This denigrates an important aspect of some empirical political behaviour and merely demonstrates how ill-adapted the model is to coping with this. Indeed what have the new democrats had to do in order to apply their paradigm of political behaviour to reality? Ingenious and acrobatic attempts are made to explain away continued adherence to traditional democratic norms such as voting, responsibility, loyalty. For the system to work as they believe it should, Riker and Ordeshook have to omit the "finer properties of man" from political behaviour, Tullock has to substitute the preference schedule for men, Downs vainly attempts to square 'social responsibility' with his utility maximizers, Dahl has to ensure an unshakeable belief in the legitimacy of his polyarchy, and Schumpeter recommends that the masses be simply kept out of politics.

4. Market theorists differ in the matter of necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. All the theorists considered seem to find elections a necessary condition of democracy. But for

pluralists the existence of autonomous groups is a necessary, and not far short of a sufficient condition for democracy. For elitists, groups are neither necessary nor sufficient, and for economic democrats provision for private utility maximisation appears to be a necessary condition.

5. This crude and ill-fashioned model can do little to explain the most eminent feature of the democratic polity namely that it affords the opportunity whereby the engagement in politics precisely need not be a one-dimensional means-end relationship. Though it is nowhere explicitly stated the gravest suspicion is warranted that the revisionist thesis in general rests on an antiquated philosophy of mind in which all enterprises in which men engage are enterprises of utility. This is fallacious. Though pursuing enterprises will increase the utility income of the person for whom these enterprises are worthwhile, those enterprises are not themselves enterprises of happiness. Whilst the revisionists seem bent on equating democracy with the society which maximizes happiness, they do not seem to appreciate that the former does not require that what everyone in that society is doing is just pursuing the maximization of utility. Hence they do not see that amongst the things that make men happy is being taken up or involved in a vast range of projects or commitments. In particular, they do not see that a participatory political and social system can afford the opportunities for just those sort of involvement and commitment.

6. The above lapse is an unfortunate one, for in empirical terms the surest way to eliminate the public opportunities for utility maximization or happiness, is to translate every activity, every conceivable rewarding undertaking into a utility calculus. Such

a currency licences only those things which it is apt to measure, the evanescent, the superficial, the slick; omitting challenge, purpose, obligation, creativity. If these points were recognized, if politics were construed as affording opportunities for enhancement and attachment, the revisionists would not have to legislate such absurdities into their systems in the vain attempt to find a "societal cement" to prevent their shallow utility democracies from crumbling. It seems monstrous that any paradigm of democracy should legislate for a split between public efficacy and private irrational satisfaction in the very act of voting. For public efficacy might be better served by the seemingly sentimental act of "doing one's bit for democracy", by casting a vote. More to the point, public efficacy on the Riker model seems to require that a man stand aside from attitudes which he takes seriously at a deep level and be alienated from his convictions, merely to become a strategic voter. The monumental indictment to be levelled at the extreme revisionist wing is that it makes an attack on individual integrity. It requires that an individual neglect those actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified, in favour of a societal optimum condition of having a clear cut majority administration. It is thus a violation of individual integrity. Some people's commitment to political interests just is at once more thorough going and serious than their pursuit of various objects of taste. Men do engage in projects connected with the support of some cause: abolition of Field Sports, Nuclear Disarmament. There are in addition other aims in political participation which flow from some more general disposition towards human conduct and character, such as hatred of injustice or of cruelty. To proscribe all such desires is to admit

for political activity only the most blatant egoistic motivation. Yet the departing point of revisionism was the failure of earlier democratic theory to account for political activity in a democracy. In place of the lofty concepts of early democratic theory, the new democrats offer a public criterion of agreement on moral and political questions which is as redundant as it is universal.

NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II

1. Chapter I, pp 33, 34
2. Schumpeter, J.A. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (5th edition) 1952. The relevant section may be conveniently found under the title. 'Two Concepts of Democracy', in Quinton A. (ed). *Political Philosophy*, O.U.P., 1967
3. Specifically his notion of 'classical democratic theory,' whereby several writers of different traditions are treated as one, resulting in a serious misuse of their work. This is discussed in Pateman, C. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. C.U.P., 1970
4. On epistemic rationality, see p.91 this chapter.
5. On pluralism, see Chapter I, p.33, then this chapter section III
6. *ibid*
7. On the differences between the utilitarians and modern market theorists, see Chapter IV, Sect. II.
8. Mention has of course been made for some time in sociological studies of the existence and significance of a high level of education in democracies, with increasing sophistication.
See for example: Lipset, S.M. *Political Man*, London. 1963., where the author sets out to test the extent to which democracy was related to various social requisites.
Lipset's work has had an important influence on Dahl:
See Dahl, R.A. *Polyarchy*, 1971. Yale University Press. New Haven.
Lipset is discussed in Banks, O. *The Sociology of Education*. London. Batsford, 1964.
Another different approach, but nonetheless avowedly empirical one, has been to encapsulate the attitudes and values which must be present if democracy is to be sustained. The major work is:
Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton University Press. 1963.
None of these works, however, provides a philosophical analysis of democracy and education, generally taking a particular model of democracy as given, without justification.
What little philosophical work has been done tends to focus on the field of political education. Some philosophical analysis on democracy and education, in general, is to be found in:

White, P.A. 'Education, Democracy, and the Public Interest' in Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H., and Peters, R.S. (eds) Education and the Development of Reason. London. R. & K. Paul. 1972

Tarrant, J.M. 'An analysis of the concept of Democracy, and its implications for Education'. Unpublished M.A. Diss. London, 1975

Very broad philosophical implications between politics and education can be found in:-

Hollis, M. Good Will in Politics, in Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, Vol V, 1976

Moore, T.W. Educational Theory - an introduction. London. R. & K. Paul, 1974.

White, P.A. 'Socialization and Education' in Dearden, R.F. et.al. (eds) op.cit.

White, J.P. Towards a Compulsory Curriculum. R. & K. Paul, 1975

White, J.P., and Gordon, P. Philosophers as Educational Reformers. R. & K. Paul. 1979.

Where attention has tended to focus on political education the conflict between market democracy and its critics emerges.

For a market position on political education see Entwistle below; I do not here want to consider the argument as to whether there ever logically can be a market 'political education', rather Entwistle is an example of the impact of the "power" theory of politics upon political education. In that respect Entwistle would cohere with pluralists such as Dahl.

Entwistle, H. Political Education in a Democracy, R. & K. Paul, 1971

Entwistle, H. 'Education and the Concept of Political Socialization', in Teaching Politics, Vol.3, No.2, May 1974

In reply to the revisionist position:-

Tarrant, J.M. 'Democracy: A Problem for the Educator', in Teaching Politics, Vol V, No.2, May 1976

White, P.A. and White, J.P. 'A Programme for Political Education' A Critique in Teaching Politics, Vol V, No.3, Sept. 1976

9. Barrow, R. Plato, Utilitarianism, and Education. R. & K. Paul, 1925
10. See, 'A Programme for Political Education', pub. by the Hansard Society, 1976
11. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972
 Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974
 Robert Dahl in his latest article takes a similar approach:
 Dahl, R.A. Procedural Democracy in Laslett, P. and Fishkin, J. eds Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. V
12. Schumpeter, op.cit. p.242
13. ibid
14. ibid
15. ibid
16. ibid. p.295
17. ibid. p.285
18. ibid. p.269
19. I use the notion of the classical theory here and elsewhere simply as a collective for the various strands of early democratic thought which Schumpeter was criticising. This does not mean that I concur with Schumpeter's treatment or verdict on earlier democratic theory.
20. Schumpeter, op.cit. p.263
21. Frohock, F.M. Normative Political Theory, 1974. Prentice-Hall. New Jersey.
 Holden, B. The Nature of Democracy. 1974. Nelson
 Lively, J. Democracy. 1975. Blackwell, Oxford.
 Lukes, S. Essays in Social Theory. 1977, Macmillan
 Oppenheim, F.E. "Facts and Values in Politics" in Political Theory, Vol 1, No. 1. Feb 1973
 Plamenatz, J. Democracy and Illusion. 1973. Longman
 Skinner, Q. "The Empirical Theorists of Democracy and their Critics" in Political Theory. Vol 1, No. 3, Aug. 1973
 Spragens, T.A. The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory. 1973. Dunellen. New York.

22. Schumpeter. *op.cit.* p.283
23. *ibid*
24. Chapter I, p.15
25. *ibid*
26. The curriculum is examined in Chapter IV for market democracy and Chapter V for moral democracy
27. Schumpeter, *op.cit.* p.284
28. See Dahl, R.A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. 1956. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. *passim*.
29. *ibid* p.3
30. Dahl, R.A. Modern Political Analysis. Prentice Hall. New Jersey 1963, p.8
31. Dahl, *op.cit.* p.22
32. Modern political analysis. *op.cit.* p.73
33. Dahl, R.A. and Lindblom, C.E. Politics, Economics and Welfare. New York. Harper. 1953. p.287
34. Dahl, R.A. 'Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargaining in Politics and Economics', p.87, quoted in Lukes, S. Essays in Social Theory. Macmillan. 1977. p.36
35. Tullock, G. The Vote Motive. 1976. Institute of Economic Affairs. p.4.
36. Locke, J. Two Treatises of Government (ed. Laslett, P.) Cambridge. C.U.P. 1966, para. 131
37. Bentham, J. A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. (Ed. Harrison, W.) Oxford: Blackwell. 1960. p.127
38. Mill, J.S. On Liberty and Representative Government. O.U.P. 1912 p.236
39. Dahl and Lindblom. *op.cit.* p.520
40. *ibid* p.300
41. *ibid* p.520
42. *ibid*.p.294

43. *ibid* p.38
44. *ibid* p.95
45. *ibid* p.96
46. *ibid* p.95
47. *ibid* p.82
48. *ibid* p.86
49. *ibid* p.522
50. *ibid* p.523
51. *Modern Political Analysis. op.cit. p.37*
52. Locke, J. *A Letter Concerning Toleration. New York. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955*
53. Berki, R.M. *The History of Political Thought. London. Dent 1977. p.129*
54. Davis, H. *The English Free Churches. O.U.P. 1963. p.8*
55. Elton, B.R. *Reformation Europe.. Fontana. 1963. p.279*
56. Dahl and Lindblom. *op.cit. p.57*
57. Downs, A. *An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York. Harper and Row, 1957. p.7.*
58. *ibid* p.23
59. *ibid* p.28
60. *ibid* p.28
61. James Mill. *On Education (ed. Burston, W.H.) Cambridge C.U.P. 1969. p.118*
62. Downs. *op.cit. p28*
63. Mill *op.cit. p.118*
64. Downs *op.cit. p.7*
65. *ibid*
66. *ibid* p.246
67. *ibid* p.367
68. *ibid* p.268
69. For Rousseau see Chapter III. Kant is also discussed in Chapter III.

70. As one proceeds through the writings of the Economic Democrats there is an increasing emphasis on privatization, and individual utility as the rationale for all social action. Indeed the latter collapses into private action.
71. Specifically this applies to Riker and Ordeshood: see this Chapter p. 94
72. Tullock G. The Vote Motive. op.cit. p.12
73. ibid, preface X
74. Tullock, G. Towards a Mathematics of Politics: University of Michigan Press. 1967. p.1.
75. Benn, S.I. The Problematic Rationality of Political Participation. Unpublished Paper, 1975, p.1. (Since revised by Professor Benn)
76. Ibid p.2
77. ibid p.7
78. op.cit. p.4.
79. Riker, W.H. and Ordeshook, P.C. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. New Jersey. Prentice-Hall. 1973. p.62
80. ibid p.10
81. ibid p.46
82. ibid p.60
83. Benn op.cit. p.7
84. op.cit. p.2
85. op.cit. p.246
86. ibid p.98
87. ibid p.111
88. ibid p.112
89. ibid p.100
90. Polyarchy, op.cit. p.75
91. ibid p.75
92. ibid p.13
93. ibid p.523

Chapter III - Moral Democrats and Education

i. Introduction

Earlier in this discussion I drew a distinction between moral and market conceptions of democracy. In the second chapter I considered various market theorists and in this chapter I propose to consider several moral theorists. I have already made preliminary points about the possibility of a very general relationship between ethics, epistemology, politics and education, and an attempt was made to apply this to Plato's Republic, and also consider the applicability of this model to liberal democracy. (1) It was suggested that both conceptions of democracy had important implications for the aims and concept of education. (2) For example, if it is held that evaluating the constitutions, norms, and goals of the political and social macrocosm is a task for the majority of citizens, then clearly some kind of preparation is necessary for this. Moreover, if a particular conception of democracy entertained the ideal of the critical citizen, then a preparation which enshrines these values is necessary. For a critical citizen is one who can consider the worth or otherwise of that which is around him. This he cannot do, logically, unless he has other ideals with which to compare norms and values that are current.

I have considered market democracy in detail and argued that it has important defects both in its logical and empirical properties, but also in its implications for education. (3) I want now to elaborate on the concept of "traditional" or "moral" theories of democracy, and in particular argue that they have implicit the notion of a "dynamic" political equality which revisionists consider chimerical. I do not want to suggest that this particular concept is evident within the institutions of modern liberal democracies: indeed I acknowledge that it is not. But I do want to suggest that it is integral to the development of democratic theory, even though

its application in liberal democracy is tightly controlled. The latter phrase requires some elucidation.

In chapter I it was noted that the different conceptions of democracy held in common the view that a change of government on a regular statutory basis, was a necessary feature of a democratic society. (4) Liberal democracy entails political equality in the sense of one man one vote and the possibility of changing the government by constitutional means. The latter of course where it is to be effective rather than nominal, entails freedom of speech, association, and judicial independence. But the equality provision does not go beyond that of formal political equality. It does not extend, for example, to the possibility either of social and economic equality, or of participation beyond the mere political level to the institution of work. Liberalism and its corollary of privatization do not of themselves directly support any form of political organization, but primarily a particular form of economic life. Whereas the state had been the fountain of the good life in Athens (5), it was a potential threat to the latter for the liberals. What the utilitarians achieved was the harnessing of democratic ideas including equality, and resentment against arbitrary power, and promoting through them a form of social and political organization that afforded liberalism most of what it wanted, especially the division between the public and the private in people's lives. From the pen of John Stuart Mill sufficient was written for the inference to be drawn that there was an inverse relationship between state intervention and a free people. (6) The sovereign rule of pluralism remains a monument to the success of this doctrine. Whilst Mill did not elevate his reservations about the deleterious effects of state power to the status of an axiom, I have tried to show that the most formidable exponent of pluralism today, has so acted, for how else could he defend his

programme of political indoctrination. (7)

Liberals, and their specifically political wing, pluralism, have taken, then, what are fundamentally democratic ideas and employed them to buttress a form of social organization a short of a public moral life and rational social institutions. The liberal democratic state does provide formal political equality, it does invoke challenges to arbitrary power, it does stress personal freedom, but it does not permit such values to measure either its obsession with privatization or its economic system of industrial capitalism. Above all, it does not appear to acknowledge that such values issue logically in an education of the sort I have already spoken about. (8) Yet there is a body of theorists whose work is a challenge to the precepts of the above model. What these theorists did was to continue to develop democratic ideas and eventually arrived, not at a total state, but a society committed to educating for the critical citizen.

Labelling theorists into rival schools of thought, is I admit a hazardous enterprise. It is perfectly true that there is much in common between Schumpeter and Locke (9) yet I have placed Schumpeter in one category and Locke in another. This is not a matter of chronology: Locke could be classified as a revisionist with his lack of attachment to elections, his view of politics as a regulative activity, his indifference to the political literacy of the mass of the people, his belief in a "private" pleasure calculus, and his minimal state. Locke, however, introduced the notion of 'tacit' consent, and attempted to apply the standard of Natural Law to politics. In so doing he laid, however embryonically, the foundations for a political role for the majority, and a standard of political rectitude beyond expediency. Yet he was not prepared

for the majority of men and women to exercise direct political control.

Though I acknowledge then that the dividing line at the point where I have drawn it is not a clear one, as in the case of Locke, it is nonetheless I believe, a defensible one. J.S. Mill, as I have suggested, has important similarities with the market democrats. He was a staunch advocate of proportional representation (10) and admitted state intervention with reluctance. Yet Mill also perceived the possibility of government as a means of ameliorating the moral life and experience of the ordinary man and woman. No ambiguity attaches to the classification of Rousseau as a 'moral' democrat; it is indeed a fascinating exercise to oppose the beliefs of Rousseau and Dahl. The former had a horror of partial associations which Dahl considers the hallmark of polyarchy. Additionally there can be no ambiguity on the position of Kant and T.H. Green.

It follows, therefore, that the moral or traditional democratic theorists whom I discuss may be considered along a continuum, extending from a clouded perception that there is indeed a moral dimension to politics, to the position where this moral dimension becomes paramount, as in Kant, finally to T.H. Green, where the moral dimension becomes sufficiently imperative for it to be inconceivable for such a society to be without education. I have stated already that whatever the latter might also entail, it will include the critical examination of society. There is, I would submit, an enormous contrast between utilitarian man, and the postulates of Kantian ethics. When the latter, with its axiom that men should be treated as an end, and not merely as a means, is applied to politics, it entails a much tighter demand on governments, than the utilitarians, for a political system allowing the greatest possible human freedom to its citizens. In particular, it is not a logical impossibility to envisage a political tyranny, yet also a happy society. Yet the

early utilitarians seemed to stipulate just such an impossibility. (11) Since their prime value, however, was happiness, it would seem that the extent of power and the nature of power of such a government is beside the point if it could make society happier than the representative institutions could. Of course it was felt that happiness arose from pursuing one's own interests, and that governments placed restrictions upon society, ultimately affecting such pursuits. But this cannot rise to the status of a logical impossibility, it is a mere empirical generalization, elevated into the status of an axiom by Bentham. Thus I would argue that it is always possible to envisage a greater amount of happiness accruing to society from the actions of a benevolent despot. In such a situation the classical utilitarian would have to champion the former society against democracy and therefore I conclude that the connection between classical utilitarianism and democracy is essentially contingent. Kant cannot be so readily dismissed because for him, freedom from arbitrary power was an essential precondition of moral agency.

In the discussion so far I have employed the term "dynamic" political equality, and I must at this point explain its use. Dynamic political equality entails two notions. In the first place it contains a belief in the possibility and desirability of the amelioration of men. To some extent it links with the notion of virtue in ancient political thought insofar as it contains the property of cognitive development. Additionally it envisages that provision shall be made within the institutions of society, especially the political system, for the means of human improvement. Dynamic political equality is the hallmark of moral democrats, as is the preoccupation with the political system as the principal means of amelioration. It is thus also the contrasting feature with market

democrats with their formal "passive" political equality.

It should be evident from the points made so far, that "dynamic" political equality is not manifest equally, or to the same degree, in moral democrats. Indeed, had it been so, and acknowledged as having been so, my thesis would be redundant. Rather, the concept of dynamic political equality evolves in these theorists, rather than appears explicitly. Liberal democracy is the uneasy ~~analysis~~^{face} of the market and moral theories of democracy. As such, dynamic political equality, if acknowledged unambiguously, would threaten some cardinal values of market democracy. What I want to argue about moral democratic theories is that the presence of a moral imperative to educate their members, is guaranteed by the truth of the ethical properties integral to the theory. For example, in many respects T.H. Green represents the acme of this perception of conceptual entailment, in his idea of the right to education. Green acknowledged a *prima facie* motivation for social action within the particular ethical propositions he held. A sincere assent to the latter entailed the recognition of a moral imperative. His doctrine of self-realization, properly understood, was a refusal to acknowledge the primacy of instrumental reasons for education, and a recognition that the ethical properties were themselves sufficient and proper motivation. Thus an imperative to educate has here the status of a primary value, freed from the snares of utilitarian considerations. Insofar as liberal democrats want the inheritance of moral democratic theories, and they do, they must, to be consistent, acknowledge the imperatives immanent in those theories. At present they are not prepared to do this, but my aim is to point out that such an imperative exists in the case of education.

I am not concerned with the point that societies do take steps of one sort or another to pass on their beliefs, skills, norms, from one generation to another. I am concerned rather with the relationship between the concept of education and the primary values immanent within their particular political system, and in particular within liberal democracy. It is the failure to recognize the link between these values and education that is threatening to emaciate the aims of education to a mere endorsement of current economic requirements, and not any suggestion that such a manoeuvre is circular. We have the concept of education that we do, partly because of these values, and it is the failure to perceive this value laden nature of the concept which threatens, when its utilitarian effects come under suspicion. (12) Indeed the liberal democrat is now on the horns of a dilemma. He has the vestiges of a liberal education, which he cannot now justify and only hanker after, yet at the same time the former is also found to be ill-suited to modern utilitarian aspirations. The malaise of education in a declining economy is a damning indictment of the liberal-democrats' paper-thin appreciation of his political heritage. Dewey's warning on the dangers of trade education is apposite: "Education would then become an instrument of perpetuating unchanged the existing industrial order of society, instead of operating as a means of its transformation." (13)

There is, however, besides the value ascendancy of education, another theme bequeathed by moral democrats which again is immanent in liberal democracy, but again tightly controlled. It is the matter that involvement by citizens within the political system itself required an ability to formulate and express ideas. That formal, procedural equality was not in itself a sufficient condition, though a necessary one, for popular control of governments. The primary means of controlling this strand of thought has been the existence

of a representative democracy with its concept of authorisation. Yet as Mill saw, some representatives are better than others and the problem of selection then ultimately turns on the fund of informed judgement in the public at large. "A democracy has enough to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency sufficient for its own proper work, that of superintendence and check". (14) Nonetheless, the implications of this doctrine were brilliantly checked by Locke through the device of tacit consent.

ii. Locke and the Levellers

That a connection was anticipated between consent and education prior to Locke, is clear from the work of the Levellers. It is moreover clear that the notion of consent was definitely stronger than Locke's doctrine of tacit consent. Locke's preoccupation with the supremacy of the legislative seemingly radical with its implied ascendancy over the executive is seen in the context of the Putney debates, to be quite reactionary. In the former debates, Rainsborough produced a doctrine of consent which implied that:

" - parliament must be inferior to, and limited in power by the people who choose its members, - every individual's consent to what is done by the government depends upon his personal enjoyment of some actual share in the political process; that is, at least in his possession of the franchise." (15) Overton and Lilburne envisaged annual parliaments, the separation of powers and a redistribution of seats among constituencies. Rainsborough forges an even stronger notion of consent during the Putney Debates:

" - everyman that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict

sense to the government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under." (16)

Active consent of this order presupposes an ability to choose between alternatives, but it may be objected that not very much is said of this particular implication by the Levellers. However, the Levellers exhibit an understandable preoccupation with the institutional deficiencies and corruption of their day. An independent judiciary and a reformed and ascendent House of Commons appeared to be more urgent short term priorities, a point neglected by Dahl (17) in his polemic on the inefficacy of institutional checks in a democracy. In fact, in his "Certain Articles", Overton included the demand: "that in all parts or Counties of the Realme of England, and Dominions of Wales destitute of Free-Schooles (for the due nurture and education of children) may have a competent number of such Schooles, founded, erected, and indowed at the publique charges of those respective Counties and places so destitute, that few or none of the free men of England may for the future be ignorant of reading and writing." (18)

Rainsborough was advocating a form of self assumed obligation which needs to be contrasted with the abstract individualism and tacit consent of Locke. Notions of self-assumed obligation logically presuppose that individuals perceive their own interest, for insofar as they cannot differentiate between their own situation, their own circumstances, and that of a changed situation or circumstance it seems illegitimate to talk of their assuming an obligation. In order for individuals to form perceptions of political, social, and moral relationships there must be provision for a moral and social education. The latter imperative is partly a logical one. A moral and social standpoint does not arise automatically from an inbuilt perceptive programme. Rather,

it develops *pari passu* with moral and political practice.

"Individuals learn to look critically at their own actions, and also at the rules and principles that order their social practices and the institutions of liberal democracy." (19) "Consciousness is not divorced from forms of social life; if individuals are to do more than merely authorize representatives to act for them, they must be given the means to do it." (20)

I am suggesting then that it is more than mere coincidence that an emphasis on the importance of education for citizens varies directly with notions of consent entertained by different thinkers. Locke of course could not accept the views of men like Rainsborough and Overton. The latter's statement on freedom shows how far he differed from Locke: "For by naturallbirth, all men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedome, and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature into this world, everyone with a naturall, innate freedome and propriety even so are we to live, everyone equally and alike to enjoy his Birthright and priviledge; even all where of God by nature hath made him free." (21) By contrast, Locke wrote for a substantial propertied order, and has more in common with Schumpeter than Rousseau and Green. Locke, however, is instructive in that he advocates a metaphysical and ethical doctrine of potential revolutionary implications, yet manages to assimilate political action to that of action appropriate to private conduct. "For Locke there is nothing inherently different in learning how to make decisions in political matters from learning how to dispose of one's property." (22) Locke is happy to single out property rather than knowledge as the quintessence of political man.

Locke was not much less of a democrat than James Mill; the latter would undoubtedly have supported Locke's thoroughly

utilitarian conjecture that legislators: " - are themselves subject to the Laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the publick good." (23)

His insistence on the supremacy of the legislature, and government under the rule of law was a modest but significant reforming stand.

"And so whoever has the Legislature or Supreme Power of any Commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing Laws, promulgated and known to the People, not by Extemporary Decrees; by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by the Laws." (24)

For Locke, democracy consists in the majority making law through a supreme legislature."

"The Majority may imploy all that power in making Laws for the Community from time to time, and Executing those laws by Officers of their own appointing; and then the Form of Government is a perfect Democracy. For the Form of Government depending upon the placing of the Supreme power, which is the Legislature - of these the Community may make (25) compounded and mixed Forms of Government, as they think good." Though he considers some form of mixed government the logic of his utilitarian considerations is that oligarchy and monarchy are less likely to care for the public good. In addition, Locke is insistent that the legislature meet regularly, which also mitigates against absolutism.

Locke's notion of consent is primarily limited to an approval of the particular political system per se and not to an examination of each law on its merits. His view appears to be that the former justifies the latter. Yet his argument relating to the initial establishment of the political system is itself a weak one. No moral justification is offered for the establishment of the procedural device of majority rule, it emerges simply as the most efficacious

device for securing the unity of society. Thus he writes:
 " - it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it which is the consent of the majority - or else it is impossible that it should act or continue to act as one body, one community, which the consent of everybody that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority." (26)

An argument emerges here, viz:

1. Without the consent of the majority it is impossible the Body remain one.
2. Every individual uniting into it agreed that it should remain one.
3. Therefore every individual is bound by that agreement to agree to the conclusion of the majority. But there is a lacuna in this argument. Only the insertion of an additional premise will give a valid argument.

Thus:

- 1a. With the consent of the majority it is impossible that the Body should not remain one.

In fact (1a) is not a logical truth.

What Locke's analogy assumes is:

- i) Equal political determination and feeling between every atomistic individual on every issue.
- ii) An identity between particular laws and the community such that refusal to agree to a law was also refusal to comply with the community per se.

Yet laws themselves alter the very basis of the community and society into which we entered. There is no contradiction in accepting a community as properly constituted, and yet not acquiescing in some of its laws. Yet Locke assumes that the latter action destroys the community. Further, the analogy also breaks

down if we assume that different intensities of feeling exist between different individuals on the matter of political action. Thus the majority may not in fact represent the 'heaviest' weight or the strongest pull on the Body!

It has long been recognized that there is a measure of dissonance between Locke's political theory, and his epistemology. (27) The peculiar passivity of the former is due to its being founded on a powerful predestination ethic, of Calvinism (28), the latter is democratic. Locke's Calvinism led him to equate the propertied with the rational, and poverty with idleness. Essentially therefore Locke finds no moral imperative as a result of which the state may legitimately act for the amelioration of men. He would not acknowledge with Green, that: " - law serves a moral end because it helps to create certain conditions of life." (29) Nor could he say with Green, that: "Moral agency is not merely an agency by which an end is attained but an agency determined by an idea on the part of the agent, by his conception of an end or function." (30) It was essentially the conjunction of these two propositions, which Locke would not accept: that certain conditions of life were necessary for the determination of the idea on the part of the agent, for his conception of an end of function. Indeed, he would not consider it possible that the state could create such conditions.

Locke is prepared to grant only the successful a place in grappling with the problems of the community. He does not feel obliged to grant the facility of considering substantive issues to the bulk of the population. Lack of property was evidence of lack of moral and rational fibre. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the poor had forfeited their spark of rationality by their failure to succeed materially, or at least they had shown it to be ill-placed. By the same token, by failing in the index of

rationality, they had forfeited their right to participation in the political life of the community, that is they had forfeited their right to education.

It has been argued that "throughout his work Locke opposed authoritarianism in intellectual life." (31) To the extent to which this is true, however, it does nothing to mitigate the dead hand of his political conclusions. For it was his political stance, and not his intellectual virtues, which influenced his views on education. It is not coincidental that in his educational theory, Locke's emphasis is more on character and less on the specific content of political knowledge. This is because Locke thinks that certain states are self evidently desirable such that there can be no dispute about them. They depend for their realization on enlightened leadership and corporate acceptance. There is a happy coincidence between outward material prosperity and inward merit.

"Though I have said - that all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality, Age or Virtue may give men a just Precedency; Excellence of Parts and Merit may place others above the common level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an observance to those whome nature, Gratitude or other respects may have made it due." (32)

This alliance between prosperity and character can be endured because there is no Platonic hierarchy of "political" knowledge. Insofar as it appeals to the senses, in some degree the property of all, Locke's epistemology is essentially democratic. In Lockean empiricism the subject is passive, he is receptive, reflexive, responsive in the constitution of experience. Even moral knowledge is grounded in sense experience for without the senses reason would lack its raw material.

" - of experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation

employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials of thinking." (33)

But there is an element of determinism about this which Locke readily admits.

"Men, then, come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety; and from the operation of their minds, within, according as they more or less reflect on them." (34)

It is a corollary of this statement that our unequal possession of property makes us see the virtues of being in society differently. Granted, there is no scope here for philosopher kings searching for a reality denied to those who are limited to mere appearances. Yet, Locke's epistemology merely invites attention to focus on the sense limitations of the ordinary individual. Ideas come from experience, and are the materials of reason and knowledge, yet experience differs from one individual to another. Locke's educated man is one who has developed his understanding and gifts assiduously through his experience of the social, intellectual, and political worlds, so that he is equipped to tackle the problems of private and public life.

"The improvement of the understanding is for two ends: first, for our own increase of knowledge; secondly, to enable us to deliver and make out that knowledge to others. The latter of these; if it be not the chief end of study in a gentleman yet it is at least equal to the other, since the greatest part of his business and usefulness in the world is by the influence of what he says or writes to others." (35)

The product of such a system is an enlightened 'all rounder'.
 "The business of education - is not, as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the sciences, but so to open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable of any when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, their minds grow stiff in it, and do not readily turn to another." (36)

His educational programme is one for rulers:
 " - gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge. And thus the studies which more immediately belong to his calling are those which treat of virtues and vices of civil society and the arts of government, and so will take in also law and history." (37)

It might be argued that this account of the relationships between ethics, epistemology, and education, in Locke, fails to take account of his interpretation of the Law of Nature, and it is the latter, rather than his adherence to predestination which should be considered. Further, that if the latter is given its due importance, my hypothesis will not hold. I want to suggest, however, that the Law of Nature is for Locke merely an external standard, about which most men may be deluded or mistaken. The Law of Nature does not therefore, in Locke, have drastic political implications; in particular, in the way in which he presents it, it permits a bifurcation between ethics and politics. The latter amounts to an enforced division between the ideals and methods of democracy, repeated by Schumpeter, which permits both the limitation on mass political activity, especially autonomy, and the non-recognition of the intrinsic right of a community member to an education, so that the course of society may be continually presented as a closed

question. We do not find such a division in Rousseau, for example, where education is both the means and the exemplification of democratic ideals. It is through education, that self-assumed obligation, the consideration of, and conclusion on, substantive issues, is made possible.

What I mean by the externality of Natural Law in Locke, is that it fails to influence the key value in Locke's system, that of liberty. It fails to promote and define liberty for the mass of the people, who are to be left in and condemned to a state of perpetual ignorance. (38) Natural Law is necessary for Locke, in that " - in Locke one sets up, by consent and contract, a political system which guarantees the natural rights which one has as a consequence of Natural Law." (39) Subsequently " - he allows a rather egalitarian theory of property justified by Natural Law and labour, to be weakened by a theory of money justified by universal consent." (40) Natural Law is on one level, that of general moral obligations, but in addition there are particular political obligations, on another level.

It is soon apparent that the relationship between Natural Law and the particular political obligations of the Social Contract is not one of reciprocity. Natural Law is both a decree of divine will and a dictate of reason. It is not only consent which creates a duty of obedience but there also arises a general duty of obedience from Natural Law. (41) Notoriously, Locke could ground the obligation of tacit consent, in its most significant manifestation of the inheritance of property, not merely in social utility but in Natural Law.

"In his theory of personal tacit consent - Locke again tends to weaken the claims of Natural Law and rights, just as his theory of money justified by universal consent had weakened them." (42)

Though Locke's social arrangements then, draw support from Natural Law, it would appear that they are not to be compared with the standards of the former. The denigration of Natural Law, however, is not complete until the doctrine of liberty. Locke believes that individuals are motivated by pleasure and pain (43), but he also believes that salvation, or rather the desire for salvation, manifests itself in "unease" and the path to salvation is one composed of "unease". Since the mass of the people experience "unease" in abundance, through a poor material existence, this would seem to auger well for their salvation, and bode ill for the affluent. However, Locke thinks that there is a qualitative difference between the "unease" arising from material deprivation and that conducive to salvation. In addition, some individuals are defective because lack of uneasiness. Salvation is the greatest good, but:

" - the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged to have -. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery; but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it makes a part of our misery." (44)

Clearly basic needs for food, shelter, warmth, can create a level of unease sufficient to stifle the unease for salvation.

"Conduct is moral only to the extent that the uneasiness of salvation is strong enough to override the uneasiness of immediate appetites and passions. The uneasiness over salvation would have to be very great to outweigh the uneasiness of hunger, but if the basic needs were satisfied and their continued satisfaction more or

less guaranteed by a large store of secure property, then a relatively weak uneasiness over salvation would outweigh the uneasiness arising from the threat of non-satisfaction of basic needs." (45)

The implication of Locke's position for the moral life of the mass of men is clear: they are incapable of moral conduct. What is not immediately apparent is that they are by the same token incapable of liberty. "To the extent that an individual's conduct is determined by the immediate flow of uneasiness, his conduct cannot be free, rational or moral. Liberty is the power of the agents' mind to intervene in the stream of passional determinations. The capability of the mind to intervene appears to depend on a higher passion being split off from the lower passions. This higher passion is the desire for salvation, and it is the strength of this desire which determines the mind's capability to intervene in the flow of immediate or lower uneasiness which would otherwise determine action. Thus free, rational and moral conduct coincide and they depend upon the relative strength of the desire for salvation as opposed to the strength of earthly desires." (46)

Though there is liberty then in suspending the operation of desire, pending an examination thereof, few can attain it. Locke however does not always acknowledge this. " - we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as everyone daily may experiment in himself." (47) Where he does perceive the deprived condition of most men, Locke simply abandons it to base his reforms on the propertied.

"These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes - a great part of mankind are,

by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those opinions; the greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries." (48)

The liberty of the intellectual appears to be the paradigm case of freedom for Locke:

"This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good." (49)

The final irony, however, is that:

" - morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general - ". (50)

The mass of the people is not merely in a hopeless state of ignorance, it is to remain there. We might conclude at this point by noting that Locke is a good deal more honest than some of his commentators have been in their suggestions that salvation is a possible path for all men.

"But the precise path to salvation is not clearly set out for men and they must find their own way, both in their reflection and in their works." (51)

The mass of the people then, derive no liberty from the Lockean state. Their condition is arguably far more wretched than it was prior to the social state since they ~~now have an~~ obligation to respect

the accumulation and inheritance of property. These obligations are not mere products of the Social Contract, they are supported by Natural Law. Yet they themselves are owed no obligations of moment from others, for there is no property to respect and little to gain from stability. Natural Law is external to them in that they cannot by the action of obligations within society appropriate the means of salvation and experience liberty. For the majority of Locke's state, then, liberty is chimerical and the Contract a pyrrhic victory.

Thus it may seem that of Locke there is nothing more to be said. His political system and ethical precepts appear to be an exemplification of passive political equality. The Laws of Nature, the sensation of unease, are necessary but not sufficient conditions of salvation, and of Liberty. Locke, however, bequeathes here a legacy of continual moment within Liberal Democratic theory. For having enunciated the several necessary conditions for liberty, Locke thereby unwittingly provides the basis of argument whereby those conditions should be made sufficient. It should be noted that the reason why many people cannot attain liberty is according to Locke, their urgent, current, unease for obtaining the necessities of life. It is this which prevents attention to the desire for salvation. Locke does not at any time change this handicap into a moral argument against the majority of men enjoying liberty: it is merely that their circumstances do not permit it. Yet by his very attempt to argue for moral agency, partly on the basis of a transcendental standard (Natural Law), partly on a universal human faculty (reason) and partly on the existence of moral knowledge (" - morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general - " (52)), Locke creates the situation whereby one can always ask that material circumstances be remedied in order to

provide a sufficient condition for liberty.

Locke might argue that such a transaction would conflict with moral considerations in that it would alter the distribution of property and wealth, already consented to. But such a consent was purely tacit. A man can will his property to his heir, who has not laboured for it, nor left over an abundance for others. Indeed, if Locke believed that one's own consent was an expression of one's natural equality, of the natural rights one has in virtue of natural law, he ought to have considered the special character of unanimous consent far more carefully than he did. It is because Natural Law remains as a standard for Locke, albeit an external one, that there remains a continual tendency within liberal democratic theory for moral agency to be actualised not merely within the area of consent to political arrangements but within other spheres of social control. The logic of this view to actualise moral agency is that the antecedent conditions to acts like voting should also be provided.

"If consent is to exist in some significant sense, then at a minimum, there are two conditions necessary. First consent has to be seen as something that arises from the acts of citizens. Now it is frequently regarded as a matter for government manipulation; consent is something that governments can (and should) manufacture; enlist, forge, generate, arouse or maximize. Secondly, if citizens are to consent then, as in the social practice of promising, they must be able to ascertain what kind of commitment they are undertaking and whether good reasons exist for them to do so". (53)

The first consideration requires a direct participatory involvement in the community, the second, an education such that men can question the values and ends of the society in which they live and know sufficient to make choices between one avenue and another.

What liberal democrats have from Locke is an uneasy alliance between consent and voting, which is always open to challenge.

"Unlike promising, liberal democratic voting, for example, allows citizens to vote only at times, and on matters chosen by others, and in voting, citizens choose representatives who will then determine the content of their political obligation." (54)

It is important to remember that the challenge is a moral one. Doubtless the importance of moral agency has been greatly reinforced by other theorists such as Kant but the importance of Locke is that in his work, as the hero of liberal democrats, the justification of a far more participatory society can be found, and by implication, of an educative society.

As long as the citizen is seen as a centre of private consciousness, exercising private choices, this tension in liberal-democracy does not become apparent. Indeed, moral reasons may even seem to require increasing privatization, so that the deliberations of the subject and the actions of the subject, indeed be his and his alone. But there is another perspective to private choice. It is that the latter is a consequence of closed public choices. The Lockean state is the acme of closed public choice, founded as it is on the supposed non-controversial premise of protecting property. Thereafter all choices are private choices. Where, however, choices are public, where the citizen is a moral chooser, and not a passive recipient of obligations vicariously undertaken, the moral and political dimension of public life requires inculcation. As an example, for Schumpeter we are assumed to be rational only about our immediate wants, not about public life in general. The corollary of this position is that the only knowledge the citizen requires, outside his own private interests, which may be called political knowledge, is knowing

how to fulfil the function of choosing a representative. Though it would be plausible for Locke to argue that choices were largely private choices because the government's impact on the individual was minimal, that could not be said today in a modern liberal democracy where public life impinges much more often on private life. Thus it would seem on the liberal-democrats own premise of private choice and moral agency, rather more than the mere mechanics of choosing representatives should be provided for the citizen.

iii. Rousseau, consent and education

That Rousseau recognizes that education is crucial to a participatory theory of consent is clear from the attention which he devotes to the former. A number of points emerge in his thesis most importantly that he requires a transformation of society, as Locke did not, in order to facilitate his notion of consent and that he recognized an entitlement to education for the citizens of his social contract, in order to realize consent. Consent for Rousseau was nothing if it was not active, if it did not emanate from the will. Yet how could a citizen will that which he did not know or approve or opine that which he could not understand? For Rousseau, it is crucial that the citizen be able to grapple with the issues of his time, and not merely authorize representatives to obligate him on every issue. The only way in which the individual can maintain the original principle of nature and exist for others is by universalising his identity and having as his concern the common good. Education can ensure that the individual comes to feel that his good lies in following this way.

Rousseau establishes a logical relationship between consent and education. We consent only where our will conforms to our actions, and it is education which ensures our will conforms to our actions.

"Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral, i.e. the will which determines the act, the other physical, i.e. the power which executes it." (55)

It is education which transforms the will so that actions accord with virtue, and are moral actions.

Locke was concerned only with tacit consent for the bulk of his state, Rousseau was concerned with virtue. The transformation of Emile was to make it possible for him to be a party with others in deliberations to decide the social arrangements to which he should be subject. If we ask why this should be so, the answer can only be that it was necessary in order that Emile preserve his freedom and yet be in society. Emile was not merely entitled to be free within society, for that freedom required a will that was his and his alone.

"Indeed, the freedom of man's will as distinct from physical matter is in a sense the root of Rousseau's political thought; the virtuous society must be free because citizens are slaves, (i.e. not truly men) if they do not freely will the laws that govern them." (56)

Rousseau does not specifically distinguish between empirically necessary and logically necessary conditions of democracy. Notwithstanding it seems that the General Will must count as a logically necessary condition, since if the Will becomes particular, the state is " - necessarily altered in substance" (57), and " - all reform becomes impossible." (58) In the Social Contract, Rousseau details what are in fact empirically necessary conditions for democracy, noting that, " - all these conditions could not exist without virtue." Education is logically necessary to democracy in that what (59) Rousseau understands by Democracy is a political society in which there is a common denominator, in that

men live as they are and not as others want them to be. To live as they are requires, as Rousseau saw, that men be able to resist the social construction of the post-division of labour society.

"In the state of nature, desires are limited and pity is not stifled by artificial passions, since "goodness" merely requires the absence of an intention to harm others, man is naturally good. In contrast, virtue is not natural; virtue requires the mastery of natural impulsions and the intention to act well towards others, and hence presupposes that men have learned to think within society." (60)

The point is that though men are naturally good, in society deliberation is required in order to arrive at an optimal solution for all. The acme of education is to ensure that such deliberation emanate solely from the will of a free creature, who is yet in the midst of society. On this Rousseau is adamant: " - my freedom consists in this very thing, that I can will what is for my own good, or what I esteem as such without any external compulsion." (61) It is the fruit of education, for Rousseau, to retain man's virtue within society, such that laws which appear to impinge on individual autonomy, actually enhance it. Thus he says of Emile:

"The public good, which to others is a mere pretext, is a real motive for him. It is not true that he gains nothing from the laws, they give him courage to be just -. It is not true that they have failed to make him free; they have taught him to rule himself." (62)

In identifying our own good with the public good, it is possible to ensure that our will conforms to our actions by making society's laws our laws. Thus our actions in society become moral actions because they are in accordance with laws that we have willed

and alienation is avoided. It is education that produces the free individual within society and facilitates the emergence of the general will. Such a process is not primarily one of intellectual accommodation: it cannot be so for Rousseau since he recognizes that the power of reasoning differs greatly from one individual to another. Rather, it reflects an ideal of fraternity not an individualistic, abstract, intellectual process.

Virtue is the overall aim of education. Since Rousseau requires an egalitarian society, a participatory society, in which citizens will all relate to one another, he favours education for all by the state. Education must be for all if men are not to be manipulated by others. Manipulation was the hallmark of the post-division of labour society. Man in the state of nature could recognize such insincerity, but education could be deleterious to such a quality:

"Human nature was not at bottom better then than now; but men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel the value, prevented their having many vices." (63)

"The question is no longer whether a man is honest, but whether he is clever. Rewards are lavished on wit and ingenuity, while virtue is left unhonoured. There are a thousand prizes for fine discourses, and none for good actions. We have physicists, geometricians, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians and painters in plenty, but have no longer a citizen among us -". (64)

What Rousseau comes close to suggesting is that an appropriate moral education is a sufficient education for citizenship in a democracy; certainly that it is a necessary condition, for he considers insincerity to be incompatible with citizenship. Men will not be able to universalize their will if others are an unknown quantity. Deception and manipulation were dissonant

with fraternity. There was no greater failing produced by intellectual progress than the substitution of envy for compassion amongst men, and the harnessing of self improvement to greed. It was compassion and not reason that was the prime civilizer of men. Of the former, he states:

" - it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance, which every man would experience in doing evil, even independence of the maxims of education. Although it might belong to Socrates and other minds of the like craft to acquire virtue by reason, the human race would long since have ceased to be had its preservation depended only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it." (65)

The vices which Rousseau identifies, lack of sincerity, lack of integrity, date from the introduction of property: "It now became the interest of men to appear what they were really not. To be and to seem became two totally different things, and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the vices that go on their train." (66)

It would appear that modern man sacrificed integrity when he grasped at material wants:

"In reality, the source of all these differences is that the savage lives within himself, while social men lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgement of others concerning him." (67)

The corollary is that such a man fails to take his measure from just laws, and his standard of right from the public good. It is these which Rousseau intends shall reflect a quintessential standard of right.

Education is indispensable in such a moral regeneration since it can reflect those moral values which are the source and sustenance of Rousseau's polity.

"To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children." (68)

It seems, too, that other passions may arise and smother those implanted by the educator, unless education is in the hands of the state. Rousseau postulates education as an empirically necessary condition for popular government: "Public education under the regulations prescribed by the government, and under magistrates established by the sovereign, is one of the fundamental rules of popular or legitimate government. If children are brought up in the bosom of equality; if they are imbued with the laws of the State and the precepts of the general will; if they are taught to respect these above all things; if they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly remind them of the tender mother who nourishes them, of the love she bears them, of the inestimable benefits they receive from her, and of the return they owe her, we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another, virtually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the will of society, to substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile and vain babbling of sophists - ". (69)

The logic of Rousseau's position is that men must cleave to an association if they are to have any moral life at all. He rejects the Hobbesian state of nature with its wickedness. Simply because men had no idea of virtue in the state of nature this would not be a sufficient reason for arguing that they were therefore wicked. Egoistic man was a contingent fact not a logically necessary concomitant of moral and social awareness, nor an irresistible innate telos, waiting to emerge.

Rousseau's point on the importance of an association in relation to the moral life was a logical point. Rousseau did not fall to the fallacy of the individualists such as Locke, who postulated an equivalence between choice and moral choice such that choice \equiv moral choice. The choice between the consumption of a packet of sweets or the purchase of a bar of soap is not, *prima facie*, a moral choice. What Rousseau appreciated, however, was that the advent of an association such as the state, presents men with a moral choice, namely whether they ought or ought not to adhere to it. What Rousseau wanted to achieve, of course, was to show that the state was not merely a respectable moral alternative to be considered, but that it could enhance the moral life, by presenting a variety of situations in which men would have to consider their own lives in relation to others. The instrument of its success would be education.

If the association was to fulfil these aims it was necessary that it be one to which all men could relate, in which they could all have an interest, on which their survival depends. It is true empirically that no society can tolerate more than a certain degree of dissension at which point the concept of agreed norms and rules becomes null and void. Similarly a democracy can degenerate to the point where it becomes mere majority rule, devoid of any respect for persons. Rousseau built in the latter value by his refusal to assign the will without prior public discussion in the sovereign body. It thus has to become association to which they can all relate, in which they all have an interest, on which their survival depends. It follows from Rousseau's philosophy of mind that the relationship will depend for its efficacy on emotion rather than on reason, and on continuing self interest. If there is to be a conflict between reason and self interest, Rousseau is certain that self interest will win. Hence his fear of lesser associations. If the latter

arise men will not merely perceive that membership is in their interests but also may be weaned by affection as a result of proximity and familiarity. It is necessary then both that the state be total and proximate. If we are heirs to the same father, if we are brothers in dependency, if we cannot move in any direction one without the other, we are bound to perceive the benefits of cooperation.

The central importance of education to Rousseau's democracy, and the conceptual rather than empirical connection of the two, is seen paradigmatically in the notion of the General Will. It represents the political counterpart of the categorical Imperative. The General Will is essentially negative in that it represents a criterion which laws must satisfy, a moral criteria, yet of itself it rules in nothing particular. It seems to be analytic that the General Will is always right. For without the distraction of partial associations, men will on the basis of their love and loyalty to the state, decide on the basis of honesty and integrity. I argued earlier that the moral life was inseparable from an association. It should now be apparent that for Rousseau, only the state, of all associations, can make men moral. This is logically so, because morality obtains only when men relate to one another as equals and they are only equal as citizens, for they must all alike relate their individual wills to the general will. Virtue for Rousseau is the conformity of particular wills with the general will. Affiliate them with various lesser associations and men will compete by any trickery possible.

Now in the matter of conformity to the General Will, Rousseau does not think that all men are capable of following the promptings of reason unaided. However he does claim an equality of sentiment amongst men. Of the various methods to effect conformity with the

general will: " - patriotism is the most efficacious - ". (70)

Certainly, reason cannot do the job, for: " - no people has ever been made into a nation of philosophers - ". (71) Virtue requires a virtuous will and it is for this reason that Rousseau relies on education rather than repression. He stresses to the Poles that: " - it is education that you must count on to shape the souls of the citizens in a national pattern and so to direct their opinions, their likes and dislikes that they shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of necessity." (72)

Their education, moreover, ought to be communal: "I do not like at all these lines you draw between your schools and academies with the result that your rich nobles are brought up differently, and in different institutions, from your poor ones. Since all of them are equal under Poland's constitution, they should be brought up together, and in the same way; and if completely free public schools are out of the question, you must at least make your schools cheap enough for the poor nobles to afford." (73)

The concept of the General Will entails a vital difference between Rousseau's conception of the Public Interest and that of liberal theorists. Under Rousseau the public interest will be established by the General Will, (74), and will not therefore be merely an abstract logical condition of a group, "the public". For this logical point is not itself a sufficient condition for an empirical consensus by a particular public about the value to them of a particular policy. It is not a guarantee that such a consensus and such a policy ever will arise, only that it may arise. Liberals overlook, as Rousseau did not, the fact that there is a crucial empirical dimension to the notion of the public interest.

For a particular policy to be rationally defensible as being in the public interest in a democracy it must be the case not merely that people will all benefit as members of the public, but that they agree that they will benefit. In order to satisfy the latter condition, people need first to be able to conceive of themselves as members of the public. In liberal political theory, however, the latter is problematic because of the fact that the two most influential expressions of democracy in recent years have been the politics of pluralism, and the politics of elitism. (75) In the former variant of democracy the state is relegated to the role of an emaciated referee helplessly observing the warring conduct of autonomous groups, out of whose conflict will be born the public interest. In the latter case a wedge is driven firmly into place between the politicians and the politically infantile masses. The public interest here is to be identified with the pronouncements of the elite.

It was Rousseau's profound contribution to democratic thought not merely to envisage the logical possibilities of public interest politics but to appreciate the crucial need for an affective dimension to public interest policies. The General Will functioned not merely as logical criterion of the public interest but as an affective touchstone. It was the standard by which the individual citizen adjudicated his desires and those of others, as a member of the public. Rousseau's horror of partial associations arises from his conviction that there is no necessary connection between logical truth and the ready acceptance of a particular empirical function of that truth. For pluralists such as Dahl, the public interest is ad hoc, empirical, and the end result of the interplay of private associations. For Rousseau, it is an objective criterion, "a real motive". Moreover, in no sense can the pluralist public

interest be rescued by alleging that it approximates to Rousseau's 'will of all'. Firstly, the latter is always second best for Rousseau, (76), and moreover as the partial associations increase in size and decrease in number, "the differences become less numerous and give a less general result." (77) Secondly, it spans a continuum of degeneration from the General Will. Numerous associations will not be far removed from the process of deliberation of numerous voters since the associations will represent the interests of like-minded citizens. It should be noted that Rousseau did not consider here any difference in resource inputs by any citizens or associations of information, communications, or finance. Thus the numerous associations can conveniently be presumed to be equal in strength. Insofar as the small associations represent in their aims and objectives the views of like-minded citizens, they are not far from the views of each citizen which comprises the association. However, the larger the association becomes, the further removed are its aims and objectives from each individual citizen, it being assumed that the views of each citizen differ to an extent from those of another citizen. In such a situation each citizen in an association has to desire not merely that his own aims are realized, but more important, has to modify his own aims in the light of the aims of the association as a whole. That is, if he wishes to be rational, he will have to acknowledge that the aims of the larger association reflect his own aims only to a limited extent and therefore his support for the association requires in some measure that he sees what is good or right in the aims of the association as a whole.

The latter affection or loyalty to the association may from a psychological point of view, manifest itself in various forms.

The citizen may attempt some form of self deception, or he may increasingly identify in a highly emotional way with the aims of the association. But in either case Rousseau's point holds in that the will of the association; "becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State." (78) For the citizen is giving a commitment to the aims and objectives of the partial association, over and above the commitment to his own aims and objectives. Whatever compromise takes place between his own political interests and those of others, takes place within the parameters of the association's values, and not those of the state. Thus Rousseau argues that: "if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal - ". (79)

Pluralists, however, cannot claim that their partial associations operate in the latter way. Pluralists are at least consistent in their treatment of partial associations in that they extend the same formal equality to partial associations as they do to the franchise. The former does nothing to mitigate enormous differences in resource inputs, articulation, access to ruling elites, and bargaining power. The effect of the latter is that the strength of an interest is no guide to its moral worth. Formal equality does not and cannot guarantee the representation of the interests of the poor and under-privileged. Rather it encourages the strength of those groups with a vested interest to defend, with an established foothold within society, as against those attempting to put forward alternative courses of action in social and economic policy. Moreover, neither does it guarantee that the protagonist groups are of approximately equal strength so that an acceptable compromise emerges. There is no mechanism within the formal equality of the liberal democratic political system to ensure that

the interests of consumers shall match that of producers.

My point, however, is that the public interest still has a role to play in the liberal democrats' political vocabulary. Its role is to function as an emotive cry, to suggest that the interests for which a group is fighting are identical with those of the public. (80) It functions in this way because it contains the vestiges of a moral imperative. Liberals may use the public interest slogan in the way in which they do because their political heritage is not merely liberal but also democratic. I have tried to show in an earlier chapter, that liberals could not defend their political practices without this democratic heritage.

Rousseau is able to hang his concept of education on the General Will. He is able to do this because the latter is the ultimate criterion of value for the citizen. (81) It is the telos of the inoffensive savage in the state of nature. The appreciation of it is inextricably connected with a moral transformation from natural goodness to virtue. (82) Because the general will is the will of the virtuous citizen it is incorrect to perceive education merely as an instrumental process. The moral transformation from savage to citizen is conceptually inseparable from the standard of political right. But because Rousseau envisages a democratic society, the standard of political right expresses not merely a moral ideal but an end which is in principle attainable. For we have said earlier that it is a logically necessary condition for a democratic society that "knowing how to live" should not be the preserve of philosopher-kings or autocrats. There is no stronger partial association than that of a philosopher-king or an autocrat. Because the General Will is a function of the deliberations of all the citizens and not of the aims of partial associations it secures

value to the moral transformation of each individual citizen. The transformation is not accomplished to suit the whim of an elite, but because each citizen is a value in relation to the General Will. If a citizen is denied this moral transformation the standard of political right is violated, and the tangible outcome of the discussions of the body politic is the poorer. It follows that any attempt to emasculate this activity of moral transformation under the guise of training, vocational considerations, preparing for work, is also a violation of the standard of political right. Knowledge for living may supplement knowledge of how to live, morally, however, it cannot supplant it.

Liberal democrats, however, have no such standard of political right, that they will consistently acknowledge. They thus adhere to a paper thin concept of education, whose values fluctuate according largely to their economic fortunes. Though it has been argued that an appropriate political education is in the interests of a democracy this argument is much weaker than it first appears,(83) depending on how democracy is understood. For to Schumpeter it could not appear self-evidently good or desirable that citizens be taught the mechanics of putting pressure on governments in order that policies accord more with their aims and objectives. Much less would it appear self-evident that citizens be taught the traditional values of democracy: respect for persons, autonomy, tolerance, dignity. For to elitist democratic theorists it is axiomatic that such values are respected only by the elite when it comes to the domain of public affairs. Politics, in the main, is not something to be entrusted to citizens, for reasons I have already discussed. A political education is, therefore, for elitist democrats, something of a misnomer. It is not a necessary condition of the survival of elitist democratic societies that there be an

appropriate political education, indeed, as I have implied elsewhere, political education is likely to challenge such a regime. Rather, citizens need only to perform an act of selection on a periodic basis, with the function of ensuring that there is always a government. If we ask by what criteria such a selection should be made, the answer seems to be simply that party which ensures sufficient stability for the optimal conduct of private interests. In the same way an appropriate political education seems dissonant with the perspective of pluralistic democrats. For the essential feature of a pluralist democracy is its assimilation of political activity to a paradigm of want-satisfaction, based on the market economy. Tolerance, respect for persons, autonomy, dignity, have an indelible hostility towards government activity. It seems axiomatic for the pluralist that public authority and activity is irreconcilable with the above values. What the pluralist wants to see then, is not the critical examination of society in the light of such values, but rather the steadfast acceptance of a justified "privatization" of such values. What the pluralist is asking for is better expressed by the terms socialization, indoctrination and possibly training, than education. (84)

The notion of a discrete activity "political education" is itself something of a sop to liberals in that it reflects the separation between politics and society, dear to the heart of liberals. For the latter, politics is essentially a regulative activity, endorsing existing social norms and institutions. Similarly, the function of education is to endorse social consciousness, not to transform it. Society is an instrument for man's needs and desires, not a necessary characteristic for his moral perfection.

By contrast, I have tried to show that in Rousseau there is the prodigious development of a creative role for the political sphere. Instead of being a shadow of private relations, as in liberalism, it is the author of social consciousness. Political arrangements are the life blood of morality in the regenerated society. Political society is an expression of man's freedom. Virtue, which is the fruit of education, is not the possession of a philosopher-king, but of an ordinary citizen, alert to the vanity and self-seeking attributes (intellectual or otherwise) of civilization. On this view: "Democratic education - must ensure that all people can identify and will resist the claims of special interests. The people of a democracy must also be skilled in detecting the person or group that puts their own interests ahead of the community -".

(85) And as a broader consideration: "Democratic education must give to men and women the sense of security and purpose that allows them to confront, without any ambiguity, the tasks of the time, and it must help all of them to distinguish between leaders who make such a commitment, and those who do not." (86)

The role of the Legislator in Rousseau, does nothing to undermine the primacy of education and the role of the citizen. The Legislator is essentially a temporary phenomenon, born of the necessary immaturity of the citizens at the inception of the virtuous society. Since abstract knowledge is not the prime aim of education the Legislator is not another philosopher-king. His position derives from the fact that education cannot take effect overnight and Rousseau was concerned with the establishment of conditions in society as a whole, which permits members of society to participate on equal terms in a civil association based on the principle of freedom.

"One of Rousseau's most basic moral principles was that men did not need great knowledge in order to lead a virtuous life." (87)

It is the function of the lawgiver only to be the architect of social institutions.

"The legislator is the engineer who invents the machine --." (88)
But his function is strictly limited to the establishment of desirable institutions.

"He, therefore, who draws up the laws has, or should have, no right of legislation, and the people cannot, even if it wishes, deprive itself of this incommunicable right, because, according to the fundamental compact, only the general will can bind the individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with the general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people." (89)

Rousseau is explicit on the reasons for the legislator:
"For a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they should become by means of law." (90)

It is this immaturity which also makes necessary the civic religion. Yet again the latter is provisional; it should be seen as subservient to the politics of the emerging state.

"We should not -- conclude -- that politics and religion have among us a common object, but that, in the first periods of nations, the one is used as an instrument for the other." (91)

The civic religion is part of the mechanism for the transformation of consciousness and the development of moral liberty which allows men to see collectively created and imposed laws as extensions of, not merely constraints upon, their freedom.

Criticisms of the role of the lawgiver and the Constitution of the civic religion, ignore the fact that the political association will have a momentum of its own. Though it is nowhere explicitly stated, it is empirically the case that communication will facilitate an emerging political consciousness which will support the society in question. Pateman argues that: "The members of a participatory association are continuously educating themselves in a fashion that serves to maintain their political association in being." (92)

This exposure to a wide range of ideas, moreover, makes it more likely that a citizen will consider the public interest in forming his political opinions. It is a necessary condition to the consideration of the public interest by an individual, that he be aware of an interest other than his own, or those similar to his own.

There is, moreover, the point that fraternity is an elusive ideal in the face of differences in perception and reasoning. To provide exclusive emphasis in education on the autonomous intellectual would exacerbate these differences and lead to dissent and agitation for self-assumed obligation. The latter cannot occur in Rousseau for the following reason. Since the General Will is the logical criterion for all laws dissent becomes a procedural rather than a substantive error. That is, my dissent is not in fact due to a difference from my fellow citizens on substantive grounds, on the merits of a particular issue, it is due to my failing to properly carry out the psychological exercise of universalizing my will. By making virtue not merely a function of political society but also coterminous with fraternity and unity, rather than with reason and autonomy, Rousseau neatly sidesteps thorny issues of dissent and self-assumed obligation. By stressing sentiment rather than reason Rousseau was fastening upon and emphasizing equality. Paradoxically this was something of a conservative move as Roche notes:

"On the whole, it must be said that Rousseau bases his hopes on a development of the feelings of men rather than upon their capacity for self-improvement." (93)

All this is not necessarily to imply that reason would clash with fraternity. Given that one considers that others have a contribution to make to truth, then to be seriously committed to the pursuit of truth entails some due deference to others.

Concepts do not evolve in a day and what Rousseau achieved in relation to the concept of democracy, was to show, in contrast to Locke, that a participatory society was a defensible end result of combining moral agency with fraternity. Rousseau demonstrated the conceptual necessity of education in (his) democracy by making it the keystone of moral agency. In so doing, Rousseau made the vital leap from a naturalistic self interested political structure to a rationally defensible moral polity. It is only in the climate of the latter that it is logically possible to stipulate education as a primary social value, rather than relegate it to a family of instrumental processes. For if the political structure is to take its standard merely from men as they are, not as they ought to be, there will be no value sanction within that structure for resisting all those immediate and diverse pressures which prey upon educational institutions to give to these interests what they "need", be it engineers, thrusting business executives, or obsequious employees. There will, in particular, be no value sanction for such institutions to produce pupils and students, with a propensity to take the moral view of life. For the latter might entail sundry consequences for powerful institutions and accepted norms in society. Conceivably such people may not readily identify with a work ethic, or a competitive ethos, or a corporation bureaucracy, or simply a predetermined work role. What a moral polity achieves is to provide

a framework for a justification of children's futures in terms other than a wholehearted commitment to an instrumental role, suited to the immediate gratification of society. The aim of education in a moral polity should be to act as the conscience of society, not its willing tool. The General Will is the conscience of Rousseau's democracy, a constant reminder of the importance of morality. What was absent in market democracy was a standard of moral agency by which to assess the conduct of institutions and social and economic behaviour in general. Downs and Tullock fastened on and canvassed for an individualism which was essentially an abstraction, omitting the finer properties of man. Hence their individualism rapidly degenerated into a naturalistic social and political setting, devoid of any objective standard of political right.

Implicit in the above is the suggestion that there is a connection between the individualistic and moral agency approaches to society, albeit a tortuous one to analyse. It is a connection that evolves further in the work of Kant.

iv. Kant

Kant reaffirmed the moral liberty of man by asserting the freedom of the goodwill. His principle of man as an end in himself may be taken to mean that all men count equally in determining actions by which many are affected. In this respect the principle of the good will may be regarded as giving an ethical basis for democracy. Though it is true that Kant was suspicious of democracy, allowance ought to be made for the fact that he was writing under the impact of the reign of terror. More important, however, is that Kant's stress on reason does not substantiate the same political structure as that of Rousseau, with his emphasis on sentiment. For Kant, man is essentially free and rational, thus only some

end set by reason can provide the basic value in a moral code that will respect man's dignity. But the ability to reason, though it is a necessary condition for a citizen, is not sufficient.

A citizen must be possessed of a measure of economic independence.

"To be fit to vote, a person must have an independent position among the people. He must therefore be not just a part of the commonwealth, but be a member of it, i.e. he must by his own free will actively participate in a community of other people. But this latter quality makes it necessary to distinguish between the active and passive citizen. Apprentices to merchants or tradesmen, servants who are not employed by the state, minors - women in general and all those who are obliged to depend for their living (i.e. for food and protection) on the offices of others (excluding the state) - all of these people have no civil personality, and their existence is, so to speak, purely inherent." (94)

The distinction which Kant makes between passive and active citizens is not to be understood as a permanent barrier against the progress of a "passive" citizen. Not merely should it be possible for the latter to progress, the legislature should ensure that no laws inhibit such a movement.

" - the positive laws to which the voters agree, of whatever sort they may be, must not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom and with the corresponding equality of all members of the people whereby they are allowed to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one." (95)

Kant is adamant that: "The legislative power can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right is supposed to emanate from this power, the laws it gives must be absolutely incapable of doing anyone an injustice. Now if someone

makes depositions for another person, it is always possible that he may thereby do him an injustice, although this is never possible in the case of decisions he makes for himself -. Thus only the unanimous and combined will of everyone whereby each decides the same for all and all decide the same for each - in other words, the general united will of the people - can legislate." (96)

Thus Kant resists the possible benefits of other political regimes: "But this welfare must not be understood as synonymous with the well-being and happiness of the citizens, for it may well be possible to attain this in a more convenient and desirable way within a state of nature - or even under a despotic regime. On the contrary, the welfare of the state should be seen as that condition in which the constitution most closely approximates to the principle of right; and reason, by a categorical imperative, obliges us to strive for its realization." (97)

Kant therefore favours a moral polity, one devoted to the welfare of its citizens, in which there is participation for all active citizens, and the possibility of passive citizens progressing to become active citizens. His dispute with democracy is primarily connected with the idea of the separation of Powers.

"Republicanism is that political principle whereby the executive power (the government) is separated from the legislative power. Despotism prevails in a state if the laws are made and arbitrarily executed by one and the same power, and it reflects the will of the people only in so far as the ruler treats the will of the people as his own private will. - democracy, in the truest sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent, so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not by all the

people; and this means that the general will is in contradiction with itself, and thus also with freedom." (98)

Kant insists, however, that " - if the mode of government is to accord with the concept of right, it must be based on the representative system." (99)

Republicanism then is a refinement of democratic government, which retains the latter's popular base, but follows a strict separation of powers.

The political implications of Kant's several ethical doctrines, are various.

"According to the principle of humanity, the dignity of each individual man is an essential requirement of the moral law, and according to the principle of autonomy, the moral law is willed by every rational being and required by him as the law he should submit to. These principles have a liberal, even a democratic air, and Kant's other notion of a universal kingdom of ends in which all men are legislating members, extends the ethical into a somewhat political sphere." (100)

For Kant man is essentially free and rational, thus only some end set by reason can provide the basic value in a moral code that will respect man's dignity. If the notion of autonomy is applied to politics it would require a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom to its citizens. But the latter could be the freedom to indulge in private interests for gain; it could not be the freedom to diminish the human condition. The latter would accrue from a desire for private gain, and not from a noble motive. Kant, then, had an ideal of respect and his freedom was the freedom which was an essential precondition of moral agency.

"Now I say that man, and in general every rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will; he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to some other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end." (101)

Further, such a principle: " - consequently imposes a limit on arbitrary treatment." (102) The government must adhere to a Principle of Right. This latter principle " - is basically only an application of the universal principle of morality as laid down in the Categorical Imperative, to the sphere of law, and thus also applies to the sphere of politics. If this principle is applied to politics it is necessary that there should be established a constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure the freedom of all the others." (103)

The above forms the test of right action in society. "Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right." (104) This freedom is limited by its effects:

" - the principles of morality bind, not because we desire the ends attained by them, but because they are the sort of principles that a being of goodwill - would adopt." (105)

The moral law has significance both as a standard of political right and, subjectively, as a motive for the public good, the latter in marked contrast to the mockery of the public interest in empirical political theory. The former also leads directly to a commitment to educate. In this respect Kant's position is essentially similar to that of Rousseau. The argument of the above may be followed in this way.

"The moral law, which itself does not require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this Law as binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the causality of free agents -". (106)

It is in this way that the General Will forces men to be free, and that the recognition of the General Will itself reflects a community of free people. Again, the General Will is a criterion: " - freedom is considered as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of determination in regard to actions possible by it, which are phenomena in the world of sense -". (107)

Rousseau's distaste for flattery and vanity within a cultured society and his belief in the sincerity of the common people is echoed in Kant: "While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of action by practical pure reason - it is also a subjective determining principle, i.e. a motive to this action, in as much as it has influence on the morality of the subject, and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will. Thus the respect for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered as a motive - ." (108)

There can be no greater contrast between the political implications of this statement and that of an ethic of rational self-interest. (109) For the latter, the final and determining principle of right is not merely to be found within the individual's own patterns of desire, but itself provides no reference point for an achievement or standard which is essentially public rather than private. Public achievements and standards are only possible insofar as they can be reckoned worthwhile within the individual's pleasure calculus. The latter, may frequently entail the most extraordinary abuse of others. For in an ethic of rational

self-interest if a man can obtain what he desires with the minimum of cost, so much the better. His situation is optimised where others are "deluded" into following a commitment to a public morality rather than themselves. For example, he profits most when others agree to modify pay increases to assist the control of inflation, thus allowing his high pay increases to retain their real purchasing power.

For Kant, however, the moral law not merely is able to serve as a public standard of political right, but also itself inheres a motive to public morality. It might be said of the Kantian citizen what was said of Rousseau's Emile: "The public good, which to others is a mere pretext, is a real motive for him." (110)

In addition, there is the point that a Kantian ethic logically presupposes some kind of public dimension. The principle of universalisability and its corollary of respect for persons, entail that transactions occur between persons. It is an inherently social ethic, and an ethic in which the public morality, behaviour towards others, is as valuable as towards oneself. The greatest fallacy one can entertain about a self-interested ethic is that it contains a maxim of equality. No such maxim is present, and it is a nonsense to try to create the impression of such a value by the imposition of so called "moral side-constraints." (111)

Such a device merely disguises the fact that individuals differ in the extent to which they can effectively pursue an interest, and indeed, in the extent to which they can even conceive of an interest.

The belief that achieving the public good would count as a reason for action which Kant and Rousseau had in mind, is the result of granting that the former is of some moral value. Where a public morality, rather than one of self-interest is accepted, there arise

reasons both instrumental and intrinsic to the former, for arguing that an education must be provided. In a sense these reasons are difficult to compartmentalize. Education might be required to stop the exploitation of the young by helping them to frame alternatives for the future, without being at the complete mercy of family economic circumstances, or sub-cultural values. The former might include a critical examination of the work ethic, an awareness of different careers, and an experience of ideals of service and citizenship. In a moral polity which valued ideals of the sort propagated by Kant, such activities would not be merely instrumentally good, they would be required by the very values of public morality. It may be as well, that the same values would demand a participatory society. If that is so, the latter would also demand that individuals were able to grasp the issues concerning those areas in which they were participants, otherwise talk of work-place democracy, or economic democracy, would be cant. These values of respect for persons, the dignity of man, the moral law, are public values. That is where their force lies. But their acceptance requires not merely some kind of participatory society, it requires too that generations be allowed to become moral participants in that society.

In his philosophy of history, Kant construed history as a progress towards rationality. He rejected the suggestion that the question of progress could be solved by appealing to experience. "We must, therefore, he says, look for a principle outside experience. We can find it in the moral character of man. To advance the spread of rationality is a moral obligation, for this advance is the only way in which our moral nature can be fully realized. " (113)

In terms of ~~how~~ this should be achieved within the educational

system, Kant is explicit. He favours a moral code and the use of examples.

"I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; and why they have not, after first laying the foundation of a purely moral catechism, reached through the biographies of ancient and modern times with the view of having at hand instances of the duties laid down, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they might exercise this critical judgement of their scholars in remarking their greater or less moral significance." (113)

" - they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice of knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity and on the other hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children may compete with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other; and so, by mere habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame, a good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course of life." (114)

If we hold that to advance the spread of rationality is a moral obligation then, ipso facto, it must be done for its own sake, and not for any results or consequences which may as a matter of fact accrue for such a process. Now such a movement towards rationality, under such terms is necessarily going to preclude activities like indoctrination and conditioning which denigrate the place of reason in man and thus defeat the very purpose of the move. It might be suggested that, as a matter of empirical fact, such processes will

be conducive to the attainment of rationality, but this will not neutralise the moral condition that persons should be treated as ends, and never merely as means. Further, the intention to advance the spread of rationality places empirical and logical limitations upon the possible means envisaged to achieve this. It is logically necessary that the means envisaged be experiences of a structured kind within those areas of knowledge which are exemplifications of reasons.

Given then, Kant's belief in the moral autonomy of the individual, and the inevitable progress towards rationality, his support for a government responsible to the people is an entirely legitimate move, as is the inference made from the same premise, of a commitment to education in its normative sense, rather than processes which sacrificed respect for the individual as a moral agent. Both are the logical outcome of his value attribution to individuals. One cannot, without contradiction, proclaim a degree of primacy to the notion of individuals as ends in themselves, as moral agents and then defend autocracy as a form of state government, since the latter is the negation of reasonableness. The autocrat, logically, is claiming an entitlement that he is not prepared to accord to others, namely the enjoyment of power over their destinies. The autocrat might claim that his position was in fact entirely reasonable. He took command over the chaos which was persisting. Thus the autocrat's ultimate value is stability, which he is clearly not prepared to reason about with his subjects, since otherwise why was it necessary in the first place for him to have to take command. If we pressed him on this issue, he might reply that in any case he was not dealing with moral agents. The problem is, however, that his index of a moral agent would be one who agreed with him on the indispensability of an autocrat to maintain stability. The democrat and the educator, must, logically, produce

reasons for the course they advocate; they must convince and persuade by argument rather than by force or surreptitious influence.

For Kant, sovereignty resides in the people and government must be open. The people have the right of public criticism of those in authority. Kant follows Voltaire in declaring that: " - freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people, although it must not transcend the bounds of respect and devotion towards the existing constitution, which should itself create a liberal attitude of mind among the subjects." (115) Reiss writes that the trend of Kant's thinking in his unpublished notes: " - makes it - abundantly plain that, according to him, sovereignty resides or originates in the people which ought to possess legislative power." (116) Kant thinks that the idea of a Contract is in fact " - merely an idea of reason which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject - as if he had consented within the general will." (117) This view is confirmed in a passage from the Social Contract. "The idea that men have made a Contract to establish the state means rather that they have been prepared to submit their own personal will in matters external to them to a universal will - the will of reason." (118)

In their political implications, the ethics of Kant point not merely to a moral and democratic polity, but to a society which is educative rather than merely regulatory. The government would be at once an exemplification of the principle of moral autonomy, by being responsible to the people, and also an agency through which society could further the declared aims of rationality and moral agency. It follows then that education is a primary value in the Kantian moral polity. Less obviously, it also follows that

individuals do not necessarily have to acquiesce in or attempt to control the content of such a programme. The thrust of Kant's writing above, is that though autonomy means the ability to determine for oneself what one ought to do, it does not logically follow that everything one chooses to do is therefore morally right. The concept of autonomy refers as much as anything else to the individual's subjective capacity to impose restrictions freely on what he chooses to do, so that the individual can choose to act morally by voluntarily constraining his selfish desires in order to act in an unselfish or disinterested manner. In the same way, the principle of moral autonomy is not necessarily violated whenever a person is subjected to external compulsion, for the latter may be morally justified to the extent that it is necessary to get the person to act morally. In particular we may liken the pupil to the passive subject of Kant's commonwealth being coaxed towards freedom and rationality.

On this view, if participation within institutions is required, it will be necessary because it contributes towards the independence and freedom of the subject, whereas on the liberal view, (119), participation may be conceded simply because it leads to a higher output in industry. Kant is much more consistent here than liberal democrats. The latter reason that consenting to obey the law is a necessary condition of having an obligation to obey the law, but then identify consent with both one overt act (voting) and acquiescence by simply following the law. The corollary is that a person is morally right to obey the law because they have consented to do so, rather than morally right to obey the laws, because in turn, the law is morally right. For if the law is found to be morally right the act of consent is superfluous, and the denigration of moral agency.

For the latter to operate in a moral polity, it requires an education which will produce the critical citizen. The liberal democratic view does not necessarily require this, since both participation and the act of consent may take place on considerations decided by elites, and not for moral reasons. (120) Participation for greater productivity, and consent to an amorphous political package which may subsequently be modified or abandoned, do not encourage moral agency. Yet what must be noted is that in their use of consent, obligation, participation, even individualism, liberals use terms with a moral connotation. Liberal democracy has a "moral" strain and it is the latter which provides the argument for education.

Like Rousseau, T.H. Green and J.S. Mill, Kant favoured dynamic political equality; i.e. that the political institutions of society, instead of merely according formal political equality, enhance substantive political equality, insofar as they act in such a way as to make the institutional provisions for controlling the affairs of the state, the instruments for the moral and cognitive amelioration of the individual, in Kant's case with a view to the attainment of autonomy, in Rousseau's with a view to fraternity. Kant is conservative only in the sense that he would rather no freedom, if freedom merely meant dependency on the will of another. Thus independence materially was a precondition of moral freedom and institutional freedom.

In his concern for the autonomous will, for freedom as rationality, Kant endorses in his society education in its normative sense. For paradigmatically, the intention to educate logically entails the intention to develop rationality, though the latter is not of course a sufficient condition of the former. It was left to T.H. Green to extend further this notion and develop it into a

right to education. A commitment to moral autonomy precludes those processes of imparting information which have an implicit disregard for the moral worth of the individual, viz. indoctrination, conditioning, even training. What is endemic, then, in this Kantian position is the intention to develop mind in a morally acceptable manner. Such an intention is an intention to educate. Kant advocates responsible government because he considers it the only government worthy of rational agents. It is the logical complement of envisaging men as moral agents. Contingently, responsible government will assist the development of rationality because it presupposes the exercise of judgement and reason on the part of men. The conduct of politics will, on this view, itself comprise part of the moral education of the community, as it did with J.S. Mill. This includes the process of deliberating about the ends of life, settling disputes, deliberating about what ought to be done. These values logically presuppose the commitment to educate. Men are not born with morality, despite Socratic bewilderment about the possibilities of it being taught. Neither are they born with the propensity to reason. Not just any upbringing will produce the citizen of a moral polity. For if we are to reason about ends, it must, logically must, be under some conceptual construction, which itself will be the fruit of concepts before it.

v. Green

Kantian considerations of dignity and respect lead ultimately, as Green saw, to an imperative on institutional provision. Green recognized a reciprocal relationship between individuals and the state. The individual has a claim on society arising out of his rational moral nature. Green's contribution was to appreciate

not merely that the latter required a moral polity, respecting men as rational beings, but he went further than Kant and Rousseau, in perceiving that a moral polity may be required to strive for the means whereby the potential of men could become actual. The latter may well amount to economic provisions and widespread institutional reform. Full moral participation in social life was for Green the highest form of self-development, and to create the possibility of such participation was the end of society.

For Green, governments cannot make men moral by laws, but they can remove many of the obstacles that stand in the way of moral development. The Kantian ideal requires that members of society meet as moral agents, that they treat each other with respect, that all are free to think and act for themselves, and that their thought and actions are guided and controlled by full moral responsibility. Because this is inherently the ideal nature of a community and of a person, this opportunity ought to be open to everyone, to realize such a life up to the limit of his capacities. Hence, society cannot aim at less than giving all men the right to moral self determination. The logic of this position is the provision by the state of education. Sabine remarks of Green: " - he regarded education as the most important function, and he conceived that the chief difference between ancient and modern civilizations lay in the degree in which the modern nation opens to all men goods which in antiquity were reserved to an aristocracy." (121)

The whole idea of a right for Green, arises out of the nature of man as a moral being seeking his self perfection; it is a claim of the individual arising out of his rational nature to the free exercise of some category. It is on this premise that Green defends the right to education:

"To educate one's children is no doubt a moral duty, and it is not one of these duties, like that of paying debts, of which the neglect directly interferes with the rights of someone else. It might seem therefore to be a duty with which positive law should have nothing to do, any more than with the duty of striving after a noble life. On the other hand, the neglect of it does tend to prevent the growth of the capacity for beneficially exercising the rights on the part of those whose education is neglected, and it is on this account, not as a purely moral duty on the part of the parent, but as the prevention of a hindrance to the capacity of rights on the part of children, that education should be enforced by the state." (122)

Education encapsulates an identity between society and the individual: it actualizes our capacity as persons " - only through society is anyone enabled to give that effect to the idea of himself as the object of his actions, to the idea of himself without which the idea would remain like that of space to a man who had neither the sense of sight nor touch." (123)

For Green, the fruit of education is self realization. This training cannot do. Democracy is inconceivable without the attribution of certain capacities to individuals common to them, and reliance on communicating them. Training leans too far towards the atomistic individual, does not partake of the common life.

There is a further common characteristic between education and democracy. Bosanquet said of a genuine human achievement that it is not diminished by being shared. The implication of Kant's kingdom of ends is that the ultimate moral community is coextensive with mankind. It is a level of human achievement embracing and superseding the spheres of work, leisure, personal relationships, and citizenship. The only good which is common to all who may

pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good, to make the best of humanity. Milne claims that for Green:

" - the highest level of rational activity is that of self-consistent or non-competitive human achievement. At this level all the subordinate levels of rationality find a place." (124)

Education connotes this acme of activity. The activity embraces mutual understanding and respect, and it is in this sense that Green's comments should be understood.

"Since a democratic community depends on mutual understanding there can be no effective democracy without an educated people. Education therefore is the state's concern; not only education of the young, but also adult education." (125)

The point about education is that it gives reality to the capacities of will and reason. It recognizes the capacity in a man of being determined to action by the idea of a possible satisfaction of himself, the capacity of conceiving the perfection of his nature as an object to be attained by action. To train him is to offer the antithesis of any recognition of innate capacity: it is to manipulate him towards artificial confines. To educate him is to pay full recognition to his moral potential. Education is both a moral expression of the Common Good, and a means of furthering the latter.

"Moral agency is not merely an agency by which an end is attained, or an idea realized, or a function fulfilled, but an agency determined by an idea on the part of the agent, by his conception of an end or function; and the state would be brought into being and sustained by merely natural as opposed to moral agency, unless there were a consciousness of ends - and of ends the same in principle with that served by the state itself - on the part of those by whom it is brought into being, and sustained." (126)

Green recognizes that the state could exist to serve merely natural means but he requires that the state be construed as a moral artifact, and that it cherish a continuing moral commitment. The latter will apply through education. The fruit of this process is a consciousness of the Common Good. The state's justification is its contribution to the moral life. Ideally, all institutions should reflect an overall moral purpose.

"The moral progress of mankind has no reality except as resulting in the formation of more perfect individual characters; but on the other hand every progress towards perfection on this part of the individual character presupposes some embodiment or expression of itself by the self realising principle in what may be called the organisation of life." (127)

It is not an exaggeration to say that in Green, 'moral democracy' reaches its climax. For here institutions are the external expression of the moral progress of mankind, and the material through which the idea of perfection must be realized. We need only note in addition the pre-eminent role of reason as the organization of the moral idea of self perfection to be attained, in order to appreciate that the education system was the moral nurture par excellence.

"The determination of will by reason, then, which constitutes moral freedom or autonomy, must mean its determination by an object which a person, willing, in respect of his reason, presents to himself, that object consisting in the realization of an ideal of perfection in and by himself." (128)

Considered in their moral authorship all civic institutions are sacred. Green refers to the state explicitly:

"The real function of government being to maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible." (129)

Pre-eminent in conditions for morality is facility for the development of reason, involving at least some resource redistribution

for education. The redistribution is justified because it provides for moral development. In the same way, so also is the state justified. It follows, however, that the form of the state must be in accord with moral precepts.

vi. John Stuart Mill

If Green is the acme of the moral conception of democracy amongst historical theorists, J.S. Mill is a salutary and final reminder of the point made already in relation to Locke, namely the difficulty of classifying theorists into a neat division of moral and market exponents.

J.S. Mill stands at the junction of moral and market theories. Though Bentham and James Mill never wavered in their indifference to all but utility, J.S. Mill saw not merely that the logic of a hedonist position was a disdain for the dignity of man, but also that self-conceptualisation was logically a function of the world in which men live, and could be altered if that world was altered. Despite his devotion to the principle of utility, Mill was hardly consistent in his views:

"It is in the third chapter of *Liberty*, in which he discusses 'individuality', as one of the elements of well being that Mill without knowing it, abandons utilitarianism. In it he makes the un-utilitarian complaint that individual spontaneity is hardly recognized by common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, deserving any regard on its own account. He then mentions with approval the doctrine of self-realization by Von Humboldt. It really is of importance says Mill, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it." (130)

The notion of self improvement introduces a further value which Mill never successfully accommodated with utility. His

attitude to democracy is correspondingly different from Bentham and James Mill. J.S. Mill supports representative government because it educates the governed, not simply because it better assures their happiness. Mill's resistance to government intervention in the life of the individual must be seen in the light of his desire for self improvement: " - there is a part of the life of every person who has come to years of discretion, within which, the individuality of that person ought to reign." (131) On the other hand, he warns: " - there are other things of which the demand of the market is by no means a test, things of which the utility does not consist in ministering to inclinations, nor in serving the daily uses of life, and the want of which is least felt where the need is greatest. This is peculiarly true of those things which are chiefly useful as tending to raise the character of human beings." (132)

Mill goes so far as to declare that: " - any well-intentioned and tolerably civilized government may think, without presumption, that it does or ought to possess a degree of cultivation above the average of the community which it rules, and it should therefore be capable of offering better education, and better instruction to the people, than the greater number of them would spontaneously demand." (133)

His commitment to a rather more exalted notion of men than his utilitarian predecessors is shown in his criticism of Bentham: "The sense of honour and personal dignity - - that feeling of personal exaltation and degradation which acts independently of other people's opinions, or even in defiance of it; the love of beauty, the passion of the artist; the love of order, of congruity, of consistency in all things, and conformity to their end; the love of power, not in the limited form of power over other human beings, but abstract power, the power of making our volitions effectual; the love of action, the thirst for movement and activity, a principle scarcely of less influence in human

life than its opposite, the love of peace —. None of these powerful constituents of human nature are thought worthy of a place among the springs of action —." (134)

Mill was certainly an optimist on the possibilities of the spread of civilized influences on the majority of men, but he does not seem to have been ignorant of the plight of the mass of the people in his day. He writes of them: "It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary lives to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine; not a labour of love, but of self-interest in the most elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the thing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces the mind to thoughts of feelings extending beyond individuals; if instructive books are within their reach, there is no stimulus to read them; and in most cases the individual has no access to any person of cultivation much superior to his own." (135)

Mill, unlike market theorists, was not prepared to let things rest there. Against the view that men should continue in that condition he urges that:

"What is wanted is, the means of making ignorance aware of itself and able to profit by knowledge; accustoming minds which know only routine to act upon, and feel the value of principles, teaching them to compare different modes of action, and learn, by the use of their reason, to distinguish the best." (136)

There could be no greater contrast with market theories than the conception of popular government endorsed by Mill which:
 " — presents an opportunity to the citizen not to satisfy his wants but to realize his potential — — — participation and self government are good in themselves because of their capacity to

develop the moral qualities of independence, responsibility and care for others." The citizen is, " - an actor realizing his moral potentialities and his freedom through public life." (137)

vii. Conclusion

Whilst I consider Mill primarily a moral democrat, he is a powerful example of the "tension" I have outlined which is inherent in liberal democracy, between limited participation in liberal democracy and the idea of moral agency. The point has already been mentioned in relation to Locke. (138) Liberals like Locke and Mill are willing to employ democratic apparatus, insofar as they facilitate the exercise of individualism, but they are not prepared to give unqualified support to the notion of moral agency on a universal basis. Specifically they do not acknowledge that cherished principles such as the free market economy or minimum government may have to be modified in the light of adherence to the value of moral agency. It is fair to say of course that Mill was prepared to envisage this more than Locke.

What is apparent at this stage is both that there is a "moral" strand to the concept of democracy and in that strand education has not merely a contingent but a necessary place. This contrasts with the position I discussed in an earlier chapter where I considered "market" approaches to democracy and tried to show that in that strand there was no necessary position for education. The moral conception of democracy has been presented as an idea which has evolved through several thinkers. Potentially it may present a challenge to some liberal democratic ideas and institutions. This point is discussed further, and its educational implications are considered in the last chapter. J.S. Mill is further discussed in the concluding chapter in relation to the educational implications of both conceptions of democracy. Finally, I have at several points hinted at important

differences between education and training and this I also intend to clarify and discuss. (139)

NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER III

1. Chapter I, pp 11, 12 for Plato, also 14
2. Chapter I, pp 9, 10, 11, 15. Specifically on the difference between moral and market democrats, see Chapter I, pp 32-34
3. Specific difficulties relating to market democratic theory were discussed in Chapter II; for the educational implications see Chapter IV and Chapter II, section VI
4. Chapter I, pp 38
5. Chapter I, p 26
6. Mill, J.S. On Liberty in Utilitarianism. On Liberty. Essay on Bentham. Ed. & Intro. by M. Warnock. Collins Fontana, 1962
7. See Chapter II, Sec. III on Dahl
8. See Chapter II, p 61
9. I quite accept that Locke is the most 'marginal' of the moral theorists I discuss. On commonality, see Pateman, C. The Problem of Political Obligation. 1929. Wiley, p 71
10. He did not, however, come to this opinion for some time. See Burns, J.H. J.S. Mill and Democracy, in Political Studies, Vol.V, 1957
11. Lively, J. and Rees, J. (eds) Utilitarian Logic and Politics, 1978. Oxford. Clarendon Press. pp 49-51
Plamenatz, J. The English Utilitarians. 1958. Oxford. Blackwell, p.184
12. The hysteria of the Great Education Debate and the plethora of fraternization with industry which followed, accompanied by obsequious murmurings about a "relevant" curriculum illustrates this.
13. Dewey, J. Democracy and Education. 1916. New York. Macmillan, p.316
14. Mill, J.S. On Liberty, and Representative Government. 1912, O.U.P. p.236
15. Aylmere, G.E. The Levellers in the English Revolution. 1975. London. Thames and Hudson, p.28
For a contrasting interpretation of the Levellers, see:
Macpherson, C.B. The political theory of possessive individualism. 1962. Oxford. Clarendon.
16. *ibid.* p.100

17. Dahl, R.A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. 1956. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, p.21. In fact, Dahl's comment on p.3: "But at a minimum, it seems to me, democratic theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens assert a relatively high degree of control over leaders -", implies that at the time of the civil war, institutional checks were correctly pursued.
18. Aylmer. op.cit., p.86
19. Pateman. op.cit. p.32
20. ibid
21. Aylmer. op.cit. p.69
22. Birnbaum, P., Lively, J., Parry. G. (eds). Democracy, Consensus and the Social Contract. 1978. Sage. p.45
23. Laslett, P.
Para. 143
24. ibid. Para.131
25. ibid. Para.132
26. ibid. Para.96
27. This view is supported by:
Vaughan, C.E. Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau. 1925. Manchester.
Sabine, G.H. A History of Political Theory. 1963. Harrap.
The reconciliation which I attempt here is closest to, though distinct from:
Macpherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. op.cit.
My view takes account of Locke's brand of Calvinism, which Macpherson does not seem to think important.
28. Dunn, J. The Political Thought of John Locke. 1969. C.U.P.
29. Green, T.H. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. Longman. 1941 p.XV
30. ibid. p.132. It is the link with state action that Locke would object to.
31. Parry, G. John Locke. 1978. Unwin, p.2.

32. Laslett. op.cit. para.54
33. Locke, J. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Ed A.D. Woozley) 1964. Fontana p.89
34. ibid. p.192
35. Artell, J.L. *The Educational Writings of John Locke*. 1968. C.U.P. p.397
36. ibid. p.58
37. ibid. p.398
38. c.f. Schumpeter
39. Riley, P. "On Finding an Equilibrium between Consent and Natural Law in Locke's Political Philosophy" in *Political Studies*, Vol. 22 Dec. 74, p.432
40. ibid. p.434
41. ibid. p.449
42. ibid. p.451
43. Locke Essay op.cit. p.173
44. ibid. p.174
45. Albritton, R. "The Politics of Locke's Philosophy" in Political Studies, Vol. 24, Sept 1976, p.254
46. ibid. p.255
47. Locke, Essay. op.cit. p.175
48. ibid quoted in Albritton op.cit. p.256
49. Locke Essay p.175
50. ibid. p.399
51. Parry, op.cit p.12
52. Locke Essay op.cit. p.399
53. Pateman, C. op.cit. p.88
54. ibid. p.83
55. Rousseau, J.J. *The Social Contract and Discourses* (transl. by G.D.H. Cole). 1913 (1968) Dent. p.46
56. Masters, R.D. *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau*. 1968. Princeton University Press. p.69

57. Rousseau, op.cit. p.55
58. ibid. p.55
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61. Rousseau, J.J. *Emile*
62. ibid. p.437
63. Rousseau, J.J. *Discourse*
64. Rousseau, J.J. ibid p.138
65. ibid p.185
66. ibid p.202
67. ibid p.220
68. ibid p.251
69. ibid p.252
70. ibid p.246. *A Discourse on Political Economy.*
71. ibid, p.247
72. Rousseau, J.J. *The Government of Poland* (trans. Kendall) 1972. New York. Bobbs-Merrill, p.19
73. ibid, p.20
74. Rousseau, J.J. *The Social Contract*, op.cit. "There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest -". p.23
75. Pluralism has been more influential: Dahl is one of the most influential exponents. Schumpeter is still the outstanding figure in elitist democratic theory.
76. Rousseau, J.J. *The Social Contract*, op.cit. p.23
77. ibid
78. ibid
79. ibid
80. Rousseau anticipates the latter " - the meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of 'public good'." ibid p.86

81. " - the general will alone can direct the state according to the object for which it was instituted, i.e. the common good -". *ibid* p.20
82. " - man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself -". *ibid.* p.16
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84. See for example my discussion of Dahl, Chapter II, section III
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86. *ibid.* p.405
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88. Rousseau, J.J. Social Contract, *op.cit.* p.32
89. *ibid* p.33
90. *ibid* p.34
91. *ibid* p.35
92. Pateman, *op.cit.* p.159
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94. Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals in Reiss, H. (ed) Kant's Political Writings. 1970. C.U.P. p.139
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Theory of Ethics* (trans Abbott). Longman, 1927. London, p.137
107. *ibid* p.158
108. *ibid* p.168
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112. Reiss. *op.cit.* p.37
113. Kant, I. *Critique*. *op.cit.* p.282
114. *ibid.*
115. Reiss *op.cit.* p.32
116. *ibid.* p.24
117. Kant, I. *Groundwork*. p.79
118. Reiss, *op.cit.* p.34
119. Locke, Mill, Bentham
120. Formal political equality lays down no strictures relating to the
level of cognition required in a given act, such as voting.
121. Sabine, G. *A History of Political Theory*. Third Edition.
Harrap. 1961. p.734
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Longman. 1941. p.208
123. Milne, J. *The Philosophy of English Idealism*. p.105
124. *ibid.* p.119
125. Lindsay, A.D. *The Modern Democratic State*. O.U.P. 1962. p.245
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127. *ibid* p.14
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132. *ibid.* p.311
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134. Mill, J.S. *Utilitarianism* (ed. M. Warnock). Fontana. 1962. p.101
135. Mill, J.S. *On Liberty, Representative Government, and the Subjection of Women*. O.U.P., 1963.(1912). p.196
136. *ibid.* p.379
137. Cornford, J. *The Political Theory of Scarcity*, in, Laslett, P. *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (Fourth Series). Oxford: Blackwell. 1972. p.38
138. See Section I, this Chapter
139. See Chapter V, for further discussion of the place of education in the moral conception of democracy.

i. Introduction

It has already been stressed that philosophy of education has had a paucity of comment to make on the relationship between democracy and education. (1) No doubt in part, this can be attributed to the fact that philosophy in common with other disciplines has its preoccupations, fashions, and priorities, and that the foregoing have simply not centred on political concepts. Indeed, it might be argued that in Dewey's seminal work on Democracy and Education, political concepts are already overshadowed by educational and social considerations. (2) Ironically pure educational considerations, whether of the progressive variety or of the conceptual school, came to the fore in the wake of Idealism, a school of thought patently political. (3) Perhaps this explains some unselfconscious neglect of political factors in the philosophy of education. Instead, the concept of education, the curriculum, moral education, and the nature of intrinsic justification became core theories.

That political factors are at last coming into fashion does nothing to alleviate the problem to which I have addressed myself. (4) Democracy still appears to be regarded as above controversy by philosophers of education. (5) Whilst I believe the attention to political factors to be inescapably correct, I still maintain that the concept of democracy employed within philosophy of education must be revised, in order to do the work required of it. (6)

Essentially what is amiss is that liberal democracy has not been analysed into its component streams of thought, as occurs in Chapter I. Instead, the most recent manifestation of the new concern with political considerations, has been a marked emphasis

upon the means-end orientation of market democracy. (7) Typically, it has issued in a concern for work, training and happiness, with a woeful inattention to criticism and evaluation of social goals. In view of the conclusions of Chapter II, this is precisely what one would expect to happen. In that chapter, elitists, pluralists, and economic democrats, were examined, and found to favour the status quo in politics.

The eclipse of the criticism of social goals in favour of immediate work-related considerations may be represented by the collapse of the distinction between knowledge of how one ought to live, that is views on what sort of society one favours, what its institutions and practices should be like, in which direction it should be moving, and knowledge for living, including principally vocational skills. There are obvious and immediate implications for the educational system of this position. Clearly if it is held that knowledge of how one ought to live requires acquaintance with theoretical knowledge and should be the province of all, then an intellectual education for all is necessary. Specifically it will be shown that the latter entails a conversance with areas such as historical, literary, religious, and moral knowledge, as well as including a programme of practical subjects. By contrast an avowed market theorist can argue that his system permits some to pursue intrinsic areas of knowledge but he is not committed to the positive thesis that all shall be so treated. These different positions in relation to particular conceptions of democracy and their knowledge correlates, will be examined in detail. (8)

ii. Market Democracy and Utilitarianism

Is market democracy merely a modern formulation, and if not does it differ at all in its educational implications from classical

utilitarianism and the work of Mill, traditional bastions of liberal democracy?

My argument is that market democracy has its roots in classical utilitarian political theory, but its implications for education in terms of citizenship, happiness, and the curriculum, are different from those of utilitarianism in certain important respects.

I imply elsewhere that happiness as a key value is an unsatisfactory basis on which to rest democracy. (9) It might be objected that the utilitarians themselves produced ample and well tried arguments for democracy, and yet were ethical hedonists. But this is far too sweeping. In terms of the modern applications of utility there are in fact vital differences from the utilitarians, and there is moreover the point that happiness led in Hobbes to anything but a democratic polity. Bentham and James Mill were as much preoccupied with men's selfishness as with their happiness. In old age Bentham showed a regard for the fallibility of rulers essentially different from the position which ultimately obtains in Barrow.

"If self-preference has place in every human breast, then, if rulers are men, so must it have in every ruling breast. Government has, accordingly, under every form comprehending laws and institutions, had for its object the greatest happiness, not of those over whom, but of those by whom it has been exercised, the interests not of the many, but of the few, or even of the one, has been the prevalent interest and to that interest all others have been, at all times sacrificed." (10)

Bentham's distrust of rulers puts him sharply at odds with Schumpeter's watch-dog rulers, with their impoverished electoral endorsement. It puts him at odds too, with Dahl's public indoctrination programme in the norms of polyarchy.

The essence of the classical utilitarian position lay in the degree of discontent felt by the public as a function of the insecurity of tenure by the rulers. By placing a limit on the tenure of public office, and allowing the public demonstration of discontent or approval of leaders, the utilitarians hoped to effect an identity between the happiness of the rulers and that of the people. Where happiness as vocational enmeshment, apolitical education, or citizen indoctrination function as aims of education, the possibility looms of a planned attempt to nullify or at least subdue the emergence of public discontent. If it is the possibility and the efficacy of public discontent which is the central plank of the utilitarian case for democracy then Dahl, Schumpeter, Riker, Barrow, et.al., go a long way towards instituting arrangements to destroy this. The problem of public discontent, and what to do about it is a cardinal issue between market and moral democrats. Steintrager argues that in respect of moral aptitude the ability of the people was at a maximum under the utilitarian system of government. (11) This is an exaggeration insofar as there seems no good reason to equate discontent with rulers with moral disquiet. What I think is probable is that the latter will have a tendency to diminish in the face of the determined pursuit of enmeshment, whether within polyarchy or economic democracy, and within the apolitical mass of Schumpeter.

In one recent view of happiness as enmeshment in work roles, (12), it is hard to see how Mill and Bentham would countenance the central directive apparatus necessary to ensure that schools would pursue enmeshment. Certainly happiness for the subject here is not independent of governmental planning agencies, and policies. In the classical utilitarians it manifestly was independent. The latter always recognized a potential desire on the part of governments to dominate

their subjects. In James Mill men are taught to love virtue, to know the institutions of government, and to judge their rulers. In market democracy they are to disregard virtue, to either (for the elitist) ignore the institutions of government, or to use them for their own particular ends and secure maximum personal utility.

The utilitarians are the forerunners of the modern pluralists insofar as they construe a man's happiness to be indissolubly linked with the pursuit of his interests, and construe the role of government as a champion of law and order. Clearly this leaves important differences between them and modern market democrats. There is no sense in which James Mill and Bentham could countenance Dahl's immovable polyarchical norms. Above all the emphasis of the extreme market wing on the pursuit of rational self-interest would have jettisoned the utilitarians cherished belief in the possibility of an identity of self and community interests. Especially, the notion that an individual's non-political activity might actually profit from the public-spirited behaviour of his colleagues. (13) Essentially for Mill and Bentham ignorance was curable whereas selfishness was not. Modern market theorists however would not endorse this view. Knowledge would be desirable for the individual to the extent that it would assist in the pursuit of his wants. In a loose sense what distinguishes modern market theorists from the utilitarians is simply their more sophisticated conclusion of the view that knowledge is power, and ignorance is weakness. For Mill and Bentham it was public knowledge of rulers actions, plus the right to enforce their opinions of these actions, that contained rulers. For Schumpeter, knowledge of political processes and policies not merely is power but rightfully is power, which it is better not to allow into the hands of the electorate. For Dahl, the widespread inculcation of the norms of polyarchy is a sufficient

condition for its survival. For Downs, the knowledge of the catastrophic results of the fall of democracy is supposed to be sufficient to support a long run preference for democracy over and above short run utility functions. For Riker and Tullock, knowledge of the likely behaviour of others is conducive to minimising costs and benefits of actions.

Given Mill's aim of educating and enfranchising the masses, he is to that extent at variance with elitists. It is likely too that Bentham would ridicule Down's attempt to maintain a higher order utility preference over and above short run utility functions. (14) On the face of it apart from sharing with modern market democrats a predilection for utility, Mill might seem closer to pluralists than other market democrats. Mill's fundamentally descriptive (15) notion of representation, and his idea of interests as preferences to constrain governments appear to support this view. Representation is necessary for Mill because without it, there will not exist sufficient means to ensure that the various interests in the community are not coerced, and hence happiness put at risk. But Mill was conscious of the danger of sinister interests and the wholesale indoctrination of the pluralists would have stunted the very consciousness he hoped to arouse by education.

Undoubtedly Hobbes makes a further contribution to explaining the roots of the market conception of democracy. There is much in common between the comments of Hobbes and the opening disclaimers of Riker and Tullock. (16) For Hobbes society was not necessary for man's moral perfection, in the sense that the latter itself was a characteristic which could be readily dispensed with. Rather society was an instrument for fulfilling his needs and desires. Again, much of the modern market relationship between desire and action is seen in Hobbes. When Hobbes uses moral language it can

often be seen to involve placing labels on previously observed tendencies or behaviour patterns.

"Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of a man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life - ". (17)

If society operates like a natural mechanism, and man as a unit of that mechanism is to be regarded as an object of observation, like any other natural phenomenon, it is convenient that, like a natural phenomenon, he behaves rather than acts. The latter presumption is tantamount to an article of faith in the work of modern market theorists such as Tullock and Dahl. It is followed by another thoroughly Hobbesian stance:

"Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth good." (18)

Hobbes and modern market theorists are at one in stipulating rationality as an instrumental good. The rational man, whether for Downs or Hobbes, is the man who can clearly perceive his own long term interests, and the means by which to achieve them.

I am not suggesting that the influences at work in the world of Hobbes were the same as those affecting the modern market democrat. Doubtless Hobbes sought to apply the seventeenth century scientific revolution to social thought whilst Downs and Tullock were applying twentieth century cost benefit trade-offs and the concept of the economic free rider to politics. The conclusion in either case was a down-grading in the character of politics and the model of the moral man, insofar as he was seen to cherish "pre-scientific" illusions about his influence on politics and his "obligation" to the political

system. The implications of this view of man are broader than politics, and permeate education also.

Hobbes example points to a further weakness in the market conception of democracy, namely that there is no conceptual connection between a hedonistic ethic and democracy. It is fundamentally a matter of empirical debate whether in fact democracy is the most apt form of political organization in the egoistic universe. Hobbes, with his concern about order and stability did not think so. Men could not live in society without unfettered coercive power. Pure egoism can issue in unqualified indulgence, which is conducive to anything from quarrelsome behaviour to civil war. To constrain the sovereign power would itself be to constrain indulgence by the sovereign and thus run counter to the original ethic.

Ironically Downs fears the collapse of democracy in much the same terms as Hobbes. (19) The former has good reason to, since his creature of rational self interest may perceive that the much vaunted long run preference for democracy is in fact a gross deception. Unlike the utilitarians Downs did not believe that all gained equally from democracy and correspondingly, not all have as much to lose from the collapse of democracy. Yet if Downs and his fellow economic democrats are to maintain democracy and stave off its collapse, they must hold out the spectre of a disaster in order to cultivate a preference for democracy. Though not all gain equally from democracy, for an economic democracy to survive all must think they do. Whilst James Mill, in the sanguine belief that some could represent the interests of others, could commend happiness as an aim of education, the economic democrat with his Hobbesian 'rational man' premise, must mount a gigantic exercise in deception in order to ensure the survival of democracy. The deception is not merely that the collapse of democracy is equally disastrous for all, but also the fact that Downs

is venturing an intuitive finding in the guise of an empirical generalization. No evidence is in fact offered to show that the collapse of democracy will as a matter of fact be catastrophic. The implications for education are not simply inferior to James and John Stuart Mill, but arguably also, inferior to a right wing anarchist position represented by Nozick, (20) who is the logical extension of the economic democrats, yet hardly one suspects, the prophet of chaos. For John Stuart Mill, the task of an informed public is to test the integrity of politicians. Education is to make men capable of judging the aims and intentions of their leaders. For the economic democrats, men are to learn that they depend upon the survival of democracy for their continual satisfaction even though the latter is decidedly doubtful and certainly inequitable in its results. Such a deception could not occur in Nozick's state because of the existence of moral side constraints. Men could not be used as fodder to maintain a system which prospered a few inordinately.

It is true also, that in marked contrast to elitists, the utilitarians found it necessary to attempt a rational political structure which incorporated the people at large. James Mill considered that ignorance was curable by education whereas selfishness was not: Schumpeter and Sartori would deny the former and remain silent on the latter. The prime function of a ruling elite for Schumpeter as for Hobbes, is to maintain order; if in so doing it is defending its own corner that is by the way. For Mill a vigorous programme of education, including civics was the answer, for Schumpeter, minimum political considerations in education must follow.

iii. Citizenship, Market Democracy and Education

For market theorists such as Barrow (21) and Dahl, democracy is to be defended on the grounds that it promotes happiness or stability, and not because it enshrines certain moral principles. It is lack

of trust in the latter principles which leads to the elevation of institutional structures and the enhancement of a unitary principle such as happiness. In the market democracy of Robert Dahl, it is groups that are the focal point of political activity. Citizens of polyarchy are to be subject to a thorough programme of indoctrination in the norms of polyarchy. This is important for Dahl because there are no public criteria, other than group strength for the resolution of group conflicts.

Thus there is in Dahl's calculus no reckoning for the moral worth of a particular project, merely the relative strength of the different groups involved. Dahl's aim is that bargaining should take place within a framework of consensus about the proper conduct of politics: hiring lawyers to dispute over contractual obligations instead of hit men. What might threaten such a consensus, however, is the perception of some parties that the whole political machinery is loaded against them. That for example, success in obtaining group demands is a function of several variables distributed in an arbitrary manner, such as economic power, access to information, and contact with politically influential and articulate persons. Indoctrination in the values of polyarchy is supposed to ensure that the members of the less fortunate groups do not enjoy such a perception.

Theoretically Dahl's pluralism, in contrast to Schumpeter's elitism, represents a more subtle attempt to solve the problem of a disenchanted and politically immature populace. The aim is that citizens shall make a ready transfer from their belief in the equity of polyarchy itself, to their belief in the equity of a particular result of policy formation. Dahl, then, certainly does not neglect the idea of citizenship as an aim of education, but orientates it towards the status quo, by the inculcation of consensus norms. It is reverence by all for the rules of the game, which is the quintessence of

citizenship in Dahl's polyarchy.

The whole notion of citizenship would doubtless be an anathema to Schumpeter. Insofar as there are citizens in Schumpeter's democracy, their role is limited to an occasional endorsement of a clutch of policies, usually on a quinquennial basis. Given that Schumpeter proscribes political activity for the vast majority, apart from the former events, he would presumably acquiesce in a curriculum which gave a smattering of drama, art, and sport, rather than any sort of political education. I have mentioned previously the very basic questions which arise from the stark Naturalistic position Schumpeter occupies here. (22) A rather different alternative here from Schumpeter, would be to follow the Economic Democrats, and turn politics into a utility commodity, with consensus, in the form of support for democracy, achieved by presenting it as a long run preference function, and particular policies as short term preferences. The difficulty with this position, and it is surely one of the reasons why a theorist like Dahl leans heavily on indoctrination, is that the long run preference for democracy may empirically be functionally dependent upon short run utility curves for particular policy objectives.

Though it appears intuitively that an Economic Democrat ought to favour citizenship as an aim of education, it is also apparent that the prosecution of such an aim may put an immense strain on the political system. For since to the Economic Democrat, democratic political structures are to be explained in terms of getting people what they want, then presumably an important aspect of citizenship is knowing how to get what one wants from the political system. Now it is clear, I think, that content for such a programme as the above can be readily prescribed, but it is not clear that the system could fulfil the demands placed upon it. For there is a limit to the resources which the community has to dispose of, and if the pressure

on those resources increases, because of improved citizen articulation, there will ultimately be a fall in individual utility.

Now an Economic Democrat such as Downs, might reply that an important aspect of an education for citizenship would be the presentation of a long run preference for democracy, so that adverse changes in individual utility functions were counterbalanced by an overall commitment to the democratic system. I have already stressed the difficulties inherent in maintaining this overall preference for democracy. (23) If the latter is to be effective for each individual, they must not merely experience disutility at the thought of democracy dissolving, but also must not perceive that to sustain democracy does not require the active support of every citizen. In many cases this will amount not so much to adopting certain practices, as refraining from others. Thus a citizen may acknowledge that if wholesale bribing of public officials occurred this would constitute a threat to democracy and as such represent potential disutility for citizens. But he could also argue that providing only he, or only a few citizens, were to bribe public officials, democracy, and hence his long run preference, would still largely be satisfied, and he would have significantly raised his short run utility function.

The more extreme exponents on the market wing (24) could reply with an additional ploy. They could argue that on their model, long run adherence to the democratic political structure could be effected by including within an education for citizenship publicly efficacious but irrational sentiments in favour of democracy. For example, they might cultivate and encourage obligations and sentiments towards democracy in individuals, which they consider wholly unrealistic and naive for an individual to entertain in relation to his political role in a democracy. Yet such a course of action might be highly efficacious in terms of preserving the democratic political structure

in the face of highly fluctuating utility functions. The rational individual for these theorists, is the one who perceives that democracy continues in spite of what he does rather than because of what he does. It is not he, but the naive and deluded citizen, with a grossly inflated view of the importance of his role in the political structure, who in fact supports and sustains democracy.

All this I think bequeathes a conceptual problem to the theorist here. It seems that education for citizenship consists at least in part in the initiation of individuals into norms held to be publicly efficacious but also irrational. That is, they would be learning that which was deemed in relation to each individual citizen to be palpably false. To maintain itself such a society would deliberately propagate that which is untrue. The inculcation of false beliefs, whatever else it amounts to, cannot be a process of education. (25)

Given the connections discussed earlier between politics and education, it follows that for the market theorist, a public education is an enterprise of utility. It follows that the latter does not prohibit the democratic elitist from advocating a severely intellectual curriculum for a few, or permitting the indulgence of a minority of select schools, financed by private money, but of course qua utility they would only be for a few, since the system itself requires only a few leaders. We cannot challenge the elitist on the grounds that his intellectual curriculum negates the utility function of training leaders for he can readily reply that a training in mathematics, latin and literature amounts to appropriate preparation for political leadership. The argument would then hinge on what amounted to a suitable preparation for leadership and degenerate into a largely empirical exchange. It seems implicit in the elitist position that he is committed to a 'high culture' view of politics

with a self-justifying axis. The latter is a logically necessary condition for a democratic elitist, since otherwise his leadership would have to be continually verified by the vast majority of citizens, and his limitation of popular control to the endorsement of one elite group of leaders rather than another, would be purely arbitrary fiat. It is the elitist claim that the populace simply do not know what they are doing in the political sphere, that constitutes his high culture view of politics. It would be absurd to pretend either that such a group would support education for citizenship on a widespread basis, or that their opposition to widespread political involvement would not lead them to favour some aspects of the curriculum more than others, and these not directly related to politics. Critical thought would be the prime antipathy to the democratic elitist, challenging as it does the kernel of his high culture view of politics.

One effect of this position would be ultimately to divorce men from involvement of a non-instrumental kind in the political realm. If the voter in an elitist democracy is restricted merely to the endorsement of party policies, and is meant to keep out of politics, his involvement is intentionally held at an instrumental level. Not every voter may perceive his role in such a way, but empirically it is the case that any attempt to extend his activities beyond registering approval or dissent in an election would be to exceed his 'proper' place. It seems that an education for citizenship, logically must concern itself with the role of the citizen though clearly it is likely to include other aspects of the political system. In limiting the role of the citizen to an endorsement of policy bundles only, education for citizenship would be disseminating an instrumental approach to politics for the mass of the public. The fact that some voters might perchance equate such an act of voting with far more grandiose considerations, perhaps on a level

with the irrational members of the economic democrats' polity, does not negate the logical point that the function of the citizen communicated in schools, issues from intentionality and is therefore a necessary, not merely a contingent, feature of education within an elitist democracy.

I have already shown that problems about perceived and prescribed citizen roles are not peculiar to the elitist. (26) I want to make one further point by suggesting that this whole relationship within market democracies between private irrationality and public efficacy, is asymmetrical. It is important from the point of view of education to notice that the irrational bolstering and support of the democratic process by some apparently misguided voters, is not reciprocated. Though some voters are prepared to construe their commitment to democracy seriously, as a matter of obligation, and loyalty, their endeavours are insupportable within the norms of market democracy. For the values of market democracy are essentially instrumental and therefore do not feedback via the educational system any commendation for behaviour of a non-instrumental kind. Of course the prescribed curriculum is only one of several influences upon voter behaviour and personal values. But to the extent to which conduct outside the purely instrumental is neither reinforced by the curriculum nor by any results accruing directly from voter actions, the non-instrumental aspect of politics will tend to diminish.

Pluralists are not exempt from this charge. The group which participates to further a radical cause in which it believes, but with the prospect of only small gains if any, renders a bonus to the pluralist machine by supporting the very claims of pluralism to be an open society. Yet pluralists are opposed to anything more than incremental change in their exposition of public administration. (27)

The pluralist thus has an insidious bonus. His theory of social change decries radical reform, yet the existence of attempts at the latter is efficacious in labelling pluralism an open society. Though citizenship is a wholly instrumental undertaking for the pluralist in that it is merely for the pursuit of preferences, within indoctrinated norms, yet, perversely, the pluralist benefits from some deviant groups participating in politics.

iv. Market Democracy and the aims of education

I have already discussed citizenship as an aim of education in market democracy. Are there any other plausible aims? On the basis of the discussion of market democracy in this essay it would be unsurprising to find utility emerging as an aim of education. The latter obtrudes at various points into government publication on education. (28) In one recent study, Robin Barrow takes the psychological state happiness and (29) elevates it to the status of a value, a guiding principle for society, education, and the individual in liberal democracy. In addition, happiness is equated with emmeshment in one's work. The postulation of happiness as a key value both makes for an insecure foundation for democracy, and leads to results for the individual which are not necessary features of a democratic society, and some of which might be deemed morally repugnant. For example the selection and training of individuals for work roles at the age of thirteen onwards is not an empirically necessary condition of democracy. Further there are serious problems about happiness as an aim or indeed the aim of education. It has already been stated elsewhere that education is not a necessary path to happiness, for many uneducated people are perfectly happy. (30) It is also concerned with having expectations of life that are matched by circumstances and it is the attempt to achieve this that leads the massive orchestration of education for work in contemporary

literature.

The postulation of happiness or work enmeshment as a key value (31) is incompatible with the ideal of the dignity of man, which is itself central to moral democratic thought and therefore to that extent incompatible with democracy. It further seems that such a society in which happiness as enmeshment was the supreme value, would not be educating its citizens, but socialising and training them. (32) It is true too that public discontent (33) will have a tendency to be stifled at source in the face of a determined enmeshment policy. The latter entails a ready identification with work, an institution whose norms it is logically possible to be critical of. Enmeshed citizens, however, are not critical citizens, they are by definition contented with their work role. Given the priority of contentment with work, and the role of the educational system in harnessing citizens to their work role: given also that some work roles are extremely limited in the range of cognitive and conceptual demands they make from the occupant of the role, the result seems to be an output of persons from the educational system who largely relate judgements about the norms and practices of society with judgements about work. In this respect it seems that a policy of enmeshment nullifies the moral aptitude of people and weakens the possibility of a literate body of citizens. The coup de grace to this whole policy is that the allegation of excessive state interference, a chestnut of conservatives and liberals, applies here to their own number. For it is hard to see how the pursuit by schools of worker enmeshment can issue in anything less than state organization and planning, if not plain direction. It is true too that Dahl's polyarchy with its wholesale indoctrination of the young suggests an encroachment on individuals' lives of greater moment than the mere institution of legislation designed to afford some measure of social equality.

The naturalistic ethic of market democracy lends itself also to

the postulation of a preparation for work as an aim of education.

An argument such as 'all men have to work, therefore all men ought to be prepared for work' has an incipient appeal to a market democrat.

A less stark position can argue simply that the aim of education is to fit pupils to be useful members of society. But this is

platitudinous until we know the society in question. Mary Warnock argues that: "To be prepared to some extent for work is an educational need." (34) She tackles the issue on common-sense grounds:

"Common sense at any rate inclines us to think of education as a preparation for life: and of life as better if the people living it have roles to fill, useful things to do." (35)

Warnock's proposition that education should reflect the values of existing society, neglects the fact that the values of society are various, and it is not clear that the preservation of society is equivalent to the preservation of all those values. Indeed I shall be suggesting that it would be preferable to have the values immanent in a moral conception of democracy, rather than those of market democracy. This is not to say that schools should entirely neglect skills and performances applicable to work, it is rather to suggest that the naturalistic and utility base of market democracy will not permit work to be examined and considered on a rational basis. Rather it seems that under a market democracy work might readily become the aim of education. The values immanent in a moral conception of democracy are not at present reflected in the world of work. Warnock's position is essentially similar to that of Barrow in that she is asking for the ready acceptance of the work values of industrial capitalism and the preparation of children for work roles therein. (36) Work again is the chief embodiment of the status quo and preparation for work the principal aim of education. For the individual who has passed through such a process of education, the values of work would not be open to rational

inspection. We eventually discover why it is that for Warnock work activities are so ameliorating:

"We value them because we want to be in control of things, on however small a scale, and it is a source of satisfaction to be so. For to be able to control or adapt things is to exercise our freedom. Work is therefore a proof of human freedom." (37)

In Alan Silitoe's novel, *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning*, it appears that the lathe operator's freedom consisted in flights of fantasy and anticipation concerning excursions entirely outside his work. Warnock does not attempt to show how a production line worker can be in control of things, or obtain satisfaction in placing a bolt regularly on a chassis. Where is the freedom for the worker on an incessantly moving line, unless it be found in stopping it, by some clandestine means, on a regular basis? Again the comment applies that this makes for an insecure foundation for democracy. The critical citizen is sacrificed in favour of the status quo.

Warnock attempts to preserve the freedom ideal by arguing for imagination having a place on the curriculum. But Warnock makes no distinction between imagination and fantasy. Her acceptance of the values of capitalism leads to the negation of imagination. She declares of work and imagination:

"I have related these two values by arguing that each in a different way is to be seen as a matter of freedom, or indeed as a contributing part of freedom. For the ability to work is plainly the ability to be an active agent, to change things rather than just let them happen. To work is to control rather than be controlled. On the other hand, the imagination is the precondition without which any freedom is possible. It is the means by which a future can be envisaged, which is different from the present." (38)

There are two possible alternatives: either Warnock is following a highly stipulative definition of work, which is merely assumed, and/or

she does not wish to refer to the majority of workers in industrial capitalism. The distinction which might apply here is that between work and labour, adumbrated by P. Herbst:

"Labour is contingently related to its product. Artifacts of the same kind may be produced by radically different productive processes." (39)

Thus Warnock may construe labour as being an inappropriate caricature of the situation of the worker in industrial capitalism, but if this is so, she nowhere substantiates it. The point of Herbst's distinction is that on his view, imagination is possible in relation to work but not in relation to labour.

"Work is conceived to be a species of unalienated action, labour is activity tending to alienation. In order to work well a workman needs to love or value that at which he works." (40)

Because Warnock denies any attempt to modify capitalism, then insofar as imagination is encouraged, it seems inimical to any enmeshment with work for the reasons I have recently given.

In practice the market aim of work appears more cautiously in government publications. The D.E.S. points out that:

"Education plays an important part in strengthening the foundations of our society, including its economic basis." (41)

But it has also institutionalised this:

"In July the Department issued a circular letter to all Chief Education Officers setting out the part which schools can play in the industrial strategy and inviting them to review, and if necessary revise their arrangements for school - industrial liaison." (42)

This trend of bridging a merely contingent separation between school and work has gathered strength. In a recent consultative, the suggestion is made "The Secretaries of State consider that substantial attention should be given at the secondary stage to the relationship between school work and preparation for working life." (43)

It is suggested that one of the aims of education should be:

" - to help pupils acquire knowledge and skills relevant to adult life and employment in a fast-changing world." (44)

It must never be forgotten, as I insisted earlier, that liberal democracy is a compound of moral and market conceptions of democracy. Thus vocational considerations appear unobtrusive in government papers because in the aims of education as a whole, they are complemented with moral aims. But we must not allow this seemingly innocuous combination to lull us into a false sense of security. One must ruthlessly enquire into the moral aims which a thorough-going market theorist could consistently endorse. Given the notion of market democracy sketched so far, a moral education in market democracy seems a limited exercise. Thus if the moral aims of the market conception come to the fore in liberal democracy certain conclusions can be drawn. On the elitist model one might conjecture that for potential leaders, moral education might approximate to an inculcation of the character of Locke's English gentleman, with a breadth of experience of what we might term 'culture' and an impregnable sense of where he and society are going. This of course would be reserved to the few, but for the rest, pace Locke, the most that it seems logically possible to achieve is an ethics of belief. For to go beyond this, to encourage autonomy, a sense of inquiry, a demand for reasons for institutions and practices, seems ipso facto to exceed the basic premise of democratic elitism viz. that most men are incapable of determining their future in relation to a political and social macrocosm.

In fact of course this is exactly what happens when attempts are made to introduce moral education into other market educational considerations. Its emphasis is status quo: moral education is character training, and the good character is one adjusted, i.e. conforming to the norms of the social and economic world which greets him:

"Thus, if at a school there were a way of developing in children a good character - this would be to look ahead to the rest of life. It would conform to the general aims of education on which we have so frequently insisted." (45)

On her side Warnock has the logical point that:

" - to be morally good is to have a certain sort of character not a certain sort of ability - ". (46)

But her construction is that to be morally good is to be as society would have one be. It has already been argued that in a thorough going market democracy the images prevalent in society are wholly restrictive. (47) If there is a moral education in market democracy, it is deterministic and self congratulatory, ultimately self-stultifying. It appears now in any case that moral education should be an addition to core subjects, along with health education, preparation for parenthood, and an adult role in family life. (48) There are good reasons I think for suggesting that a character training subservient to the norms of society is the acme of moral education in market democracy. Indeed in this suggestion there lurks the principle of happiness, especially happiness as enmeshment which we have encountered before. (49) I must reiterate that I am aware of the logical point that character training must have a social basis insofar as there are linguistic and ethical presuppositions which are only intelligible in the context of social life. But this is not my criticism of this brand of moral education. My point is rather that whilst linguistic and ethical presuppositions are logically necessary to any conception of a social self, that is the self as a social actor, I can find no conceptual or empirical reason for the further inference that the particular images of current social life must themselves, without exception, be endorsed as good and right. The latter can only arise from elevating a contingent property to the level of a logical

truth. For though some form of social conception logically must figure in the education of character, it does not follow that its endorsement as the form of social life should also occur.

The prime difficulty for the market conception is that the latter will indeed tend to happen because the naturalistic ethic of market (50) democracy is geared to the images, desires, and aspirations of the present and immediate. This is not merely apparent in the strongly political material of these theorists, though clearly it exists there. But it is apparent also in the search for stability within society and the championing of utility for that end. This applies to Downs, Riker and Tullock with their emphasis on human action as the mediating function between wants and their satisfaction. There would, however, be little difficulty in extending it to Dahl and Schumpeter, for the former advocates polyarchical indoctrination because it maximizes happiness and the latter could well argue that the trouble with people is that politics makes them unhappy. Indeed, happiness is the panacea for the market democrat if we follow the implication of the market view that all desire is for happiness, and all action is motivated by desire. (51)

There is no such thing as a motivating 'ought', rather it is the thought of my own happiness which prompts me to act. This position in turn sheds further light on moral education and work roles in such a society. It is logically possible for men to engage in rational reflection about their own role in society. The lack of a meta-value principle in society, whilst not a causally sufficient reason for engagement in rational reflection about one's role, does seem to be a logically necessary one. For though under the aegis of the supreme principle of happiness I may engage in rational calculation about my station in society, my duties and responsibilities, I cannot engage in rational reflection about the same, since to do so would be to call into question the worth of the principle of happiness. There is an insidious psychological twist to the latter, which follows from the stipulated

importance of happiness as a psychological principle in explaining human action. That is, there would be something odd about my wanting to engage in rational reflection about my station in society. That is because happiness on the market model is not merely a moral principle but functions also as a synonym for the psychological state of homeostasis. Any sign of a desire for rational reflection on the moral plane, as opposed to rational calculation, is also then an indication of a psychological disequilibrium, which in turn is morally undesirable.

The juxtaposition of happiness as a value and happiness as homeostasis leads for example to the ready identification of the desire for equality as a symptom of a fundamental psychological disequilibrium. The desire for equality, that is, is in reality a psychological disturbance which can be remedied by ensuring a more perfect match between an individual's skills, dispositions, and experiences, and his work roles. If the latter is achieved then the desire for equality, which like other desires arises from a fundamental state of disequilibrium, will cease. It is this identity between happiness and homeostasis which is the antecedent to the slide towards happiness as a supreme value principle.

It is hard to resist the view that for market theorists, happiness as an aim of education, is equivalent to maintaining homeostasis. Conflicting ideals and forms of life leading to rational reflection about societal institutions and goals are clearly out of court, threatening as they do the principle of happiness. Homeostasis is best maintained by preserving rather than removing existing inequalities. Hence education is likely to be highly selective with a curriculum differentiated for different grades of schooling. An education for market democracy entails both a firm commitment to the production of an appropriate supply

of labour for industry and the possibility of rational calculation for the happiness of the individual. The former entails a ready acquiescence in the demands of industry which may entail the bulk of the schools population attaining only a very limited repertoire of skills and no proficiency in evaluating the aims and methods of industry itself. I have already argued against any synonymity between rational reflection and rational calculation. (52) I am happy, however, to extend the argument further and proceed with an equivalence relationship between the two. Even in the case of the equivalence relation, it is a necessary condition for rational calculation concerning my role, that I attend to reasons for being what I am. Whilst it is logically possible to feel happy after rational calculation concerning one's role, it is empirically by no means certain that this would be the result. Indeed, the possibility of rational calculation suggests a degree of detachment from one's immediate environment that hardly seems possible in the case of an individual educated under the aegis of homeostasis. For the possibility of rational calculation in relation to a role presupposes comparing that role with other roles in order to judge how better or worse off one is. If we abandon the presumed equivalence between rational reflection and rational calculation, and revert to the former, then it is difficult to see how the worker who is also trained to be a happy worker, can have the necessary conceptual facility to indulge in rational reflection, the first requirement of which is to examine the role objectively.

v. Market Democracy and the Curriculum

Market Democracy does have some broader implications for the curriculum than simply education for citizenship. I have suggested that in a market democracy political enterprises are enterprises of utility. I want to venture an important argument here that activities on the curriculum, normally deemed to be of intrinsic worth, (53) will

be devoid of any instrumental support in a market democracy.

The latter may seem an outrageous comment initially, since to suggest that some activities are of intrinsic worth, is ipso facto, to argue that no further justification for their pursuit is necessary. There is, however, a fallacy here. For to say that certain activities are of an intrinsic worth says nothing about how such activities are to be provided, to whom, and in what proportion to other activities. That is to say that an activity is of intrinsic worth, is still not to say anything about its provision or distribution. What we are claiming when we say that an activity is intrinsically worthwhile is that the reasons for pursuing such an activity are to be found only within the parameters, axioms, and precepts of the activity itself. But what we are also talking about and are concerned with in relation to the formal curriculum is the matter of planned, intended learning experiences. It is thus a further question as to the mechanics of distributing those planned experiences and I see no reason for insisting that an activity that is intrinsically valuable cannot at the same time be included within the curriculum on instrumental grounds. I can see no logical reason, that is, for arguing that because reasons for the pursuit of the activity are internal to the activity there cannot also be other reasons for pursuing the activity. Even if it were true that all reasons for pursuing the activity were internal to it, the presentation of the activity for pursuit by others and in competition with other activities seems to amount to a set of circumstances manifestly external to the activity. For though an activity may be of this nature it cannot of itself tell us how far it should be pursued, how often, when, at what age. I must emphasise that I am not trying here to make any novel claim about the concept of the intrinsic, simply to employ the concept as it stands along the lines of existing educational literature. Predominantly this involves literature and history rather than metalwork and craft.

I would therefore argue that instrumental arguments can be adduced for allegedly intrinsically valuable activities. For example, we might acknowledge that mathematics is a subject of intrinsic worth, but also argue that it is useful for an individual to be able to cost out purchases, assess how much wallpaper he requires for a living room, or the cost of a new carpet. The point about these arguments is that they are contingent on what is thought to be useful or desirable for people in a particular society to know. They are not located within the activity itself. Yet they are potentially important for the curriculum since the latter is a reflection of the norms of a particular society and not an unchanging immovable structure. Because the pursuit of *English Literature* is held by its converts to be intrinsically worthwhile says nothing in itself about the extent to which it should be provided. It seems that a thorough-going market theorist can readily and plausibly argue that such an activity must take second place on the curriculum in favour of let us say "the world of work", since he is reflecting the value of utility which is the concern central to his society. It will not help the literature enthusiast to meet the market theorist on the same ground by suggesting that literature also affords utility. For the market theorist in planning the curriculum may be considering the utility to society of work-related activities and argue that these activities afford greater utility in this respect. I do not want to pursue a rival utility conflict, but merely point out that in advocating utility the literature enthusiast has implicitly recognized an instrumental dimension to curriculum provision. If there be any doubt that the latter is an instrumental argument, one need only point out that the literature enthusiast can hardly concur with the suggestion that it is utility he is pursuing all the time and not literature!

In fact of course market theorists will take up different positions, that is they will use different instrumental considerations, depending on their own particular persuasion, pluralist, elitist, or economic.

The most interesting variant will be that adopted by the elitist for whom politics itself is an esoteric activity, though not necessarily one with an intrinsic justification. The elitist may hold that for the majority curriculum such activities cannot be given first priority on the curriculum, (a) since such activities are necessarily difficult for most people perhaps because they involve restricted (54) linguistic and conceptual properties or because they involve the criticism of and reflection on different ideals of life which are inaccessible for most people, and (b) most people in society have to earn their living by pursuing routine and elementary skills which take most of their time to master and these vocational requirements should self-evidently come first. Of course there would be no prohibition on elite schools to teach this to potential leaders. It is possible too that a pluralist might require such activities to remain a low priority insofar as they might encourage reflections antipathetic to the norms of pluralism.

If I am correct in maintaining, (a), that such activities can legitimately in the matter of provision be supported and opposed by instrumental arguments, and (b), that a market polity, because of its inherent value paradigms of utility and the status quo, logically must supply instrumental arguments for educational provision, the implication is not merely that 'intrinsic' activities are potentially unlikely to receive much provision on a 'majority' curriculum, but that such a grasp of these activities as is likely to occur, is likely to be devalued for its holders, by the whole means-end ethos of market democracy. Its lack of an immediate "pay-off", its impotence in finding jobs, its conflict of ideas with current norms, its recondite nature, will find no compensating reinforcement for its student. Its low status within public currency, peer group, and sub culture will stunt its pursuit quite as much as an inferior place on the formal curriculum. The very fact that such activities are public, i.e. within the educational system, does not isolate them from

political considerations, but renders them vulnerable to cost effective measurement and all the conglomerates of a market administration.

Ironically the instrumental argument for the provision of 'intrinsic' activities proves a very poor weapon for the market theorist who intuits that poetry is superior to pushpin. For if all enterprises are enterprises of utility the market theorist who favours poetry must set about the dubious empirical exercise of defending it on grounds of utility. It is ultimately my contention that the moral conception of democracy can marshal much stronger arguments for 'intrinsic' activities (55), but it is probably right that I should consider here the most serious attempt to marshal arguments within a utility calculus, for such activities J.S. Mill considered the whole problem of the compatibility between activities of intrinsic worth, and a societal ethic of utility. Mill wanted to save his principle of utility from the attack that it cannot and does not allow for the dignity of man. He declares that: "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimating of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." (56)

Clearly it is compatible with a utility principle to recognize some kinds of pleasure as more desirable and more valuable than others, but only on the grounds of producing greater happiness! Mill attempts to avoid this conclusion by the introduction of the terms quantity and quality. It leads him inexorably to the moral democratic conception of dignity. The reason is that the notions of quantity and quality alone, will not do the work Mill requires of them. Of course it is plausible to argue that a short experience of one pursuit may produce greater happiness in aggregate than a more lengthy experience of another

pursuit, but upon analysis this merely translates to the conclusion that the brief experience produces a greater quantity of utils than the latter. There is no objection to the notion of quantity here, providing only that quantity is equivalent to "produces a greater number of utils in a shorter time." Essentially what I am trying to say is that the principle of utility is a concept necessarily geared to effects; it is not a property which inheres in the subject matter itself, and by which we may distinguish one experience as more worthwhile than another in respect of its form, structure, use of imagery, excellence of style or whatever.

Since Mill is striving for a distinction based on the latter lines, he has ultimately to abandon the principle of utility for another value in the assessment of pleasures, namely that if all, or almost all, who have had experience of both sorts of pleasures, prefer one, that one is the more desirable. In particular, this is how quality in pleasures is to be decided on.

"If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far out-weighting quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account." (57)

This position appears compatible with an elitist such as Schumpeter, since the appeal is to those who are competently acquainted with activity. However, it is not yet apparent, though Mill eventually intended this, that such enjoyment should be popularised. It is in attempting to save the principle of utility that Mill enunciates a principle of dignity which takes him beyond the market conception of democracy and links him at this point with the moral

conception of democracy. The latter principle arises in Mill's distinction between happiness and contentment.

"It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify." (58)

Dignity it seems for Mill, is a feeling or capacity for feeling which men possess in proportion to their higher faculties. It is an essential part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong such that nothing which conflicts with it could be an object of desire to them. It is this notion of dignity that the extreme market wing legislates out of their model of (59) political behaviour. Mill desperately strives to include it, but he does not save his position very much here. If we allow his premise of dignity, it only leads him into inconsistency, for if I have this sense of dignity, am I thereby exempt from contributing to the general happiness? Unless Mill can show that the greatest amount of general happiness will be generated by following our sense of dignity, he places the being with higher faculties in an impossible position, for to contribute to the general happiness he can confound his sense of dignity. For the one compelling 'ought' and 'right' which Mill will allow is contribution to the general happiness. Yet it will be a purely empirical matter whether the objects of the general happiness will be in conflict with dignity or not; indeed Mill seems implicitly to recognize that they will be. One low pleasure may generate a much greater amount of happiness than several high. We do not have any

general principle which will protect the "dignity" which Mill apprehends. Moreover, there seems no compelling reason why a man must necessarily prefer the higher to the lower pleasures. Mill wants to rest his case on the recorded opinions of all who have experience of both sorts of pleasure. The pleasure which they opt for is the most desirable pleasure. Mill's argument here is essentially circular. To experience both sorts of pleasures requires a being "capable of the higher pleasures - ". (60) This being, however, because of his capabilities, requires more to make him happy -. Hence the lower pleasures are not able to satisfy him. - he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence." (61) Thus the lower pleasures cannot provide the enjoyment to him that they yield to the gourmet or the professional seducer. Mill has simply stipulated that the one needs higher pleasures. The rest of his argument merely confirms his stipulation.

Mill's argument here is persuasive in that we do intuit a capacity for higher pleasures to some beings and that we further intuit that some pleasures are more desirable than others. The difficulty is that Mill wants to sell this proposition solely within the bounds of the principle of utility and:

"irrespective of any feelings of moral obligation to prefer it - ". (62) (i.e. the higher pleasures). He wants to root this proposition in a feeling, "a sense of dignity". (63)

Mill is in fact trying to make a subjective impression do the work of a moral principle. Resting as he does on the principle of utility, Mill can only save the situation by claiming that the higher pleasures are to be preferred, because those who have experienced both sorts of pleasure have preferred them. This, however, will not do. Not merely because, as argued above, the superior being has an inbuilt preference for higher pleasures, but also because, to succeed in his

plea, Mill has not only to show that such pleasures are desirable, he has also to show that they are desired, and desired to the extent that they will contribute more to the general happiness than the lower pleasures. What in essence he tries to argue onto from this position is that since such pleasures are regarded as preferable by the cultivated, the dissemination of character improvement amongst the majority will lead to a like preference, and hence a greater amount of happiness.

I do not at this point want to follow Mill into the relationship between a moral conception of democracy and his belief in the dignity of men, though as I have suggested, that logically is where his aspirations lead us. (64) Whatever the merits of Mill's attempted defence of utility, it is worth noting that the different market variants of democracy cannot empirically conform to his model of the political process. Though it is true that elitists are logically bound to concur with his preference for a cultivated minority, they will not share his belief in the possibility of ameliorating the majority by such a diet. A high culture position properly understood maintains the efficacy of two-culture systems and the folly of attempting to rear the populace on conceptions, modes of thought, and criticism, inherently elitist. For the crude economic democrat, ameliorating the masses is a highly questionable exercise for politics, and one best proscribed from political practice. Where the market democrat parts company from Mill, is in divorcing a majority of men from involvement of a non-instrumental kind in the political sphere. It thus excludes an important dimension of man recognized by thinkers from Aristotle to Green. If such involvement is either irrational or inconceivable, such labelling will do much to denigrate these projects in the minds of new generations. It will do much, too, to debar the presentation of conflicting ideals in education, and

different views on man and society. Long term endeavours which do not have an immediate pay-off will be problematic. It is arguable that for the majority the attempt to master literature, history and the arts, will be in disrepute.

vi. Concluding remarks

That happiness should finally emerge as the overriding aim of education in market democracy is entirely consistent both with the view that education is a moral enterprise in market democracy, and with the point that the very ambiguities in the concept of happiness enable it to serve all three variants within the market conception of democracy. It may be equated with the utility of the economic democrat pursuing private interests in a minimum state, the deluded pluralist who believes the system is equitably processing his wants and the employee in elitism who enmeshes with work. Market theorists make the crucial move from happiness as a psychological principle to happiness as a moral principle. (65) But it is fallacious to argue from the fact that everyone always and necessarily desires his own happiness, to the conclusion that everyone ought to desire his own happiness. In terms of the aims of education this leaves us with the consideration that we ought all to aim at happiness, since happiness is what we all desire. I have tried to suggest that this bequeathes a number of problems to education, not least the thorny problem of the relationship between pleasure and happiness. (66) For Plato some pleasures were clearly undesirable (67), happiness was to be identified with the exercise of man's rational nature. (68) But the development of man's rational nature is, as Mill saw, the fruit of education. Yet how on the basis of happiness as an aim of education, are we to tackle the problem that typically a great deal of drudgery is incurred in the development of man's rational nature?

There is moreover the point that the evanescent character of happiness, especially the sensation of feeling happy, gives rise to formidable problems in educational policy. If for example a policy of selection is commended with happiness as our ultimate principle, then our judgement must be determined by considerations of future happiness, i.e. the anticipated happiness which work enmeshment will bring; or is our judgement determined by the happiness which actually accrues when vocational placement has occurred? How can we be sure that a different distribution of placements would not have secured greater happiness? There is also the thorny problem of the distribution of resources for education. Suppose it were possible to measure happiness, and we were able to calculate that an increase of resources into the creation of more sixth forms creates as much happiness as the same increase of resources into remedial education. How could we make a rational choice between them?

It seems that the market conception of democracy creates more problems than it solves. The appeal to a rational nature within individuals implicit within the moral conception of democracy was ridiculed by market theorists. (69) But the incipient naturalism of the market case not only contains conceptual difficulties, but empirically threatens the survival of democracy. If the attack on the moral conception was initially aimed at its metaphysical underpinning, the dispute has widened significantly, largely to the disadvantage of the market theorist. Its effect on education has been discussed in this chapter. It is now time to discover whether the moral conception can do better.

NOTES AND REFERENCES CHAPTER IV

1. See Chapter I, p.7
2. Political concepts within mainstream democratic theory such as the Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, the Sovereignty of the Legislature, simply do not appear in Dewey.
3. By this stage Idealism had waned in its influence upon Dewey. Some consideration of the link between Idealism and modern schools of thought in education is found in White J.P., and Gordon P. *Philosophers as Educational Reformers*. R. & K. Paul. 1979.
4. Note the part played by political ideas in:

Barrow, R. *Plato, Utilitarianism, and Education*. R. & K. Paul. 1975

Peters, R.S. *Democratic Values and Educational Aims in Teachers College Record*, February 1979, Vol. 80, No.3
5. See Peters, R.S., *ibid*
6. The blanket use of the term liberal democracy should be abandoned. in favour of an examination of the two rival, market and moral, conceptions of democracy. If this course of action is followed, greater clarity will be reflected in the aims of education.
7. See Barrow, *op.cit.*
Also, Warneck, M. *Schools of Thought*. Faber. 1977

Warneck, M. *Education: A Way Ahead*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1979

Gordon & White, J.P., *op.cit.* is a notable exception to this trend.
8. See especially this chapter, section V, on the implications of the market view and the curriculum, and chapter V, section II on the implications of the moral view and the curriculum.
9. See Chapter III, p.122
10. Steintrager, J. *Bentham*. Allen and Unwin. 1977., p.44
11. *ibid* p.102
12. Barrow, R., *op.cit.*
13. See Chapter II, pp. 96-99
14. See Chapter II, p.86

15. Mazlish, B. James and John Stuart Mill. Hutchinson. 1975. p.84
16. c.f. Chapter II, p.90
17. Hobbes, T. Leviathan (ed. Oakeshott, M.) Macmillan. 1962. p.80
18. ibid p.134
19. See Chapter II, section IV
20. Nozick, R. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974
21. Barrow's adoption of happiness and status quo enmeshment in his work., op.cit., leads me to identify him as a market theorist.
22. See Chapter II, section II
23. See Chapter II, p.87
24. See Chapter II. The discussion of Riker and Ordeshook. p.94
25. See Chapter I, section I
26. See p.194, this chapter
27. See Chapter II, pp. 74-75
28. See the reference to the D.E.S. papers, p.209
29. For recent work on happiness in education see Dearden, R.F. Happiness and Education, in Dearden, R.F. Hirst, P.H., Peters, R.S. (eds) Education and the development of reason. R. & K. Paul, 1972
30. See Peters, R.S. op.cit.
31. This is explicit in Barrow, op.cit., but one might refer to Warnock's position as "future enmeshment".
32. On socialisation and training, see Chapter II, section II(b).
33. This is a general empirical consequence in market democracy whichever variant we follow. See also my discussion of the difference between market democracy and the utilitarians over discontent, this chapter, p. 193
34. Warnock, M. Education: A Way Ahead, op.cit., p.6.
35. Warnock, M. Schools of Thought, op.cit. p.128
36. It may be objected that Warnock does discuss moral education at some point in her work. Essentially however it seems that for Warnock moral education consists in a character training suitable for living in future industrial society. See p.211 this chapter.

37. Warnock, M. *Schools of Thought*, op.cit. p.145
38. *ibid* p.170
39. Herbst, P. *Work, Labour, and University Education*, in Peters, R.S., ed. *The Philosophy of Education*. Oxford. O.U.P. 1973., p.60
40. *ibid*
41. *Progress in Education: A report on recent initiatives.*, D.E.S. H.M.S.O., 1978., p.15
42. *ibid*
43. *A Framework for the School Curriculum: Proposals for consultation by the Secretaries of State for Education and Science and for Wales.* D.E.S., 1980. p.8
44. *ibid* p.3
45. Warnock, M. *Education: A Way Ahead*, op.cit., p.80
46. *ibid*
47. This chapter, p 218
48. *Framework*, op.cit. p.8.
49. This chapter, p.206
50. On the naturalistic ethic of market democracy. See Chapter II
51. See Chapter II, p.109
52. See this Chapter, p. 212
53. I am not here attempting to elucidate the meaning of the "intrinsic". I equate it broadly with those who hold that certain kinds of knowledge are valuable for their own sake: Coleridge, T.S. Eliot. I am centrally concerned with matters relating to the distribution of such studies on the curriculum and not the nature of the studies themselves. The meaning of the intrinsic is discussed in: Cooper, D.E. *Illusions of equality*. R. & K. Paul. 1980. p.57
54. These properties are restricted in the sense that they entail abstract and conceptual features inaccessible to the limited vocabulary and perceptions of most people.

55. These arguments of course would still be instrumental arguments, but they are not bound to the value of utility in the way that the market theorist is. See Chapter V, Section IIa. The weakness of the market theorist here is not that he has to use instrumental arguments, for so does the moral theorist, but that he has to use instrumental arguments of a very narrow variety.
56. Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism (ed. M. Warnock). Glasgow: Fontana. 1962. p.258
57. *ibid*, p.71
58. *ibid*, p.260
59. See for example Downs in Chapter II, Section IV
60. Mill, *op.cit.*, p.260
61. *ibid*
62. *ibid* p.259
63. *ibid* p.260
64. But this point is developed in Chapter V. p.²³⁸
65. This is especially true of Barrow, *op.cit.* In theorists such as Downs and Riker, utility undergoes a logically equivalent process. I grant of course that happiness and utility are not synonymous, though market theorists do not make the distinction explicit, nor I think would they want to. For it is difficult to see what the reaction of Downs, et.al., would be to the comment: "I took the course of action which yielded the greatest utility for me, but I was not happy with it." My view is that for market theorists the two terms are synonymous, and in general that is the usage I follow here.
66. See my discussion of Mill, p. 219
67. Plato, Republic (transl. Cornford) pp 306-307
68. *ibid*,
69. See Schumpeter is attacked on classical democratic theory in Schumpeter, J.A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 1952

Chapter V - Conclusion - Taking Moral Democracy Seriously

i. Introduction

The focus of this chapter is knowledge and its relationship to the moral conception of democracy. A number of topics are discussed including some further attention to the relationship between the moral conception of democracy and education, the implications for the curriculum, for vocational aims and for policies on education within a liberal democracy. The latter items are not exhaustive of the possible educational implications of the moral conception of democracy. They exclude for example implications for the Universities, the media, and to a great extent economic institutions. I recognize that there may be important implications for the latter, but I am bound to be selective to some extent in the issues I take. In addition, I have so far considered the relationship between market democracy and education, the curriculum, vocational aims, and happiness, and the presentation of the moral democratic position on these same issues seems apposite although they will be presented somewhat differently within the context of this chapter.

The moral conception of democracy entails the rejection of that species of naturalism which takes empirical constraints, such as supposed lack of cognitive ability, and promotes them to the status of a value judgement. Moral democratic values entail, as I have tried to show, the education of individuals, and this provides the means to ameliorate the empirical constraints operating within the political system. But there are challenges which the moral democrat must face. Whatever and how much knowledge is considered necessary for the individual citizen to possess, the moral democrat clearly has to show that he can meet the problem that conceptual facility varies from one citizen to another and that rationality is a function of conceptual facility.

Moral democrats acknowledge the importance of individual moral choice; revisionists consider this chimerical for various reasons, and have postulated a role for the individual limited to the mere expression of preferences. The difference between the two schools of thought is not a difference about the place of values in political theory, for whatever the revisionists claim to the contrary, it has been shown that their position is unambiguously valuative (2) in its orientation. The controversy over individual moral choice is in the place and kind of citizen function and knowledge within the political system. Democratic elitists reserve policy initiatives to leaders, pluralists to groups, economic democrats to those for whom there is the probability of a net gain over a given resource input, be it time or money. For the mass of the people under market democracy, there is knowledge only of how to endorse leader policies (elitists), or how to secure wants (economic democrats), or the maintenance of an unflinching belief and commitment to the values of pluralism. For the moral democrat, however, knowledge inheres within the critical citizen, and is essentially moral knowledge of the worth of society and its direction.

ii. (a) What should the moral democrat know?

It is now necessary to try and clarify initially the status of the various conjectures about knowledge, in the moral conception of democracy. Are there some things that citizens logically must know, and others whose status is merely contingent?

One way into this issue is to take stock of the proposed connection between education and the moral conception of democracy. It is clear I think that the argument has been that the connection is not merely contingent. Consideration has been given to the political implications of Kant, and the argument was that insofar as

Kant's notion of morality is endemic to the moral conception of democracy, then since the spread of rationality is, on the Kantian ethic, a moral obligation, and since the concept of education entails the intention to develop rationality, then a conceptual link is present here. It was stressed that training (3) was not a sufficient condition for the emergence of a rational chooser, its logical function being that of a paradigm determined concept, rather than an open-ended concept, facilitating the evaluation of the norms and institutions of society. I shall suggest subsequently (4), however, that training has a role to play in the emergence of the rational chooser, insofar as one may train persons to recognize inconsistencies or covert assumptions in the statements of politicians. As far as the concept of education is concerned, I have argued for the logically necessary function of intention (5), and especially that such a function is inherently valuative, deeming some learning to be more important than others. The latter is in turn a reflection of the norms prevalent at that time. In addition, it was suggested that the sort of knowledge considered to be desirable, to be prized, has implications for the form of the political system.(6) In particular, if the knowledge-educated man ideal, be of a highly abstruse nature, then, contingently (contingent on the facts about the average limits of human cognition), given the overwhelming importance of how to live, such an ideal will ensue in an autocratic political system. But, correspondingly, a comparatively low-level knowledge-educated man ideal, will support a democratic political system. Reference was also made to the works of Rousseau and T.H. Green. The former demonstrated the crucial moral importance of education by showing that the citizen consents only where his will conforms to his actions, and it is education which secures that conjunction. For Green, education encapsulates an identity between society and the individual; it actualizes men's potential as moral agents. By giving reality to the capacities of will and reason,

education is an expression of the Common Good.

It is true that it has been argued elsewhere that education cannot be one of the: " - logical conditions of a democracy, or one of the conditions whose instantiation is entailed by the existence of a democracy." (7) It has also been argued, " - that there could be beings, in other respects like men, except for the possession of certain innate ideas and capacities constituting the knowledge of how to operate a democratic system." (8)

One immediate difficulty with evaluating this objection is that it contains no distinction between different conceptions of democracy. I have not used democracy as an undifferentiated term, and I have argued for education as logically necessary only in the case of the moral conception of democracy. A concept is, as Wittgenstein pointed out, part of a form of life. His analysis of language games has shown just how complex a seemingly innocuous concept like game can be. The moral conception of democracy presupposes for a full appreciation, terms like respect for persons, integrity, justice, autonomy, dignity. These are in their own right, terms which are essentially social; they make sense only against a societal field, with a subtle interplay of socio-linguistic forces. The essential point about humans is that they do not instantly arrive at the possession of such concepts, but acquire them over a comparatively long period of time. If there are such creatures as has been suggested in the references quoted, it is difficult to see what difference this can make to the relationship between democracy and education since my own work is concerned with human society and democracy as an organization of human government.

If education is one of the conditions whose instantiation is entailed by the existence of democracy, it remains to be seen what the citizen should know and whether the dissemination of such knowledge is feasible on a wide scale. It is a logically necessary condition of

democracy, that it be possible to change the government at regular intervals (9), through the actions of a vast majority of the adult population. It would be a negation of the democrats' own values not to equip succeeding generations for the performances of an act that was a logical condition of democracy. Of course, emerging generations may prefer not to exercise their rights in this matter, but this does not alter the fact that potentially it is a decision they face as citizens in a democracy. To fail to provide for such a decision would imply a lack of respect for persons. It would be to fail to put a person in a position where he understood the significance of what he was doing. To educate for democracy in a minimal sense, is to show this relationship between the citizens and the government of the community.

Since Rousseau, moral democracy has recognized the importance of a participatory society. Philosophical advances along the lines of self-assumed obligation auger (10) for an education which prepares individuals to grapple with their own more immediate social, political and economic surroundings. For G.D.H. Cole, men would obtain a free society by becoming self governing in their work. Cole argued that it was inconsistent to admit democracy in politics and deny it in the rest of life. (11) Recent trends at least implicitly recognize that work is an important factor in the life of the individual, and that workplace democracy is a moral issue. (12) If we follow the argument that a participatory work place is necessary, the issue arises as to how to equip persons for this. I have already suggested that (13) the concept of self-assumed obligation is the ultimate fruit of moral democracy, with its logical connection with education. I say logical in that conceptions of dignity, promising and rationality inhere in a conscious moral agent. To opt for a society of moral agents, to opt for dignity, is to require a society in which promising, rationality, are purposeful, expressive acts, emanating from coherent conceptual structures in which choice is subject to a conscious

progressive structure. At a minimum this demands the sort of consistency of ranking A, B, C, in order of preference, and when faced with a choice between B and C, opting for B.

Such consistency is not, however, a sufficient condition for a role exceeding that of a passive recipient in the social and political field. Individuals must ultimately, through institutional change be given the opportunity to do more. Aristotle and Mill both appreciated the link between experience and political expertise. (14) People, that is, must be able to engage in an appropriate form of political life, and must be equipped for making choices of a moral kind; i.e. they must be equipped with knowledge of how one ought to live, as well as knowledge for living.

I suggested earlier (15) that the former derives in part, from reflections on intrinsic areas of knowledge. Doubtless it is logically possible to construe such disparate subject areas as cookery and accountancy as candidates for the intrinsic label since they afford opportunities for the application of skill and judgement to a fine degree. But this would be to, in part, make the application of the term intrinsic contingent upon a psychological manifestation and it is the scope for the exercise of reason, judgement, and skill afforded by the discipline, rather than any psychological concomitants to the former, which have I think rightly, attracted attention. In addition, the concepts of cookery, accountancy, needlework, are not constitutive of reflection upon the norms of society or social and political problems. It is true of course that literature and history are not sufficient conditions for such reflection, but they have claim on being necessary conditions which I would deny in the case of the above activities. My point in any case was the logical one that it was possible and legitimate to advance an instrumental argument in favour of the traditional "intrinsic" (16) activities having a place on the curriculum. I now want to advance an instrumental argument from

from moral democracy, for the inclusion of such activities on the curriculum.

In advancing this argument I am following what I have identified as the mainstream view on "intrinsic" (17) areas of knowledge. The moral conception of democracy entails a view about the good society, though the latter is always a matter of debate. The aim of education is to equip men to take part in that debate. My contention is that one tenable view of art, history, literature and drama is that they present a view of the good society, inviting reflection on existing institutions, challenging current cultural norms and preoccupations, raising individual consciousness above the immediate and the facile. It is important to appreciate that the latter statement is not solely a value judgement. Clearly there is room for debate as to what constitutes the "essence" of a particular discipline, and the way in which it should be taught. Nonetheless there are conceptual limits within which the debate can move. We may for example differ about whether history should be taught in the light of the present or not, but I think we have to agree that history involves the past. More important, perhaps, what I have referred to as the mainstream view on the "intrinsic" areas of knowledge seems to require that such material is not trivial, simplistic, or facile, but that in terms of the degree of intellectual ability to master it, it be demanding. If, however, the moral conception of democracy entails a view on the nature of the disciplines above, an objector will surely reply that the market conception of democracy also will have equally valid but different complications for these same disciplines. This objection cannot I think hold. Clearly a market democrat may wish to include art, literature, history, drama on the curriculum for the vast majority of pupils, indeed I think there are positive reasons for him wanting to do so. Such activities can entertain, please, amuse, occupy and

distract. But I would point out that to make such functions the sole purpose of including these disciplines on the majority curriculum is tantamount to trivializing them in the terms of which they have been understood in 'mainstream' opinion. Whatever else one may say about them on such a curriculum, one could not argue that they were functioning in the way that intrinsic areas of knowledge have been traditionally understood and characterized.

Insofar as "intrinsic" areas of knowledge, properly understood, invite reflection on existing norms and values, challenge current cultural preoccupations, and contemporary images, and require the lifting of consciousness above the immediate and the fascicle, they cohere with the values of the moral conception of democracy. As John White argues when writing of the moral democrat T.H. Green:

" - for Green and his followers, citizenship and knowledge for its own sake were much more closely connected, since the good citizen will wish his own and others consciousness to be raised as far as possible." (18)

The presentation of alternative styles of life and the reflection on existing past and present styles of life are of the essence of the moral view of democracy. In this respect the citizen becomes an agent, in that he can envisage alternatives to existing life styles and caricatures. From the British Idealists came: " - the insight that morality is inextricably political: the moral man is the citizen of a political society, his education fitting him to become one." (19)

The activities of literature, history, art, and music, present the possibility of communicating life perspectives freed from contemporary needs and culture. To teach people merely the skills required by the economic society of their time, is not to teach them to be critical of the parameters and values of the society in which they live. Indeed it is ultimately to lead to the devaluing of

such activities, as I suggested earlier. But the significance of the moral conception of democracy is that its exponents, " - show abundantly the centrality of morality as an aim, or even the aim of education." (20) An over-arching moral aim for the emergence of critical citizens presents the strongest instrumental argument for the inclusion of worthwhile or intrinsic activities on the majority curriculum. The 'universal' tragedies of Shakespeare, the Lawrentian encounters with consciousness, and the putrifaction of industrialisation, the conscience of Zola, the rasping morality of Brecht, and the revelations of Camus, are themselves social perspectives on which moral agents might sharpen their teeth. There is too the fact that such disciplines have much to say about relationships amongst men, whether they be crudely utilitarian, or genuinely empathetic. For the moral democrat then, such disciplines will appear on the curriculum for the majority, not merely to entertain or to amuse or divert attention from social and political considerations, but to promote the values of the moral conception of democracy. For G.D.H. Cole, democracy: "was more than a political principle; it was a moral relationship among men. Democracy entailed respect for each individual as a moral subject, and sort to express each person's will and creativity in as many activities as possible." (21) J.S. Mill also echoed this view when he stated: " - what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be." (22) With such a heritage the moral conception of democracy presents a sympathetic climate for the fostering of the "intrinsic" disciplines. For such activities will be devalued and besm'arched to the extent that their values are not respected in any particular subculture, and I have tried to show that for the majority in market democracy, it is utilitarian considerations which will be presented as appropriate values for life.

Mill of course attempted to support the higher pleasures on the basis of a utility calculus, and I dismissed his argument, (23) but I suggested that a defence might be possible under the moral conception of democracy. Instead of being devalued by the utilitarian ethic, the higher pleasures will be the prime vehicle for the moral aim in society. As such they will have a greater prestige in education in a moral democracy, where the emergence of the moral agent is a greater priority than in market society. For the higher pleasures have the property not merely of utility for a particular individual, but of transforming the latter's perception of himself and society; they contain the necessary conditions for challenge, reflection, and criticism of a person's own values and those of society.

There is, I grant, much work to be done on the connection between traditionally intrinsic areas of knowledge, their key concepts, and their relationship to particular political systems. This I suspect warrants a thesis all to itself and is one point where new work in the philosophy of education ought to begin. Part of the task certainly would entail some elucidation of what is meant by the "intrinsic", but there is also the further point as to how far the values of a particular society entail the inclusion of certain subject areas on the curriculum. I have tried to show that such connections can be made and to sketch them in the case of the moral conception of democracy. Reference has been made to disciplines such as history, literature, and art, and subsequently the place of vocational skills on the same curriculum will be discussed. I want to give one further example in this section of entailment between the moral conception of democracy and curriculum material.

It is arguable that Religious Education is a candidate for including on the curriculum because it offers a vantage point on the choices which societies and individuals might take. It presents

a detached perspective on one form of life with implications on matters of social and political goals as well as relationships between individuals. It is thus a factor which the moral democrat would not want to exclude. But there is the further point that religion is a part of the value system of moral democracy. I have discussed in Chapter III, the importance of religious ideas in forming the democratic organization of the independent churches. Since the moral conception of democracy is concerned with both the values and procedures, religion seems an important component. To fail to introduce pupils to religion, would be to fail to introduce them to one of the guiding principles of the moral conception of democracy. It is true of course that it is by no means the only guiding principle, and it is arguable that the values of Kant are at least as important in explaining such basic tenets as equality and respect for persons. So that when reference is made to Religious Education it has to be interpreted as including a specific corpus of instruction in Moral Education. Let me stress that I am not here advocating a pure Wilsonian treatment of Moral Education, aimed at turning out budding moral lawyers. Doubtless a measure of competence in assessing arguments for consistency and testing them for fallacies is a necessary portion of expertise for the critical citizen, and I acknowledge this elsewhere. Rather I am concerned here with two further necessary connections between the moral conception of democracy and that amalgam of subject matter consisting of New Testament, Kantian moral principles, It would I think help to keep these points distinct.

1. I have argued consistently that the most fruitful elucidation of the concept of democracy is one which takes account of historical shifts and nuances in its parameters. (24) This is not to assume what one sets out to elucidate. It is a matter

of opting for a particular methodology in the same way in which logical positivists opted for a particular methodology in their use of the verificationist principle. To be a citizen in moral democracy it is tautological to say that one also ought to be conversant with the values of moral democracy. Yet these values are to be found in the history and development of moral democracy.

2. If men are to cultivate moral dispositions, the latter logically are not created in a vacuum. That is, for a disposition to be a moral disposition it must function in the light of a moral code. It may be analytic to say that all societies require moral dispositions but it is certainly logically necessary for the moral democrat, requiring as he does that all the members of the society endeavour to have a view about the political and social macrocosm. A moral code is ready to hand for the moral democrat within the values from which the moral conception of democracy developed. Thus, though the moral aim should predominate in the disciplines I discussed above, of history, literature and art, it should also be concentrated specifically within Religious/Moral education for the purpose both of creating some facility with moral argument, and for developing moral dispositions.

The above arguments I think make the position of Religious Education on the curriculum a good deal stronger than its position in relation to the curriculum of market democracy where it may be taught either for purposes of social control in elitism, or because it makes men happy. In both cases its situation is provisional. For the market democrat, if to teach something else rather than religion is to produce greater utility, or create greater social cement, then religion must give way.

ii) Moral democracy and Political Education

Political education will clearly differ between moral and market democracy. It will turn again on what the citizen is expected to know which in turn depends on the role of the citizen. Both moral and market democrats implicitly recognize that there is a problem about what role should be given to the citizen in a democracy. I have criticized the recommendations of market democrats in this respect in some detail. (25) According to Plamenatz, (26), there is something appropriate about citizens not knowing very much outside their private interests since their function is different from that of leaders. The implied suggestion here is that it is not rational for citizens to know more than leaders, a position entirely acceptable to Schumpeter. The problem is what it is that leaders are supposed to do that differs from what a citizen has to do. The answer will differ according to the particular conception of democracy adopted. As we have seen, (27), for most market theorists, leaders are supposed to process preferences, and citizens are to present various interests to leaders. For moral theorists, leaders are to (Kant) further the spread of rationality, to (Green) provide sufficient legislative support to enable the individual to realize himself, to (Mill) provide a beneficial influence on the masses. This rules out men as mere objects of utility, it includes epistemic rationality (28) and political participation. We may encapsulate this in the idea of the critical citizen.

It is axiomatic to my contention throughout this essay that judgements about the ends and purposes of life are moral judgements; that is, they are inescapably connected with what men ought to do. I have rejected a characterization of the human predicament which treats such judgements as merely commensurate with satisfaction or utility; such judgements will of course involve purely technical considerations, but that is another matter to be examined shortly.

For the moment, we should not lose sight of the further moral argument for equipping citizens with the facility for making broad judgements about the ends and purposes of society. It was an important plank in the moral democrat's case that there was an objective public interest (29) which should command the attention and respect of subjects, and which should motivate over and above their private interests. To choose for the public interest implies an assessment of policies quite outside the immediate effects upon oneself, and requires knowledge of the alternatives available. Policies have an effect on people and institutions and may be compared in their effects by those on whom they fall. But the comparison - or rather its frame of reference is a complex function. It may be assessed from the perspective of utility, or moral worth, or both. It is a necessary condition of the moral 'public interest' concept that a policy can be assessed from the point of view of its moral worth. Further, that in appropriate cases account may be taken not merely of one's own utility, but the effect on others of such a policy and a measure taken between the two. Further, that a policy can be seen as a function of a broader moral perspective of a particular political party.

There are a number of empirical objections which may be relevant here:

1. Some policies are not the result of lofty moral programmes but merely adopted for reasons of expediency.
2. Some policies are not the result of lofty moral programmes but merely the outcome of interest-group compromise.
3. It is not possible for most citizens to appraise policies in other than a utilitarian perspective.
4. Even if (3) were erroneous, it is problematic for citizens to be equipped for other than a utility appraisal.

I think from an empirical point of view (1) and (2) are correct. However, even if it were the case that empirically all policy alternatives were the outcome of pressures from Interest Groups, as pluralists would favour, this would not of course negate the fact that some policies were the outcome of the application of political principles to current problems. But my main point is that even though (1) and (2) are correct, the fact that some policies are evolved in this piecemeal expedient fashion does not logically preclude a moral assessment either of such policies themselves, or of the broader consideration of the political parameters which permit such compromises. My point is though, that it is the moral democrat who wants to insist that such an appraisal is indeed a necessary condition of democracy. The market democrat wanted to preclude this. For the moral democrat the political system is inextricably part of the moral life. As such, even if it were the case that all political enterprises by a government, were enterprises of utility, they could at least be perceived as such, as one of several values. By contrast, for a market democrat, utility is not merely one value amongst many, but appears to have the status of an axiom. The market democrat is thereby robbed of any standard by which he might judge the utility calculus. For Schumpeter, it appears that political enterprises cannot be perceived in moral terms at all, by the masses, unless he is prepared to equate infantile behaviour with moral judgement. For Dahl the norms of polyarchy are to have the status of axioms, and for Riker utility is axiomatic. It is for this reason that under an education in market democracy, there is no room for a rational appraisal of political values.

In the moral conception of democracy, even if it were true that all policy alternatives represent merely the outcome of pressures

from interest groups, as pluralists would argue, this would not preclude the assessment of policies by a vote cast in terms of principle. Thus supposing that two political parties put forward a major programme of taxation revision, the one embodying a steeply graduating tax, the other with an almost uniform rate of change for all earning levels. Even if it were true that the rival programmes were solely the outcome of a judicious assessment of the wishes of the parties' supporters, it would still be possible for a voter to choose between the policies in terms of moral principles, such as the principle of fairness. The discernment of principles from amongst policies does in this way represent a higher level of morality than the mere opting for one policy rather than another on the basis of private whim or fancy. The reason is that the discovery of the principle requires objectifying the values. The latter exercise requires an evaluation by citizens, and an informed public reminiscent of the ideal supported by J.S. Mill. The notion of the worth of evaluation, criticism, and the pursuit of principles, is implicit in moral democracy. To maintain an intention to educate for the latter, is not to contemplate the prospect of being committed to pumping into a child an endless procession of inert facts, but it is to be committed to achieving an conversance with alternative styles of life in the shape of alternative clusters of values.

iii.(a) Is Moral Democracy possible?

It might be objected that if the critical citizen is to be a reality educators would be obliged to keep men in tutelage until they were fifty, as Plato counselled, before they had marshalled enough knowledge on which to base their judgements. There is the challenge that it is empirically beyond the realms of the possible for one person to be competent in several fields of knowledge. For I have

in my comments on market democracy, clearly rejected a characterization of activities in the political field at least, which treats judgements about the latter as merely commensurate with satisfaction or utility. What then can be done to meet the objector who urges that people cannot possess say knowledge of two rival economic policies?

There are, I think, a number of points to be made in reply.

1. To possess knowledge and make choices between alternatives on the basis of that knowledge, is not necessarily to be an accredited expert within a given field. Thus a pupil may know about the policies of Bismark and Napoleon III, and make a judgement as to whether Bismark did or did not manouvre France into war in 1870 without being an accredited expert on Franco-German relations 1866-1870. Competence would not amount to an acquaintance with primary sources but rather an appreciation of the issues involved, an evaluation of the record of events of that period.
2. We are it is true, accustomed to assume ignorance amongst people on matters of economic policy, and it is arguable that the close links between economic policy and political affairs makes an understanding of the former all the more important for the emergence of the critical citizen. We cannot argue here, however, that ignorance of economics is simply due to the esoteric subject matter. For what is evident is that schools have in the main neglected the teaching of economics, as indeed they have neglected the teaching of politics. In the consultative paper on the curriculum, 1980, economics and politics, unlike employment, are not mentioned in the aims of school education, neither do they figure in the 'core' areas in the structure of the curriculum. Finally, they are not mentioned in the various suggested additions to core areas. A View of the Curriculum in the HMI series, acknowledges that social and political

education has not been widespread, though it suggests that:

"Schools do quite commonly now offer pupils a choice from history, geography, economics;" (30) though they admit that: "It is however questionable whether, in view of the way these subjects have developed over recent years, young people will derive enough of what they need to know and understand from a choice of only one of these." (31)

In the past scant attention has been paid to equipping pupils with the relevant concepts for economics. To appreciate the distinction between interventionist neo Keynesianism and market monetarism does not require cognizance of The General Theory of Employment Money and Interest, or Friedmanite controversies about the direction of causality between the level of income and the Money Supply. Both theses may be distilled to an elementary form analagous to the way in which the course of history may be distilled from primary sources.

3. It might be argued that what is worrying about (2) is the matter of value judgements. Is not the problem with economic policies that we have to make value judgements between them? In the first place this is clearly true of history as well. To opt for the thesis that Bismark manouevred a sick, dominated, and deluded Emperor into war in 1870 is itself to make a value judgement. What this objection amounts to is a market protestation that teaching ought to be value-free. I have already tried to counter this suggestion by pointing out that the market theorist is value-loaded in his approach. (32) Of course the choice between Keynesian and Monetarist policies will not be value free. It is the choice between unrestrained entrepreneurial activity and government intervention to mitigate against the harshest effects of the market. But the moral democrat has no cause to apologize for the intrusion of values, for the critical citizen is the outcome of moral deliberation.

4. If it is possible to form judgements at the elementary level of a particular discipline and apply these judgements to political affairs, a further objection might be put that within particular disciplines and by implication within political affairs there are some questions which are purely "technical" questions, which most people are not competent to adjudicate on. Now there could be difficulties over what we mean by purely "technical" questions here. In other words the term might refer either to issues in which value judgements logically do not arise, or that whilst they do arise the information on which such a judgement is based is by its very complexity inaccessible to most people. As an example we might consider the difficulty over the reliance to be placed on a particular document in history. What are we to make of Bismark's own accounts of his policy-making? The judgement of professional historians is that Bismark deliberately wrote in such a way as to reflect the greatest diplomatic mastery to himself, and consequently primary sources from his pen must be treated cautiously. (33) Intricate issues doubtless lead to such a consensus, but the conclusion is one that may with feasibility percolate down to an elementary level, issuing in the more cautious portrayal of Bismark as the master of European diplomacy 1860-1885. In other words to appreciate the conclusions of professional historians does not itself require a professional historian.

But what of examples where there is less of a consensus, and where there is a direct connection with political affairs. Are there not purely technical questions at issue between rival schools of economic thought? Granted that we can feel the effects of rival economic policies, say in terms of more or less government intervention, and that this is a possible vantage point by which to adjudicate between them, should we not also be concerned with the extent to which one is more effective in controlling inflation or alleviating

unemployment, for certainly politicians may choose to emphasize those aspects. For example, it is a fundamental tenet of monetarism that public borrowing crowds out private enterprise (34) and therefore the former ought to be decreased. The latter is of course a value judgement. The first part of this example is a highly technical issue, posing as it does serious problems of controlling variables. For within any given period of time, where it might be argued that public borrowing crowded out private borrowing, the low proportion of private borrowing may be due to a third factor such as high stocking levels, poor expectations, even scarcity of brash entrepreneurs.

What this points to is the necessity for an informed public to be aware of the limitations of correlations, the problem of causality, and the vexed question of controlling variables. Politicians love statistics in that they may bask in the ignorance of the recipients of those statistics. It is therefore that the concepts of correlation and causality seem vital candidates for a moral democratic public. To appreciate that X does not necessarily vary as it does because of Y, but maybe because of an unaccounted for Z, does not seem any more demanding, and indeed less demanding, than to appreciate that King Lear is a play about integrity. The former provides in itself a test for the limitation of popular political appeals. The discernment of value judgements, too, seems a necessary ingredient in Mill's informed public. The citizen must be able, for example, to discern the value judgement implicit in the claim that inflation must be tackled before unemployment.

The existence of technical questions, in the first sense in which I dealt with them, that is where they are devoid of any value questions, is of some interest. If we take it that greater equality of wealth is desirable, it is a technical question as to whether in fact that can be achieved by a wealth tax. But the latter is not

the concern of the citizen, directly at least, the former proposition is. To design a wealth tax so that it does in fact equalize wealth, rather than fragment it within the same family, is a technical issue. It is the principle of wealth equalization itself that should be within the compass of the critical citizen. I reject any suggestion that such topics have been tried and failed. All the evidence points to the absence of a social and political education in British schools, and within colleges of education. (35) It is a glaring omission.

iii.(b) The Moral Democrat and work

Much has been written concerning the necessity for citizen enlightenment and involvement in macro-political goals and values but the issue remains of whether a similar involvement would be possible at work. There seem to me to be at least two distinct issues here: the one is concerned with whether existing work institutions largely those of industrial capitalism, could be modified sufficiently to accommodate a power structure compatible with morally autonomous employees for whom work was one obvious and immediate institution for rationalization and reform, and secondly, the issue of how and whether pupils could be prepared for participation in work institutions. I want to make it clear that I am primarily concerned with the second question, rather than with the first. I recognize that the first issue is logically prior to the second and clearly therefore a participatory model of work organisation will be apparent in what I am saying. What I want to resist is a detailed discussion of the first issue and thus I do not discuss in this essay whether industrial capitalism is compatible with a participatory work structure. It seems far more coherent, bearing in mind the general trend of this essay, to consider how preparation for work differed within a moral democracy from that adhered to within the market conception of democracy. It would differ primarily in endeavouring

to place the worker in such a position whereby he could evaluate both the internal aims and processes of his own work institution, for example, which contracts might be accepted and which refused, and the external property of work as an institution, for example, whether and to what extent private enterprise should flourish within society, how acceptable modern methods of selling are, to what extent modern motivational practices within industry are manipulative. There are both technical and valiative questions here. To be able to discuss which contracts should be accepted and which refused a worker needs to be able to recognize a contractual situation, and to have a yardstick against which to decide whether to accept or reject it. It should be apparent from what has been said previously that the decision may entail moral considerations, where for example it originates from a repugnant political regime. For this the critical citizen should be well prepared. Implicitly I am rejecting any view of decision making which construes the latter as a function of entrepreneurial flair. There is no necessary reason why the latter should coincide either with workers long term interests or the moral values of society. To recognize that such commercial situations as the above have a rational basis is itself to remove a barrier to worker participation in work. For this is to recognize that reasons can be given for and against a decision, and that such decisions can be discussed. It is to pave the way for a rational discussion. Indeed we can state that without the concepts of marginal cost and contractual liability the employee could not perceive any rational basis for decision-making. (36) The former concepts appear to be a logical necessity for understanding here. The latter achievement is precisely what the moral conception of democracy seeks for men in their work situation, viz. ensuring that they have the concepts to perceive the nature of the situation in which they are placed.

There will of course be other knowledge required, of an empirical order. That is, the latter will depend on how the work is organized for a particular employee: whether he is building cars, and how much of the car he is building. It seems to me that such matters can be left to shop-floor instruction, rather than be deliberately imported into the curriculum.

Let me however apply the points about an understanding of the work role to a further example. For though someone may agree about the logical necessity of the understanding of marginal cost and contract law for a private sector employee they may require to know how one should tackle the situation of the public sector employee. What for example must the librarian know in a participatory society, and how does it differ from the worker in industry? It is a contingent fact about the librarian's job that it is unlikely to involve decisions on whether to accept or reject a contract for the supply of goods on the basis of private cost. But the activities of a library are subject to both legal and financial constraints. They depend upon funds from public authorities and act under a statutory duty to supply books to the public. The key to a rational appraisal lies in an acquaintance with the legal and financial constraints themselves, for it is they which determine the parameters within which the activity takes place.

A rational appraisal of an individual's work situation requires then an acquaintance with those concepts which reveal the constraints acting upon the particular enterprise. The moral conception of democracy would therefore require that legal and financial concepts be given a place on the curriculum of schools which at present they simply do not have. It is no coincidence that such concepts are only accessible through higher education, and are reserved to the policy makers in an enterprise.

On the broader aspect of work as an institution, by contrast with work roles, the moral conception of democracy also has something to say. There are a host of broad issues which ought to concern the critical citizen. Issues of the ethics of some methods of motivation, hours of work, the balance between work and leisure, how large a share of the economy should fall to private enterprise, the merits or otherwise of advertising. These issues would complement an acquaintance with the work role and parameters of the individual employee's situation. The objective is a rational appraisal of work as an institution rather than a particular work role. How might this be achieved, and why might it be described as complementary? Motivation would serve as an example, as part of the repertoire needed for a rational appraisal of work. The individual would not merely require the concept of motivation, but also to know the social purposes and manifestations of motivation. (37) The latter would alert the individual to the possibilities inherent in modern motivational research of manipulating persons to produce more by "identifying" more closely with the aims and objectives of work. (38) It might be objected that individuals might still prefer to be placed in the situation of crude "Taylorism" and simply settle for higher earnings. But there is of course a difference between settling for this, knowing and seeing it for what it is, and merely responding to a work motivation without knowing why.

The above demonstrates that moral democrats certainly would not neglect the world of work. But it is of course radically different in its educational implications from the market democrats who would merely turn the school into a preliminary factory experience. For the moral democrat, work is an institution to be subject to rational scrutiny. Those who advocate autonomy in one sphere of life and

not in another are producing a recipe for cognitive dissonance and eventual disillusionment.

I have tried to show that a rational scrutiny of work will entail both the application of moral principles to work practices and contracts, and the application of decision-making techniques to suggested policies and problems, by employees. Both these points I think are logically necessary conditions for a rational appraisal of work and follow from the idea of the critical citizen. The question might be posed as to how far such conditions can be realized within liberal democracy, or how the latter might accommodate them. Before indicating how that question might be answered I shall have to say something more about the relationship between liberal democracy and the two conceptions of democracy I have been considering.

iv. The Enigma of Liberal Democracy

Though it is fashionable now in philosophy to proceed from a stipulated "initial position" (39) and establish logical relations between the former and various other properties and conditions it should have been clear from the beginning that whilst I have been drawing inferences from various propositions, I also have been venturing an historical connection, albeit a conceptual one, between the moral conception of democracy and liberal democracy. (40) Hence whilst I have attempted to establish the moral conception of democracy and its implications for education, it is perfectly consistent with my theme to relate the latter points to liberal democracy, since I have consistently argued that liberal democracy is a hybrid of both market and moral democracy.

In the main, writers within the field of philosophy of education have failed to differentiate between the market and moral conceptions of democracy. (41) Now I have characterized market democracy in depreciating tones, pointing out its inconsistencies, its excessive

instrumentalism and its inadequacy as a secure basis for a democratic polity. How is it then, it will be asked, that the prescriptions put forward as education in liberal democracy have seemed at all credible? The reason for this is that it is the moral conception of democracy that lends credibility and a semblance of underlying structure to the liberal democratic hybrid. At the same time, it is emaciated sufficiently by market considerations to cause philosophers to cast around for some over-arching aim to justify their position. A detailed examination of liberal democracy would have revealed its incoherence especially the defects inherent in the market democratic conception on which it partly relies.

What I am suggesting is that a good deal of progress could be made within the philosophy of education by going behind the hybrid liberal democracy and taking the implications of the two rival conceptions of democracy. In fact what has ensued from an acceptance of this compound is a welter of confusion. In part this failure to spell out the underlying features within liberal democracy may be due to the earlier preoccupations with the concept of education and the belief in its primacy. But I have tried to show that the moral conception of democracy itself provides the underpinning so vital for the justification of much of that concept. Liberal democracy merely covers the competing claims of moral and market conceptions of democracy. The result is a welter of confusion within the aims of education. Hard line market instrumental aims emerge as the radical solution to an intellectual concept of education which appears to have lost its way. (42) But, says the objector, do not competing aims of education merely reflect changing priorities within the social and economic framework? In modern liberal-democracy these differences in aims arise from changing priorities which themselves reflect fundamental contradictions within the liberal democratic

polity. Philosophy of education has in the main been based on a consensus about liberal democracy which is illusory. No attention has been paid to the competing strains within the market conception of democracy, discussed earlier. Nor has much attention been paid to the emergent participatory theory of democracy, emanating from Rousseau through Cole to Pateman, and firmly within the moral conception of democracy from both an historical and conceptual point of view. Yet this division within democratic theory is surely different enough in its implications for education to warrant the attention of philosophers of education. The different implications for the education of the majority between Schumpeter and Pateman could hardly be more disparate!

Where philosophy of education has turned to the political organism, it appears to have been wedded to the typology of Aristotle. The essential features of Aristotle's typology of political systems are those of quantity, staticism, and institutionalism. Such a model is inadequate in the face of dynamic cross-currents of power and utility, which cannot be readily identified with any one institution. How for example could we apply Aristotle's classification to a highly group centred polity when endeavouring to ascertain whether in fact it was pluralistic or whether it was rather highly elitist? In reality modern political systems logically do not have to conform merely to one typology. Empirically, it may be the case that the leaders of Dahl's pluralist groups would themselves represent an elite. Similarly, pluralism could easily flourish within an economic democracy because citizens found that considerable utility was to be gained by functioning as a pressure group between elections.

Essentially what both Aristotle and Montesquieu pursued was an institutional analysis of a polity, whereby for example, the institution of monarchy can be readily distinguished from that of

oligarchy. On the same scale, democracy can be identified with representative institutions, from which individual choice is inferred. Hence philosophy of education has based itself, in part, on an institutional representative polity with an autonomous public. To market theorists go the honours for first showing the inadequacies of such a model. The effect of the welter of confusion is to obscure the value basis of liberal democracy, thereby both prohibiting a judgement about which values might be preferable, and inhibiting an assessment of the conceptual basis of education within such a polity. Though market theorists deny it, their characterisations are value laden, and to neglect value considerations within a democratic polity is to remove its foundation stone. It was no coincidence that serious defects were found in market democracy. The problem with aims such as utility and happiness is that they readily lend themselves to the superficial and the facile; that they reinforce contemporary consumer images at the expense of criticism, analysis, and self-determination. If the principal aim of education becomes equipping pupils for vocational ends, the norms of criticism and objectivity will be jeopardized. The extreme discomfort attendant upon any public statements in education on macro-political values allows, intentionally or otherwise, a much firmer profile for vocational aims. Because, in other words, liberal-democracy is the unsatisfactory hybrid that it is, declarations on social and political education are treated with extreme caution (for some liberals there would doubtless be grave concern about the state having anything to say or do with political education), whilst the immediate and seemingly obvious goal of employment assumes the major role, and of necessity not as an institution or practice which requires critical examination. (43)

All this leads one to expect government publications in education fairly closely identifying with the "needs" of industry,

and this is in fact what happens. 'A View of the Curriculum', declares: "The capacity of young people to profit from whatever opportunities may be available to them beyond 16, will depend heavily on the attainments, interests, and attitudes they possess as a result of the education they have experienced up to that point. Awareness of this is an important responsibility for all concerned with the 11 to 16 curriculum. On the other hand, an excessively instrumental view of the compulsory period of education runs the risk of actually reducing the pupils' opportunities at a later stage, by requiring premature assumptions about their likely futures - for example in highly specific occupational terms - and by narrowing the educational base on which their potential may be developed." (44)

But so tendentious a declaration as the latter part of that statement can easily be overruled by economic malaise. The latter brought, " - a searching look at many aspects of educational policy." (45) Developments such as measures to widen educational opportunities and raise standards of literacy and numeracy, the review of curricular arrangements and the experiments in vocational preparation, " - will give our children and young people a better chance to realize their potential and will equip them better to face the demands of adult life. This is educationally and socially good, it is also economically sound. The active contribution by industry to careers education; work experience, the government of schools and discussions about the curriculum have been successfully fostered." (46)

The ambiguity and indeed predilection for instrumentalism in the above statements reflects an overgeneralized approach to the aim of education in liberal democracy. Though it is acknowledged that when discussing points of substance about aims it is necessary " - to make explicit the values of the society in which education is taking place and then state the specific content of these values that we think need emphasis"; (47) yet I can find no evidence of a

comprehensive attempt to conduct just such an operation with reference to liberal democracy. The result is that we have a characterization of the latter which is unrecognizable to the major schools of thought discussed here. An economic democrat could hardly agree that:

" - because of its highly idiosyncratic character, and because of the large element of luck lurking in its objective conditions, education cannot predictably promote, let alone guarantee happiness." (48)

Again, Dahl could not consistently endorse the point that democracy

" - requires the institutional underpinning of a system of representing public accountability, and freedom of speech and assembly. If these are to be more than a formal facade that can be manipulated by interest groups, something approaching Dewey's passion for shared experiences, together with concern for the common good, is also required to encourage widespread participation in public life." (49) Yet again, an elitist such as Schumpeter could not consistently endorse the call that for those in error, prejudiced, and simple-minded, especially in the political realm; "one of the aims of education is to make them less so." (50)

Finally, neither elitists nor economic democrats would endorse that: "The first priority, therefore, in a democracy is to aim at what L. Kolilberg calls a "principled morality." (51) Nor would any market theorist agree that: "In the socio-political sphere much is demanded of a citizen of a democratic state. He must have a general knowledge of how the political system works, and be sensitive to the social and economic conditions that it has to shape and by which it is shaped. He must be familiar enough with current affairs to criticize policies constructively and to make up his own mind which way to cast his vote. Ideally, too, he should possess the social skills necessary to participate in public affairs at least at the local level." (52) No market theory can justify the point

that preparation for work " - should not be narrow training. It should also serve as a way into the understanding of principles of more general application and as a focus for more general matters of human concern." (53)

It is clear then, I think, that greater clarity between education and democracy can result by spelling out the different conceptions of democracy and the distinctive divisions within these. At present we simply do not have a coherent statement on the above and its implications for education; it is long overdue.

Concluding remarks on themes which have emerged in this essay

1. It is clear that some transmission of norms is empirically necessary for market democrats. Market democracy of whatever variant is logically committed to certain values and the latter cannot be delimited in their effects to political institutions. For education is a function of political and ethical norms; it is analytic to argue that education consists of planned and desirable experiences, and these experiences constitute the subject matter of learning. No market democrat could with consistency reject the enterprise of education, since he also espouses certain values which appear to be necessary for the market political society. Schumpeter for example requires leaders for democracy and these are persons of proven ability. He requires an economic substructure which presumably entails the inculcation of certain skills for the majority of people. But he requires too that people shall keep out of politics, apart from voting, and shall accept this minimum role. Now to keep men out of politics does not imply that they should be restricted merely to the engagement of skills, for it may be that an elitist may include on the curriculum facilities for music, art, and literature merely for their entertainment or 'distraction' value. Resources may be readily available for children to acquire skills in the playing

of musical instruments but not for the development of any expertise in politics. Presumably democratic elitism requires an acquiescent rather than a critical pupillage, so that highly authoritarian transmission of norms seems to be implied. Dahl shares the same status quo values as Schumpeter, but he is prepared to enforce what he understands by democracy by a programme of indoctrination for the masses. For the economic democrat, education should be conducted in a manner commensurate with net maximum utility since this is the value criterion. If education is to be publicly funded this indicates transmission in such a way as to maximize gains and minimize costs. One can only speculate that such a position entails that the maximum quantifiable learning takes place. The return, since it is an economic one, will have to be a return on measurable benefits such as more electricians or plumbers.

2. The moral aims of market and moral democrats are incompatible. Despite the protestations of market theorists to the contrary their theories are value-loaded. Granted that the market theorist has a value, such as the status quo, he is committed to favouring some types of learning rather than others. For Rousseau, Kant, and Green, the presence of a moral imperative to educate is guaranteed by the ethical properties integral to their theories. (54) Assent to ethical propositions such as a necessity to advance the spread of rationality entails the recognition of an intention to educate. For market theorists, education, like politics, is a regulative activity. (55) In the moral conception of democracy, the values of autonomy, rationality, respect for persons, self realization, themselves require that activities, including politics, are not prescribed. In the market model, however, it is arguable that the citizen of Dahl's polyarchy is in an inferior position in relation to political understanding than a member of

Schumpeter's polity. For the latter may always by chance obtain some perspective on politics as a result of events quite outside the educational system. Dahl's citizen, however, will have no chance for a rational appraisal of politics as a result of a previous indoctrination programme.

3. I have suggested elsewhere that market values form an insecure and insufficient base for democracy. An amorphous electorate in an elitist system is fodder for any group which does not play the rules of peaceful competition for votes. An apolitical populace can be harnessed to the designs of a political extremist, simply because they are not in a position to assess his views against any other social and political aims. It is never apparent why Schumpeter's elite should keep to the 'rules of the game'. Dahl's pluralism reeks of an enforced oligarchy. True, men may elect their governments, but the latter is an emaciated watchman, suffocated by the demands of groups. The choice which voting offers is not then a change of policy, for the latter lies with the powerful and articulate groups. The absence of an objective public interest here leaves out the issue of moral rectitude. If the government is elected on a popular ticket in polyarchy and meets the opposition of sectional interests, the only way it can fulfil its role is to mobilise popular support, yet to do this would be to undermine the values of polyarchy itself. Despite their attempt to elevate the values of privatization to the status of an axiom, the economic democrats on their own utility premise, would have to acquiesce in a super despot. No argument is produced to show that utility is indissolubly wedded to private ends.

4. The moral conception of democracy offers a meaningful public morality for all men. The public morality of the market is restricted in Schumpeter to leaders, in Dahl to group leaders, and

in the economic democrats it is subsumed under privatization. There is no logical reason for equating a shared public morality with totalitarianism. Kant arguably offers a sophisticated public morality based on universalizability, yet Kant is relatively conservative in relation to government activity. That this public morality must be a part of education in the moral conception of democracy is not merely a contingent matter. It is necessarily a part of it insofar as education is an intentional activity. But there is more to it than this. Public morality is not merely inter-personal in a logical way, in the sense that we cannot talk of a public morality without referring to relationships and understandings between people. It is also inter-personal in that in the moral conception of democracy the public is meant to be involved in judgements about the distribution of benefits and burdens, power and influence, choice and enjoyment. For the public to share in this morality, in this sense, is also for them to share in government itself.

If we enquire why it is that for the market theorist, men may not share in this morality, the reasons appear weak. They cannot for Schumpeter, because they cannot be relied upon to act responsibly within that morality. But simply because men are deemed to be politically inept, is not a sufficient reason for making the value judgement that they ought to so remain. For Dahl they cannot meaningfully share in that morality, because they cannot be relied upon to accept it, hence it must be made second nature to them. But this is to suppose that the morality of polyarchy is self-evidently right, and beyond question. For the revisionists a public morality is to be privatized into utility maximization. Yet why are we to endorse utility; apparently because it satisfies!

Moral democracies offer a share to men in the public morality. For talk about autonomy, rationality, self-realization, is about men

exercising choices, not merely in relation to their own private wants, but in relation to the benefits and burdens in society, in relation to policies and institutions. But for men to perceive public choices as such, itself requires a social, moral and political education. This is a logical point in that public choices require appropriate concepts on the part of choosers.

5. The thesis I have proposed is stronger than the now fashionable move of making various stipulative conditions around some initial position and subsequently drawing out various implications. I have not simply taken a conception of democracy and discussed its educational entailment. The reason that it is stronger is that empirically the democratic political system in the U.K. contains elements of both market and moral conceptions of democracy.

The above implies not merely the presence of competing aims in education, but also that the aims reflecting the moral conception of democracy may at any time in a liberal democracy be pushed out. Though there are moral aims adhering to the market conception of democracy these do not require the provision of a social and political education. Especially insofar as liberal democracy incorporates the moral conception of democracy it cannot, logically, ignore the cultivation of moral dispositions.

It is useless for liberal democrats to claim that they value the formal principles of equality, such as toleration, freedom of speech, and yet to fail to provide for them in the minds of successive generations. Moral democratic conceptions cannot prosper solely under a utility calculus. If a societal cement is required, and market theorists think it is, the way forward is through the cultivation of appropriate moral dispositions, especially universalizing one's identity. When he reformulated the Social Contract as an Idea of Reason, Kant (56) broke with economic individualism, yet he formulated a touchstone for judging present

legislation. There is no necessary requirement for the grandiose centralized organs of Rousseau in order to secure a perceptible public interest. For men to conceive of themselves as members of the public does not require them to be a centralized public. But it does require some kind of 'relational' dimension to one another, an affective aspect, which may be local rather than national. It is important in this 'affective' aspect that men do not feel cheated by groups and rationally self-interested individuals. A public interest morality would be the standard by which they adjudicated their desires, the triumph of an interest would be an indication of its moral worth.

6. What this suggests is a concern with moral education in macro terms rather than the highly individualist ethos of character training. It is true of course that the former might well include training, but this would be related to assessing the arguments of politicians; to recognizing inconsistencies and fallacies. I have already stressed the importance of an economically and politically literate public, but it is vital such people be rehearsed in how policy proposals are presented for edification, and the limits of such statements. Whilst I have suggested that the critical citizen may be the product of diverse curricula content, it seems necessary that his values and concepts should be sharpened into a political prong by the use of specific political training sessions mentioned above. The notion of the critical citizen is vacuous if such citizens cannot apply themselves to political and social questions. It may be a necessary condition of restoring a greater degree of moral politics in liberal democracy, for future citizens to be aware that rational argument does not always win the day in politics. One step to improving the performance of politics is to know how it works already. Some degree of political training then seems a necessary condition of effective political participation,

and may most conveniently be taught as a distinct discipline.

But I must reaffirm that this is to be conducted in conjunction with other curriculum areas from which the values of the critical citizen derive. Thus in recommending a political training I am not following the market theorist in producing a self-interested lobbyist who is intent on gaining maximum advantage from the system. The idea of a political training is to make effective on the political stage the values I have discussed earlier, it is not a substitute for these values.

It should be apparent from this concluding chapter, that the values derive not from one specific discipline, or set of lessons, but from the several facets of the curriculum. In this respect the establishment of the critical citizen is inseparable from the processes of education in general.

8. On the basis of the relationships drawn between the moral conception of democracy and education certain changes would be required in schools, and in teacher education. The latter changes I think can be inferred on the basis of what is said about the former.

(a) Politics must be taught in schools and not merely on a descriptive "social studies" basis of disparate newspaper articles glued into a scrapbook or truncated chunks of outdated textbooks on central government. I insisted that what was required by the end of schooling was a facility with political argument. It may be that resources must, as I suggested, give ground from the generous support of musicianship to political training and education.

(b) Traditionally schools have had little if anything to do with the teaching of finance and legal studies. A fundamental change on the curriculum would be necessary to accommodate these subjects, but the effect could be modified by legislative provision for employees to continue their studies on day release courses where such studies

would be complementary to any craft or technical training. This provision should also apply to those persons in (a) who were not able to achieve facility with political argument by school leaving age.

(c) What has been said in the thesis must also I think affect the matter of selection in schools. Under (b) above a large section of the population would have access to two disciplines traditionally the preserve of those in higher education. Whilst it might be argued that such studies would not enable them to dispense with qualified lawyers and accountants, it is also true that managers themselves, in industrial capitalism, completing final institute examinations, are not able also to dispense with these professional persons. But whilst trained managers have been acquainted with these disciplines, employees would not be as well. In the pursuit of these disciplines in schools and on day release there would be as a result a greater commonality in the curriculum of secondary schools and to that extent the ease for selection would be harder to make out. It is true too that the post-school functions of pupils as citizens and in work roles would be broadly similar, thus again making the ease for selection harder to make out.

(d) There would in addition to Religious Education be Moral Education and Ethics. Ideally links should be forged between teachers of these subjects and teachers of politics since in the moral conception of democracy judgements about society and its institutions are inescapably moral. This suggestion may seem bland, in fact I suspect it would be momentous owing both to the general absence of political education in schools and to the traditional isolation of R.E.

(e) On the view put forward here of the moral conception of democracy it follows that every teacher is in some sense contributing to the end product of the democratic citizen. This does not however entail

finding an outlaw or an aristocrat in every novel. It does entail that teachers have a perception of their role as one of producing future citizens. Arguably their training has not so far helped them to develop such a perception.

(f) It may be that the present administrative arrangements for the control of education at local authority level may impede rather than enhance the above changes. Some local authorities and governing bodies may not be in sympathy with the above suggestions. Though less than perfect the above arrangements may be helpful in resisting the simplistic efforts of the teacher in (e) above seeking to wholly politicize every item of learning, and the irresistible stockbroker belt P.T.A., insisting their children be told that private enterprise is best.

9. Additionally I think it is clear that there are question marks over some liberal democratic institutions, as a result of the points made here. What the questions come down to is whether the institutions of liberal democracy are rationally defensible structures. Economic and political convenience is not the equivalent of the latter, and it may be that a politically literate mass will demand extensive modifications in respect for example of the ownership of work institutions or the management of policy making in government. The Levellers criticized these grandiloquent institutions the Lords and the Courts and eventually obtained reform. It remains to be seen whether critical citizens will be as successful in relation to those modern sacred cows, the norms of secrecy and the capitalist economy. Neither of the latter two appears to be remotely connected with conditions necessary for a democratic state. If however, liberal democracy is merely a hybrid on market and moral democracy, then the critical citizen appears to that extent to have a prior claim both

logically and historically over the two features above of secrecy and the capitalist economy. It follows from this thesis that the extent to which existing institutions are compatible with a democratic citizenry must remain an open question.

Whatever skills a particular work role may or may not require, moral democracy requires employees with a moral reference point, a factor which cannot logically be subsumed under platitudes about happiness or the needs of industry. Ideally schools should be distanced from such pressures as the latter, lest they work to prevent an objective appraisal of industrial capitalism. A moral conception of democracy would not necessarily work against the adoption and acceptance of hierarchy within post-school institutions, if that practice could be rationally defended. What it would do would be to put such structures on the defensive instead of presenting their various social contrivances as natural to men. The latter would be a definite step forward.

I have suggested that an analysis of liberal democracy reveals that it contains two rival constellations of values which I have termed the moral and market conceptions of democracy. These two conceptions have been examined and found to contain diverse conclusions on the matter of involving populations in the management of government policies. The institutional provision for the change of a government on a regular basis which appeared to be common to the different schools of thought, covered sharp differences in relation to the extent to which provision was made for the electorate to have any control over policy. Within the market conception of democracy alone, differences over the role of government between elitists and economic democrats are considerable.

The concept of liberal democracy is an obstacle to the realization of the vast differences within societies subscribing to statutory changes of government. One consequence of clinging to this model is the failure to perceive that the market wing contains values which do not offer firm support to some of the practices championed by this wing, be it peaceful competition by elites or regular elections. Yet such models are acceptable precisely because they do champion these political practices. Logically the latter along with civic guarantees such as the separation of powers and the right to be heard, survive because of the values immanent in the moral conception of democracy.

Without an explicit statement and acknowledgement of the moral conception of democracy what I have deemed acceptable political practices, have only vague notions of the sanctity of the individual left to justify and defend them. Only by abandoning the liberal democratic hybrid as such and dissecting it into its parts can its ultimate dependence upon the moral tradition, become apparent.

As long as the liberal democratic hybrid is employed in education then logically it is only possible to talk vaguely and in a somewhat contradictory fashion about the aims of education. Thus proposals to improve economic performance by the production and supply of suitably trained labour are mitigated by talk of the life chances of the individual, and the responsibilities of citizenship. Of course one can still proceed in a Rawlsian manner and stipulate a different conditions about a polity, proceeding from there to conclusions about the aims of education and the content of the curriculum. But this is essentially a different game. What I am saying about liberal democracy is that to go behind it is actually to arrive at a different conditions from which conclusions about education may be drawn. My own view is that the latter procedure is much stronger in its appeal for educators than the alternative stipulative exercise.

That this should be so arises from the essential subordination of education to a particular polity, sketched in the first chapter. It means that paradoxically educators can point to properties of a particular polity to argue the case for activities and practices which may be given less than full support by governments, business men, and administrators. To arrive at the moral and market conceptions of democracy is to be able to trace in far more concrete terms the aims and implications for education than is at present possible with the concept of liberal democracy. It is also to appreciate that the moral aim must be predominant.

NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER V

1. See Chapter III, p.171. *passim*
2. See for example Chapter II, section 2
3. *ibid*, p.8
4. This Chapter, p. 264
5. Chapter II, p.61
6. Chapter I, p.9
7. White, P.A. Education, Democracy and the Public Interest, in Peters, R.S., ed The Philosophy of Education., O.U.P. 1973. p.227
8. *ibid*
9. Chapter I, p.38
10. For self-assumed obligation see Pateman, C. The Problem of Political Obligation. 1979. Wiley
11. Carpenter, L.P., Cole, G.D.H., C.U.P., 1973. p.50
12. See Pateman, *op.cit.*
Also, White, P.A. Work-place Democracy and Political Education in Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol.13., 1979
13. See Chapter III, p.158. *passim*
14. See Aristotle: The Politics (Barker) O.U.P. 1948. p.145
Mill, J.S. On Liberty, Representative Government, and the Subjection of Women. P.U.P. 1963 (1912) p.196. *passim*
15. See Chapter IV, section V, *espec .* p.216
16. *ibid*. For my use of the intrinsic see Chapter IV, section V p.214
17. *ibid*. What I say here on the intrinsic does slightly extend the discussion in Chapter IV, Section V
18. Gordon, P., and White, J. Philosophers as Educational Reformers. R. & K. Paul. 1979. p.53
19. *ibid* p.230
20. *ibid* p.231
21. Carpenter *op.cit.* p.50

22. Flamenatz, J. *The English Utilitarians*. Oxford: Blackwell. 1958. p.66
23. For the use of "intrinsic" here, see the earlier discussion on this matter in Chapter IV, p.214 See Chapter IV, section V
24. See Chapter I
25. Chapter II *passim*
26. Flamenatz, J. *Democracy and Illusion*. Longman. 1973. pp 120-127
27. See Chapter II
28. On epistemic rationality see Chapter II, p.91
29. On the public interest see Chapter III, p.149
30. *A View of the Curriculum*. H.M.I. Series. H.M.S.O. 1980. p.17
31. *ibid* p.18
32. See Chapter II, Section II
33. W.N. Medlicott develops this theme, see his *The Congress of Berlin and After*
34. The principles in this particular construction of Monetarism are illustrated in Lipsey, R.G. *An Introduction to Positive Economics*: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 1973
35. Note the use of the adverb "now" in the quote from 'A View of the Curriculum' on p.27 of this chapter. On the state of course in politics in Colleges of Education. See Heater D.B., *History Teaching and Political Education*. Longman. 1974
36. The worker requires to know under what conditions his acceptance of offer for the supply of goods constitutes a contract, and what the consequences of a breach of contract amount to. On the matter of acceptance or rejection of such an offer the tool of Marginal Cost is essential! I refer here to Marginal Cost as an accounting concept and not as it is employed in economics. For example, suppose that a Factory has the opportunity to supply goods for a contract worth £1500
Variable Costs (direct materials, labour) amount to £900
Contribution is therefore £600
Given no alternative contract yielding a higher contribution, the above contract should be accepted.

37. Much of modern motivational theory is of a paternalistic variety. Maslow, Herzberg, and MacGregor are all based on the perceived value of compromise, identity of interest, between workers and management. Successful motivation amounts to achieving greater identification between the aims of the employee and the objectives of the organization.
38. As in 37 above. A succinct account of motivation theories may be found in Handy, C.B. Understanding Organizations. 1976. Penguin
39. See Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice. O.U.P. 1972
Also, Dahl, R.A. Procedural Democracy in Laslett, P., and Fishkin, J. eds Philosophy, Politics and Society. Fifth Series. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. pp 97-134
40. Chapter I, pp 20-23
41. See for example, Peters, R.S. Democratic Values and Educational Aims, in Teachers College Record, February 1979. Vol.80, No.3
Barrow, R. Plato, Utilitarianism and Education, 1975. R. & K. Paul
42. Evidenced by the plethora of attention focussed on the article by Gallie, W.B. 'Essentially contested Concepts in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. Vol.LVI: pp 167-198
43. See for example Barrow. op.cit
44. A View of the Curriculum, op.cit. p.15
45. ibid
46. Progress in Education: A report on recent initiatives. D.E.S. H.M.S.O. 1978. p.15
47. Peters, R.S. op.cit. p.467
48. ibid
49. ibid p.468
50. ibid
51. ibid p.474
52. ibid p.477

- 53. **ibid p.480**
- 54. **See Chapter III**
- 55. **See Chapter II**
- 56. **See Riley, P. 'On Kant as the most adequate of the Social
Contract theorists', in Political Theory. 1973. Vol. 1, part 4,
pp 450-73**

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